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Development banks had almost no involvement in the field of international 
health just a few decades ago, but today they shape the lives of millions of people by 
setting global health priorities and implementing health programs. In the context of 
neoliberal governance, “innovative finance,” and the shift from international to global 
health, key actors and approaches in the field have shifted, and what counts as relevant 
expertise in global health has also been called into question. This dissertation 
examines relationships of power and knowledge in the health work of development 
banks—examining what comes to count as relevant knowledge, who gets to use it, and 
with what social and political consequences. It does so by bringing together 
ethnographic research on two development bank-coordinated projects in Guyana with 
interview and archival research at the headquarters of the banks that finance and 
oversee these projects: the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.  
How do these international financial institutions investigate and understand health 
problems and implement solutions? What kinds of knowledge and values become 
influential as bank staff and consultants negotiate with Guyanese healthcare workers 
and government officials as to what problems will receive priority, through which 
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methods, and who will be served? These are questions about the practice of 
contemporary governance in late neoliberal capitalism, as past international 
enthusiasm for private management of social welfare has begun to transform. 
While international financial institutions emphasize the importance of using 
economic tools and techniques to determine the “best investments” in public health, 
my research has highlighted the very different ways that economic knowledge comes 
to be valued across bank networks—even within a single project. Research and 
operations divisions, for example, have distinct understandings of how tools such as 
cost-effectiveness analysis ought to be used. And while economic analysis has been 
surprisingly absent from operational practice, experts in cultural anthropology and 
indigenous law have played a central role in shaping health projects in Guyana. In the 
process, their knowledges have become entangled with development bank histories 
and logics, and even as these institutions attempt to reform themselves, development 
bank health projects have continued to inscribe state racial codes in the bodies of 
Guyanese citizens.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
ENTANGLEMENTS: EXPERT NEGOTIATION AND POPULAR 
POLITICS IN GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
In May 2015, Guyana inaugurated its first black president in twenty-three 
years. The ceremony was held at the National Stadium just outside of the country’s 
capital city, where military and law enforcement personnel paraded extensively and 
three indigenous dancers encircled the new President to mark his official inauguration. 
The day after the ceremony, photos of President David Granger with his wife Susan 
Granger and the new Prime Minister Moses Nagamootoo emblazoned many 
Caribbean newspapers: the image of these two men of African and East Indian descent 
joined by a woman of Chinese and indigenous heritage was offered as a symbol of 
multicultural unity overcoming Guyana’s previous decades of racial discrimination 
and race-based voting. The primarily Indo-Guyanese People’s Progressive Party (PPP) 
had held control of Guyana’s executive branch for over two decades, but it had finally 
been displaced by a large coalition including historically Afro-Guyanese and 
Amerindian parties as well as former members of the PPP. 
In the weeks after the election, the new government announced that one of its 
first steps towards ending government corruption would be conducting an official 
review of development aid projects. In a meeting with the Regional Vice President for 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) held in Georgetown the following 
month, Guyana’s new Minister of Finance expressed concern about the bank’s 
flagship health loan. Like the new Minister of Finance, the IDB Representative was a 
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Caribbean economist trained in the US and the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
But as the two economists discussed the health loan, they debated about the quality of 
the nutrition program it supported. The Guyanese Minister argued, based on his 
lifelong personal experience in Guyana, that it simply wouldn’t work to ask Guyanese 
to sprinkle micronutrient supplements on their food, as the sprinkling of food additives 
after preparation was not part of “Guyanese culture.” The IDB Regional 
Representative, however, argued that the project was certainly effective in Guyana, as 
it had already received many awards and had been “written up by Harvard” as an 
example of global health best practices. The Guyanese Minister was not convinced. 
He stressed that initial awards did not guarantee successful ongoing implementation, 
and he noted that the new government planned a detailed financial audit of the project. 
Soon after the meeting between Guyana’s Minister of Finance and IDB’s 
Regional VP, the Government of Guyana officially ended the IDB project in question, 
and initiated a new IDB loan to support a different program for maternal and child 
health. Rather than focus on maternal health by offering preventative nutritional 
supplements and supplies, as had the previous project, the new project focused on 
institutional reform. The project framed high rates of maternal death as a problem of 
organizational management: of hospital referrals and the allocation of tasks for various 
levels of healthcare workers. This problem framing has privileged a very different set 
of voices; Guyanese nutritionists had a primary role in the former project, whereas the 
new project prioritizes international management consultants. The new program places 
emphasis on “health system strengthening” in three regions of Guyana deemed to 
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provide the best basis for future “scalability,” rather than targeting women and 
children in the poorest districts nationwide, as had the previous project. 
While these two projects present diverging constructions of Guyana’s health 
problems and their appropriate solutions, neither project turns to the traditional tools 
of neoliberal health reform, such as public austerity, private insurance, user fees, or 
even discourses of incentives or market competition. Nor have these projects been 
planned based on economic evaluation using tools such as demand modeling or cost-
effectiveness analysis, I found through participant observation on these health loans 
both at development bank headquarters and in bank country offices in Guyana. But 
how was this possible, I kept asking myself during my initial months of fieldwork: 
surely these financial institutions, known for their neoliberal rationalities and teams of 
economists, must be making use of the economic tools and market logics they 
otherwise tout, and for which they are so widely criticized by activists and scholars of 
public health (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010; Adams, 2013)? Or had neoliberal 
management here become so purely focused on bureaucratic rationalization, shunning 
its roots in market fundamentalism? 
The reputation of development banks as quintessential neoliberal institutions is 
widespread among academic researchers, development practitioners, and even popular 
media; for over twenty years, activist challenges have garnered mainstream media 
attention in much of the world, drawing public attention to the banks’ practices of 
privatization, liberalization, and environmental degradation (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
Much of this attention has surrounded the banks’ structural adjustment loans, which 
required borrowing countries to implement major macroeconomic reforms aimed at 
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privatization and liberalization of their economies (Kapur et al, 1997; see Chapter 3 
for further discussion). These loans have been a central means of spreading neoliberal 
thought and policy internationally, as they have required and given intellectual cachet 
to policies promoting private management and individual entrepreneurialism as the 
most efficient and effective means of governing (Harvey, 2005; Craig and Porter, 
2006).1 Economists and sociologists alike have strongly criticized these structural 
adjustment programs for undermining social services and leading to increased 
poverty—especially through monetary reforms and major cuts in public employment 
(Sparr et al, 1994; Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 
1998). But beyond economic policy, neoliberal capitalism has promoted the extension 
of economic, business, and market rationalities into ever broader realms, including 
management of the self—where supposedly calculating individuals are made 
responsible for managing their own health and well-being rather than being able to 
benefit from systems of social promotion and solidarity (Brown, 2003; Lemke, 2001; 
Foucault, 2008[1978-9]).  
In light of development banks’ histories in advancing neoliberal reform, I 
began my research with the goal of examining how ideologies of individual 
responsibility, as well as the valorization of market mechanisms and private 
                                                1	Amidst	its	evolutions	and	varied	forms,	neoliberal	theory	has	been	rooted	in	the	assumption	that	individual	entrepreneurialism	and	private	control	are	the	most	efficient	and	effective	forms	of	management,	and	should	be	favored	over	government	intervention.	These	ideals	have	been	applied	at	a	variety	of	levels,	from	the	management	of	national	economies	to	forms	of	self-management	(Foucault,	1991;	Rose,	1996;	Brown,	2015).	But	anthropologists,	sociologists	and	political	theorists	have	consistently	shown	that	neoliberal	policies	work	to	enrich	and	empower	the	world’s	wealthiest	at	the	expense	of	the	poor	and	middle	classes,	and	of	social	solidarity	(Brown,	2003,	2015;	Lave	et	al,	2010;	Robison	and	Hewison,	2005;	Elyachar,	2005;	Sharma,	2008;	Pfeiffer	and	Chapman,	2010;	Karim,	2011).		
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management, operate in the banks’ health projects. In their extensive health programs, 
do development banks treat health as a commodity to be bought and sold, incentivized, 
and improved through competition, as opposed to an essential government obligation 
of care for citizens? Along with this, I sought to examine the role of economic 
expertise as a key form of neoliberal knowledge, investigating how economic tools get 
mobilized in constructing the banks’ understandings of public health. Still, after 
several further months of fieldwork in Guyana I was yet to observe such tools at work. 
I had designed my dissertation research to study how economic tools and rationalities 
were being mobilized in health projects run by the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank, but I had seen no such thing, even after almost half a year of 
initial ethnographic work in Guyana with multiple bank projects.  
While economic analysis seemed surprisingly absent from the practice of the 
bank projects I studied, what I did find was expertise on Guyanese racial and electoral 
codes, as well as knowledge of cultural anthropology and indigenous law, all being 
mobilized to shape health programs. But why did these observations differ so 
drastically from development banks’ own self-representations and the visions scholars 
and activists offered of development banks as economically calculating institutions, 
even regarding public health? These tensions from my empirical work led me to 
broader questions both about development banks and Guyanese governance that 
guided my subsequent twelve months of ethnographic research in Guyana and at bank 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. This dissertation addresses these observations 
through questions in multiple registers. Taking public health as a site of power that 
shapes peoples’ self-understandings and the opportunities open to them, as well as 
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relationships of national sovereignty,2 the dissertation most broadly asks: how do 
development banks construct health problems and solutions? What relationships and 
visions of power, responsibility, resources, and justice do these projects enact? What 
kinds of knowledge come to be valued in this process, who gets to use them, and with 
what social and political consequences? And how do the entanglements of knowledge 
and values shape these processes? 
 
Development Banks and Global Health 
Although development banks had almost no involvement in the field of 
international health just a few decades ago, they have come to wield immense power 
over the lives of millions of people as some of the world’s most central global health 
agencies: they mobilize large amounts of financing for the health programs they 
design and implement with borrowing countries, and they exert great influence in 
international debates over public health priorities and methods (Noy, 2013; Ruger, 
2005; Brown et al, 2006). In Guyana, for example, fifteen to twenty percent of the 
country’s health budget has been funded by the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank over the past decade (Ministry of Health of Guyana, 2008). But 
what ideologies and knowledges guide these institutions’ approaches? Do bank 
projects approach public health as a fungible commodity, as an essential responsibility 
of the state, or as the basis of social justice and solidarity, for example? Do these 
                                                2	Scholars	across	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	have	emphasized	how	public	health	interventions	influence	peoples’	conceptions	of	proper	and	possible	lives,	and	also	operate	as	spaces	where	governments,	NGOs,	international	organizations,	and	private	enterprises	struggle	over	lines	of	influence	and	responsibility	(Fanon,	2002	[1959];	Arnold,	1993;	Crane,	2003;	Boddy	2007;	Biehl,	2007;	Nguyen,	2009,	2010;	Fullwiley,	2011).	
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institutions assume a world of economically calculating individuals who can always 
act on health knowledge provided to them, or do they focus on the structural 
constraints and valid logics behind people’s many ways of being? Social scientists and 
anthropologists investigating development banks and power in public health have 
largely focused on development banks’ structural adjustment projects, examining the 
health effects of monetary reforms and the large cuts to public spending that the banks 
often required in the public health sector (Lundy, 1996; Breman and Shelton, 2007; 
Pfieffer and Chapman, 2010). Devi Sridhar is one of few scholars who have studied in 
depth how development bank health promotion efforts beyond financial reforms, such 
as their nutrition programs, incorporate ideologies and relationships of power (Sridhar, 
2008; Noy, forthcoming).3 I build on this work in examining the knowledges and 
values shaping development banks’ health programs today, and the dynamics of power 
that result. 
Development banks’ growing influence in global health in the 1990s was part 
of a broader shift from “international” to “global health” (Brown, 2006)—a field of 
research and public health practice that increasingly turned to actors beyond national 
governments (such as private corporations and NGOs) and to methods rooted in 
business management (such as “innovative finance” and “public-private 
partnerships”). In the process, the forms of knowledge deemed relevant in global 
health have also been called into question. While development banks often frame their 
                                                3	Other	scholars	have	examined	these	dynamics	without	making	development	banks	the	specific	focus	of	their	analysis.	Manjari	Mahajan	(2008),	for	example,	has	examined	the	World	Bank	as	part	of	a	conjunct	of	organizations	implementing	HIV/AIDS	programs	in	India.	However,	I	am	interested	in	understanding	the	specific	role	of	development	banks	as	financial	institutions	operating	in	global	health,	between	their	headquarters	and	operations.	
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work as the result of apolitical, scientific analysis, any expert analysis is based on 
assumptions and values that deeply affect the analyses produced (Martin, 1991; 
Latour, 1983; Haraway, 1988). Such assumptions operate both in the creation of 
expert knowledge, and through the types of knowledge that come to be deemed 
relevant for expert decision-making (Porter, 1995; Jasanoff, 1990; Mahajan, 2008; 
Parthasarathy, 2017). Anthropologists and economists, for example, look at problems 
quite differently: whose expertise is to be valued in planning a health program?  What 
forms of knowledge become legitimate in a meeting room at the Parliament of 
Guyana, where IDB representatives discuss project design with civil servants from the 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health? Whose knowledge counts, and with what 
effects? If economic tools are not central to project operations, what role does 
economic expertise play in development bank health work (Chapter 4)? And how does 
this relate to other forms of knowledge, such as expertise in nutrition, clinical 
medicine, cultural anthropology or law (Chapter 5)? 
In spite of my concern for these knowledge dynamics, my ethnographic work 
emphasized the importance of Guyanese racial and electoral politics in the 
relationships of power and marginalization that most concerned me. During my 
research, I continued to be struck by the ways that Afro-Guyanese were mobilizing 
black American discourses to counter marginalization by the majority Indo-Guyanese 
government, and interested in the racialized extraction of public resources for private 
benefit. It is clear that the dynamics of knowledge are deeply entangled with popular 
politics in the work of development banks. The World Bank and IDB’s self-
presentation as “knowledge institutions” advancing objective, evidence-based policies 
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to produce the best possible “development outcomes” (Goldman, 2005) runs up 
against their emphasis on national sovereignty and the democratic priorities of 
borrowing countries. International development agencies are not meant to interfere 
with the national politics and sovereignty of “borrowing countries;” as such, 
development banks have often ignored the popular politics entangled with their own 
projects, framing political problems as technical issues that can be addressed through 
technocratic solutions (Ferguson, 1994). But how do the shifting dynamics of 
knowledge in global health interact with these popular politics? Through my research 
in Guyana, as a corollary to my overarching questions, my research came to ask: how 
do expert debates interact with racial and electoral politics in constructing health 
problems and solutions? How do the entanglements of knowledge and values in expert 
decision-making relate to the knowledge and values at play in electoral and popular 
politics?  
These questions arose through iterative research between field sites in Guyana 
and Washington, D.C. In its methods and focus, this dissertation moves among the 
Washington, D.C. headquarters of two development banks, their country offices in 
Guyana, and the varied sites of contestation, planning and implementation of two of 
the banks’ health projects in Guyana. It combines ethnographic examination of these 
two health projects—one of which aims to eliminate neglected tropical diseases and 
the other to improve nutrition—with interview and archival work at the headquarters 
of the banks that finance and oversee the projects: the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the World Bank. In my research, Guyana does not serve simply a “case-
study” of how development banks operate “on the ground,” but as an essential 
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initiation of inquiry and insight regarding banks and public health, racialized 
governance, and Caribbean politics. In the interplay between my research sites, I came 
to see how, even as development banks have vastly expanded their expertise and 
notions of social justice in recent years, their health projects have helped re-inscribe 
state racial codes in the bodies of Guyanese citizens. Projects aiming to improve 
nutrition in Guyana have singled out indigeneity as malignant, and project designers 
have mobilized neglected tropical disease programs to confront racial and electoral 
tensions amongst Afro- and Indo-Guyanese.  
To begin examining these processes, in this introduction I first highlight the 
intellectual and institutional histories that underlie my research questions, before 
discussing how multi-sited ethnography allows me to examine dimensions of power 
across development banks’ networks. I then further elaborate the dissertation’s central 
argument: that development bank health projects have operated as part of the 
institutions’ efforts to reform their images and practices, but their mobilization of 
expertise on anthropology, indigenous law, and Guyanese racial codes have 
nonetheless furthered histories of marginalization both within development banks and 
Guyana. 
 
Problematization, Knowledge, and Values 
The overarching questions of this dissertation are fundamentally about 
problematization. In the early 1990s, James Ferguson described the great power that 
development banks wield by defining development problems in ways that position the 
banks as purveyors of essential solutions (Ferguson, 1994). Since Ferguson’s early 
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work, social analysts have continued to build on the theory of Michel Foucault to 
highlight the importance of knowledge practices in defining certain processes and 
patterns as problems in need of intervention (Foucault, 1990[1978]; Bacchi, 2012: 1; 
Hodžić, 2016: 8).4 Such problem framings fundamentally shape the ways that people 
are included and excluded from social programs and networks of power. Are single 
black mothers in the US understood as legitimate caretakers in need of social support, 
for example, or vilified as the source of racial inequality (Crenshaw, 2013; Harris, 
1999)? And are indigenous Guyanese framed as a heterogeneous group with low 
levels of malnutrition, or as dependents whose cultural practices present a biological 
risk to their communities (see Chapter 4)? The forms of expertise and evidence 
brought to bear on such questions have major implications for the policies and 
programs that result, and the lives of people made the objects of such knowledge. 
Development banks have become key actors in defining development problems 
and solutions (Goldman, 2005), including through the health projects that they finance 
and oversee. What counts as a nutritional problem, for example, and do such issues 
result from parents making poor choices, or from poor labor conditions that 
fundamentally shape the resources families can use towards child nutrition (Sridhar, 
2008)? These dynamics motivate my interest in the construction of health problems by 
development banks through expert knowledge. STS scholars have consistently 
underlined the assumptions and values that shape not only the creation of scientific 
knowledge, but the very kinds of knowledge deemed relevant in various spaces of 
                                                4	The	far-reaching	consequences	of	the	way	people	delineate	and	represent	social	issues	have	also	been	the	subject	of	sociological	literatures	on	“framing”	and	“the	construction	of	social	problems”	(Borah,	2011;	Blumer,	1971).	
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decision-making—from courtrooms to government agencies (Jasanoff 1990, 1990b; 
Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2008). For example, environmental regulators in the US and 
Europe have taken different approaches to weighing mathematical models of toxic 
exposure against qualitative analyses of risk, leading to divergent approaches to 
environmental health. And in many parts of the world, patients have fought to have 
their experiences recognized as relevant expertise for defining drug protocols and 
approval timelines. Analyzing such dynamics, STS scholars have highlighted the 
power that comes from being able to define oneself as a relevant expert and define the 
knowledge on which democratically-significant decisions are made. Steve Epstein and 
others have called these negotiations over what counts as relevant expertise and who is 
able to mobilize it “the politics of knowledge” or “the politics of expertise” (Epstein, 
1996; Hoffman, 1989; Parthasarathy, 2011; Baert and Rubio, 2012; Sending, 2015).  
Within development bank projects, such politics of expertise are deeply 
entangled with popular politics; development institutions’ dual goals of “objective” 
project planning by experts and “democratic” control by postcolonial countries often 
come into conflict. Following Ferguson and other critical development scholars, 
Richard Rottenburg (2009) has argued that actors shift between “scripts” in different 
circumstances in order to address the inherent tensions between expert decision-
making and national sovereignty in international development. My research builds on 
this work in emphasizing how different people in different positions across 
development banks’ networks mobilize very different understandings and visions of 
the institutions’ work. The Director of IDB’s Guyana Country Office, for example, has 
often quarreled with the institution’s upper management as to the rightful place of 
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electoral politics in the design of health projects, revealing tensions among operations, 
research, and institutional policymaking (see Chapter 4).  
This concern for the relationship between expertise and electoral politics 
emerges also at the intersection of literatures in science and technology studies (STS), 
cultural anthropology, and political theory. A central strand of science and technology 
studies developed in opposition to interpretations of power focused on political 
parties, military intervention, and class interests. In his influential 1983 essay “Give 
Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” Bruno Latour criticized earlier scholars 
for focusing on politics almost exclusively as “elections and law,” when science is so 
inherently political, in the sense that it defines the very nature of the world and the 
forces through which one can mold it (Latour, 1983). But prominent STS scholars 
such as Sheila Jasanoff have critiqued Latourian STS for its lack of attention to the 
moral relationships of social justice and conventional governance (Jasanoff, 2004; 
Restivo, 2005; Amsterdamska, 1990). Many STS scholars have joined Jasanoff in 
examining the politics of knowledge as they relate to questions of government, 
including tensions between expert decision-making and the concerns of citizens 
regarding such issues as genetically-modified organisms or nuclear energy (Campbell, 
1985; Wynne, 1992; Porter, 1995; Hilgartner, 2000; Gupta, 2008; Gusterson, 2008; 
Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). However, this has not included much attention to electoral 
politics as such.5 The black-boxing of electoral politics amongst international 
development agencies is mirrored by a similar process in the field of science and 
technology studies. By attending to the entanglements of electoral and expertise 
                                                5	Notable	exceptions	include	Gottweis,	1995;	Lynch	et	al.,	2005;	Miller,	2015;	Hajer,	2006;	Oreskes,	2011.	
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politics, my work builds a fuller picture of the dynamics of power shaping 
contemporary governance. 
Cultural anthropologists have paid far more attention to popular politics, rooted 
in the field’s foundational focus on political systems (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Southall, 
1956). More recently, anthropologists have highlighted how development projects 
operate within the landscape of electoral politics, often interpreting such relationships 
by theorizing corruption – and perceived corruption – surrounding development 
efforts (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 1999; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; James, 2012). While 
corruption operates as a trope in the global North that denigrates postcolonial 
countries as “backwards,” many anthropologists have recognized the power of local 
discourses on corruption and the importance of considering relationships of patronage 
and public theft, leading these scholars to analyze such relationships of power while 
avoiding stereotypes of poor countries as “more corrupt” than wealthy ones (Smith, 
2008; James, 2012; Gupta, 1995). While I build on these analyses in examining the 
relationships of clientelism at play in development bank health projects, I do not see 
such patronage politics as “interfering” with objective technical knowledge – as have 
many analysts (Lewis, 2006; Dietrich, 2007; Gostin, 2014; Price, 2014; Anderson and 
Beresford, 2015). Instead, I draw on STS literatures emphasizing that scientific and 
technical knowledge is always deeply political; such knowledge always integrates 
assumptions and values that shape its production and use (Haraway, 1988; Martin, 
1991; Bloor, 1991; Collins, 1985). My work shows that there is more to the interplay 
between development and politics than corruption; I demonstrate the shifting 
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discourses and spaces where popular politics come to be valued in the face of 
aspirations towards “objective” governance. 
Working at the convergence of STS and political anthropology, my research 
draws attention to variances across development banks’ networks in the forms of 
expertise that come to be valued, and also in the ways that justice comes to be 
understood and valued. I emphasize that the creation of knowledge (e.g. in economics) 
and the creation of values (e.g. democracy) rely on intertwined processes: assumptions 
shape economic calculations, just as ways of knowing shape visions of democracy. In 
addition to highlighting these entanglements, I emphasize the ways that both 
knowledges and conceptions of justice can be mobilized as currency to create value in 
the design and implementation of health projects. When disputes arise, actors can turn 
to various forms of knowledge, but also various conceptions of justice, in order to 
advocate for their perspectives. 
Studying the knowledges and values at play in development bank work in 
Guyana and in Washington, D.C. within a common frame helps me find a mode of 
analysis that takes seriously both electoral politics and the politics of expertise; it 
allows for finding a space between the conventional ambits of political science and of 
post-structural analyses, theorizing relationships among these major forms of power 
that have so often been treated separately. My focus on Guyana is an essential element 
of investigating power of both Politics and the political. Guyana has not been allowed 
in either popular or academic understandings (both in Guyana and abroad) to have a 
political life beyond racial and electoral machinations. This is not because other kinds 
of politics are not at play, but because popular frameworks of power have so strongly 
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focused on ethnic politics between African and East Indian descendants and the 
political parties associated with each (Bissessar and La Guerre, 2013; Quinn, 2017; 
Wilson, 2012; Hinds, 2011; Williams, 1991; Vaughn, 2012). These histories help 
reveal how racial and electoral politics integrate their own assumptions and expertise, 
including experience with the racial codes of the Guyanese state. 
This dissertation examines how knowledge and values are enmeshed in 
decisions both within the work of development banks and in the government agencies 
they contract with in Guyana, and especially in the liminal spaces where healthcare 
professionals, government finance representatives, bank staff, and consultants 
negotiate about what problems will receive priority, through which methods, and who 
will be served. And while my dissertation emphasizes the importance of the specific 
legitimacy politics in Guyana, it is just as concerned with provincializing development 
banks: highlighting the personal connections and aspirations that shape the banks’ 
approaches far beyond (and inherent to) expert calculations of development 
(Chakrabarty, 2007[2000]). But studying these multiple spaces across expansive 
networks is a complicated task. In the following section I introduce the 
methodological basis of my research, which I discuss further throughout the text. 
 
Methods for Studying Lifeworlds and Systems 
 
 In his 1995 Annual Review of Anthropology paper, George Marcus took up the 
question of whether the “emergent methodological trend” of multi-sited ethnography 
allowed for the in-depth knowledge that standard ethnography has been prized for, 
writing:  
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The issue then arises of whether multi-sited ethnography is possible without 
attenuating the kinds of knowledges and competencies that are expected from 
fieldwork…One response is that the field broadly conceived and encompassed 
in the fieldwork experience of most standard ethnographic projects indeed 
already crosses many potentially related sites of work, but as research evolves, 
principles of selection operate to bound the effective field in line with long-
standing disciplinary perceptions about what the object of study should be. 
Thus, fieldwork as traditionally perceived and practiced is already itself 
potentially multi-sited (Marcus, 1995: 100). 
 
 
While highlighting the novelty of multi-sited research, Marcus emphasized that even 
in the supposedly “single-sited” work that has occupied imaginations of 
anthropological methods, research also involves choices of where to focus, and often 
brings together many “sites” within a single geographic space. 
My own research is based on seventeen months of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Washington, D.C. and Georgetown, Guyana between 2013 and 2016. This included 
participant observation on both of the World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) health projects in Guyana that were ongoing during the period (one of 
which aims to eliminate neglected tropical diseases and the other to improve 
nutrition), as well as ethnographic research within the health divisions at IDB and 
World Bank headquarters. In addition to participant observation, I conducted formal 
and informal ethnographic interviews and oral histories with over ninety healthcare 
professionals, bank staff, consultants, members of the Guyanese government, program 
participants, and volunteers,6 and I conducted extensive archival research within the 
archives of the World Bank and IDB’s headquarters, the National Archives of Guyana, 
the holdings of the Pan-American Health Organization at the University of Guyana, 
                                                6	Throughout	this	dissertation	I	have	used	pseudonyms	in	referring	to	my	informants,	except	in	the	case	of	published	professionals	who	authorized	me	to	use	their	full	names.	This	research	has	received	ethical	approval	through	Cornell	University’s	Institutional	Review	Board.	
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and in the personal files of a variety of current and former high-level administrators in 
Guyana’s national health system. Through these documents and oral histories, I 
investigated health projects implemented through development banks starting from the 
first such project in 1979, and I examined government public health discourses in the 
1970s, prior to development banks’ earliest health projects in Guyana, allowing me to 
enrich my ethnographic investigation of two ongoing projects through a broader look 
at the breadth of development bank health projects. 
This is a multi-sited ethnography in the sense that I lived in two cities on two 
different continents during the “field” research (and in several others in New York 
state during preliminary and follow-up research). But even in the “single” location of 
Georgetown, my participant observation on project teams included many sites: day-to-
day meetings in IDB’s country office, within Guyana’s Ministry of Health, at clinics 
in the city center and in villages a morning’s bus ride away. In Washington, D.C. my 
research involved observations of institution-wide meetings within the World Bank, 
meetings of health economists within IDB’s Social Protection division, of World Bank 
legal staff with trust fund directors and finance officers, etc. – it included work both in 
operational divisions focused on health and in research segments investigating finance 
and the “social sectors.”7 
In both Guyana and Washington, D.C. I conducted extensive oral histories 
regarding the history of the World Bank and IDB’s health programs, and the 
experience of healthcare workers and administrators with shifting regimes of public 
                                                7	IDB’s	official	languages	are	English,	Spanish,	French	and	Portuguese.	My	proficiency	in	the	first	three	allowed	me	to	follow	movements	between	languages	that	are	common	at	IDB	headquarters	and	among	IDB	teams	visiting	Guyana.	However,	daily	operations	in	Guyana’s	IDB	Country	Office	are	conducted	in	English.		
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health governance. As I discuss further in Chapter 3, I take oral history interviews not 
as a direct representation of the past (Cole, 2001; Chamberlain, 2007), but as 
significant references regarding the experiences of these nurses, economists, 
bureaucrats, etc. with the health programs of the World Bank and IDB. And while I 
recognize the important ways in which subsequent experiences shape recollections, 
there are nonetheless significant overlaps in the methodological concerns of analyzing 
oral histories and interviews regarding more recent experience (Charlton et al, 2007); 
neither is a direct representation of reality: both involve choices in how interviewees 
represent their experiences. When a Guyanese physician emphasizes the similarity in 
public health policies advanced by the current government and those implemented by 
Guyana’s controversial former president-cum-dictator, this is a representational 
choice. When a World Bank consultant emphasizes corruption in the payment systems 
of the Guyanese government, this too is a choice in representation. The challenge of 
analysis lies in untangling the elements that shape these representations, by 
considering life histories, publicly-circulating discourses, professional values, etc. 
Multi-sited research also helps unravel these dynamics, allowing me to see my 
research sites from multiple vantage points—to take seriously the self-representations 
of the people and institutions I study, while also taking note of the contradictions that 
emerge across sites within the expansive networks that make up these institutions. 
Amidst these tangled stories, this dissertation is a tale of displacement, one that 
becomes visible in motion across bank networks: between research and operations, 
headquarters and country offices, “lender” and “borrower.” Projects are planned and 
implemented in concert across these networks. IDB and the World Bank have 
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produced research and designed their health programs with an eye towards countering 
negative images of the institutions, but in mobilizing health projects to counter 
criticism, the banks simply have concentrated development discourses onto seemingly 
remote populations. In the following section I demonstrate how these development 
banks have attempted to remake their neoliberal image, in part through enrolling 
cultural anthropologists and legal experts; I argue that even as these specialists have 
moved the banks towards providing broader public programs and social services, they 
have played a key role in maintaining histories of marginalization within Guyana and 
within development banks. This argument speaks to the work of ethnographers such as 
Michael Goldman and Aradhana Sharma, who have emphasized development banks’ 
ability to enroll critics and their knowledges in entrenching their own power 
(Goldman, 2005; Sharma, 2006). But my analysis is also an inversion of this work and 
Tania Li’s (2007) famous research on “the will to improve” enacted by development 
institutions upon the subjects of development: here I describe development’s most 
central institutions striving to improve their own practices. In the process these banks 
have entrenched their histories of marginalization, in which they have created 
development projects that disenfranchise indigenous peoples, and generate racial 
divides. To examine these arguments, in the following section I return briefly to my 
conundrum of the “missing” neoliberal knowledge and health practices in 
development bank health programs. 
  
 
Remaking a Neoliberal Image  
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In spite of development banks’ histories of neoliberal health reform and my 
own interest in examining such logics in public health, the power of neoliberal 
governing rationalities did not emerge as the most significant dynamic in my empirical 
work. I did not find that the bank projects and practices I studied were promoting 
privatization, economic or financial knowledge, individual responsibility, the power of 
pharmaceuticals or corporations, market logics, incentivization, or management. 
While the nutrition projects I studied aimed to encourage pregnant women to seek 
prenatal care by offering food vouchers at their visits, program organizers designed the 
vouchers explicitly as a form of wealth redistribution (Chapter 5). And while the 
neglected tropical disease project I studied in Guyana is based on drug donations from 
multi-national pharmaceutical companies, the project moves far beyond global 
health’s growing emphasis on pharmaceuticals (Biehl, 2007), combining 
understandings of environmental causes of disease with an emphasis on preventative 
care (Chapter 4). With regard to economic expertise as neoliberal knowledge, I found 
that the banks’ promotion of economic tools for public health decision-making has not 
much guided operational practice (Chapter 4). And, as I discuss in Chapter 3, the oral 
histories I conducted with Guyanese healthcare workers, and my subsequent archival 
research both highlighted how central neoliberal values – such as individual 
responsibility, efficiency, and even incentivization – were key discursive elements 
promoted by socialist politicians and administrators in 1970s Guyana. These 
perspectives emphasize the need for precision in examining what exactly is novel 
about the banks’ current discourses of capitalism and power.  
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One can argue that a food voucher program is an extremely limited form of 
wealth distribution that enables ongoing international exploitation by giving the 
impression that development banks are sincerely engaged in the project of addressing 
global inequality. Indeed, global health as a whole functions in much this way, as I 
discuss below. Neoliberal rationalities have certainly not been altogether absent from 
the development bank health projects I examined. In the early 2000s, IDB and the 
World Bank both financed health loans in Guyana that were rooted in neoliberal 
understandings of federal government as regulator, rather than provider of social 
services. IDB’s USD $23 million Health Sector Program loan aimed to contract health 
provision from the federal government to Regional Health Administrations, which 
would provide a narrow set of “essential health services,” in line with the selective 
primary healthcare approach advocated by the World Bank since the late 1970s. 
Likewise, the World Bank’s 2004 USD $10 million HIV/AIDS Prevention and 
Control Project loan was designed to enact neoliberal values of civil society and the 
private sector as primary implementers. However, the private sector was not ultimately 
a focus of that project, which focused more on “multi-sectoral collaboration” across 
government ministries, as well as an anti-retroviral therapy provision program for the 
11,000 HIV positive people in Guyana at the time (World Bank, 2010b). 
But since the early 2000s, the World Bank and IDB have both promoted 
expanding government expenditure on health in Guyana, although they have argued 
this should be supplemented by “creating the conditions for increasing the contribution 
of the private sector” (World Bank, 2002: viii). This is a part of an explicit shift within 
these two banks away from market-based health projects and policy. These 
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development banks now promote a form of neoliberalism that is explicitly self-aware 
and which has incorporated widespread criticism of their earlier practices of 
privatization. The term neoliberal has become a part of the banks’ lexicon, although 
members of these financial institutions use the term in a much more narrow fashion 
than the critical social science and humanities literatures do – restricting it to the 
macroeconomic tenets of the Washington Consensus.8 But even as the institutions’ 
leadership publicly reject “neoliberal” governance (Stein, 2014), development banks 
continue to promote neoliberalism’s basic tenets in a form of what political economist 
Jamie Peck has called “zombie neoliberalism” (Peck, 2010). This means that 
privatizing forces are slightly more hidden than they’ve been in the past: the World 
Bank’s flagship health effort since 2010 has been Universal Health Coverage (UHC), 
and while this sounds like a rather leftist goal, one has to dig deeper to find that the 
World Bank’s version of UHC often amounts to the promotion of private health 
insurance (as opposed to broad, publically-provided healthcare). However, these 
institutions have long thought of health as an “emotional” sector with major 
implications for their public image, which has been a major driver of the institutions’ 
approaches to health (see Chapter 1). Michael Goldman has described how the World 
Bank’s ability to reformulate itself and enroll critics has been one of its strongest 
assets (Goldman, 2005), and public health is a key site through which development 
banks promote the idea of a bank that truly does good for the poor.   
                                                8	The Washington Consensus is a set of policy prescriptions that DC-based financial 
institutions promoted in the 1990s, including privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation of the economy (Naím, 2002).	
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Today, neoliberal values play a central role across the field of global health, 
which differentiated itself from its precedents in international health through its focus 
on involving non-state actors and mobilizing public-private partnerships, business 
management tools, “innovative finance,” and economic modeling (Thomas, 2004; 
Brown et al, 2006). Development banks have played a key role in the promoting these 
approaches, for example through the banks’ widely-circulated reports and substantial 
data sets, and their prestigious training courses. As Vincanne Adams has suggested, 
“commitments to market-driven solutions have impacted the very business of how we 
think of doing global health work” (Adams, 2016). The work of development banks 
has opened space for much more wildly capitalist visions of global health in other 
spaces, such as profit-making global health investment projects that claim to make 
global health “pay for itself,” as in the Global Health Investment Fund structured by 
JP Morgan Chase and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (JP Morgan Chase & 
Co., 2017). Other branches of the World Bank Group also operate more clearly in 
extreme capitalist modes than do the health functions within the World Bank itself 
(see Chapter 1): for example, the venture capital funds of the IFC that invest in 
healthcare startups.  
The ongoing development bank health projects that are the focus of this 
dissertation are strongly rooted in the institutions’ efforts to remake their neoliberal 
image: a dynamic that becomes especially evident based on my methods, and 
especially my work in Guyana. As sociologist Shiri Noy has pointed out, qualitative 
studies of how the World Bank’s agendas have shaped public health in postcolonial 
countries “have focused on the most extreme examples” (Noy, 2013: 82). Selecting a 
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quintessential neoliberal project as an object of study shapes the analyses that result. 
Studying the banks’ interventions through time in Guyana, with a focus on the breadth 
of the banks’ current projects as I have, instead draws attention to the role of global 
health in development banks’ branding efforts, and the shifting place of the banks in 
the terrain of global health. While in the late 1990s, development banks administered 
almost thirty percent of global health funds around the world, by 2013 that percentage 
had dropped below ten, with new funding channeled largely through partnerships such 
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunization (IHME, 2016: 21). Development banks have 
attempted to position themselves as central players in these new partnerships, although 
there has been tension surrounding the role of development banks: should the World 
Bank simply hold the funds for these partnerships, or should they have a central voice 
in how funds are administered (SM Interview, 2012)? Responding to critiques of their 
work has been significant for development banks trying to retain power in these new 
global health partnerships. In the following section I further explain how, in using 
health programs to respond to such critiques, the banks have entangled cultural 
anthropologists and legal specialists as they have re-inscribed state racial codes in the 
bodies of Guyanese citizens. 
 
Displacing Critique 
In recent years, development bank reports and publications have often made 
reference to “neoliberalism” in critiquing the institutions’ own past emphasis on 
market-based policies, especially in public health. Since the early 1990s, members of 
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the banks’ health divisions have attempted to distance themselves from structural 
adjustment efforts; today they often argue that the health divisions had little power in 
these privatizing programs, which were designed by the banks’ macroeconomists. 
While this is a strategic representation that absolves health divisions of blame for the 
decreased health budgets and increased poverty that resulted from adjustment 
measures in many countries, my research has pointed to the very different approaches 
to health at play in different parts of the banks’ networks. While senior staff within the 
World Bank and IDB have recognized the negative effects structural adjustment loans 
have had in many parts of the world, many economists working in development banks 
still argue that such negative effects resulted from the incomplete application of 
adjustment measures, rather than the basic tenets of privatization and liberalization 
(Rogers, 2010; World Bank, 2005). This perspective on implementation failure differs 
drastically from the visions of structural adjustment that operate in the banks’ health 
sectors, where today staff and consultants quickly denounce the idea that cutting 
public health budgets and massively diminishing public employment might improve 
life for the world’s poorest.  
Throughout the dissertation, I emphasize the very different priorities and 
perspectives of different divisions, enclaves, etc. within these banks. I argue that while 
development banks have responded to critiques of their coercive approaches by 
promoting “country ownership” and public participation,9 these principles have held a 
very different place in research and operations divisions. As I describe in Chapter 4, 
operations divisions’ emphasis on democratic priorities has differed drastically from 
                                                9	Development	banks	have	both	contributed	to	and	played	upon	broader	development	and	governance	discourses	in	this	regard.	
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the methods advanced by economists in the banks’ research divisions, such as cost-
effectiveness analysis for determining health priorities. These contradictions explain 
why bank practices so often misalign with development banks’ self-representations 
and those offered by critics. Here my research draws attention to the very different 
forms of knowledge deemed relevant in various spaces of global health, even within a 
single project.  
But across these contradictions, development banks’ mobilization of health 
programs has helped re-inscribe state racial codes and institutional histories in the 
bodies of Guyanese citizens. The banks’ emphasis on democratic priorities has helped 
IDB’s neglected tropical disease project to operate as a form of patronage aiming to 
bridge Afro- and Indo-Guyanese populations, and critiques of the banks’ treatment of 
indigenous peoples have led to the singling out of indigenous Guyanese as “racialized 
citizens,” presumed to be bound by a culture that harms their health and biological 
well-being. In responding to critiques, these banks have often simply concentrated 
development discourses onto seemingly more remote populations, such as indigenous 
Guyanese. But while my argument builds on substantial literatures regarding the “elite 
capture” of development projects (Swindler, 2009; Smith, 2003; Ferguson, 1994; van 
de Walle, 2001), I do not see this as a simple case of government actors making use of 
development projects towards their own ends of maintaining electoral majorities. 
Instead, I describe the racialization produced in negotiation among both government 
representatives and bank managers seeking legitimacy, enrolling anthropologists and 
legal specialists who contribute to reproducing histories of dispossession.  
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But the particular forms of dispossession produced through these projects exist 
within a much larger framework of development banks’ work internationally. In the 
final section of this Introduction, I address how this micro-level study fits into the 
larger context of the banks’ work. 
 
Aid and Extraction 
During the course of my research, many people I worked with took me for a 
program evaluator: someone who would gather data as to how many pills were being 
distributed, how efficiently resources were being used, or how well a project was 
doing in achieving its goals. I consistently explained to project staff, but also 
American academics and my own family members, that my goal was not to evaluate 
how many people the institutions’ projects were “saving,” or whether the money was 
being used “appropriately.” My goal was to understand how health projects both 
contain and create assumptions, values, and relationships of power, not only within the 
terms of development discourse, but within more expansive understandings of justice 
– informed by post-structuralist, feminist, and critical race theories. 
But what would it mean in the current study for the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank to be doing “a good job with public health”? While this 
is not the lens I have used in framing my research, a version of the question is 
embedded in my work: in seeking to understand the knowledges and values that shape 
health projects, my research investigates whether these projects are rooted in 
expansive notions of social justice, if they are supportive of broader systems of 
exploitation, and how these dynamics of justice and inequality function. However, 
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taking a more explicitly normative approach to development banks’ health 
interventions draws attention to the values of leftist scholarship underlying my 
research.10 It requires me to highlight that first and foremost, I understand global 
public health as a part of aid efforts that are dwarfed by the ongoing exploitation of 
Guyana and other postcolonial countries by governments and corporations of the 
world’s wealthiest countries (Griffiths, 2014). According to analysis by the University 
of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, such governments and 
corporations devoted 36.4 billion US dollars to public health interventions in low- and 
middle-income countries in 2015 (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2016).11 
However, regulatory schemes established by Northern countries continue to promote 
forms of extraction that far outweigh global health funding and financing. Since 2002, 
net official development funds have consistently moved from poor to wealthy 
countries, because loan repayments are greater than new aid (Browne, 2006). 
Compound interest payments on past development loans by themselves (i.e., not 
including repayment on the principal loan) amount to more money annually than all 
development aid for health (Hickel, 2014). This is on top of global financial 
regulations that create licit tax breaks and facilitate illicit tax evasion (especially 
through global financial deregulation) amounting to over a trillion dollars extracted 
from poor countries annually (Kar and Spanjers, 2014; Dyreng et al, 2008), as well as 
trade and intellectual property schemes that further exploit resources and labor from 
                                                10	My	own	research	is	not	exempt	from	the	inherent	entanglement	of	knowledge	and	politics	that	I	describe	in	development	bank	projects;	my	leftist	stance	is	informed	by	the	extensive	literatures	and	evidence	I	cite	throughout	the	text.	11	This	includes	concessionary	loans	from	development	banks,	which	have	to	be	repaid	(IHME,	2016:	16),	so	its	categorization	as	“aid”	is	somewhat	misleading.	Aid	in	the	sense	of	support	that	does	not	have	to	be	paid	back	would	thus	be	even	lower.	
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postcolonial countries to the benefit of wealthy ones (Amoah, 2015; Cimoli et al, 
2014). 
In spite of the very sincere efforts on the part of global health professionals, the 
field does little in comparison to the ongoing damage inflicted in poor countries by the 
same governments, corporations, and organizations that fund global health efforts. The 
overlap between global health financers and the key players in predatory trade and 
regulatory schemes suggests that global health may in fact play an obfuscatory role. 
Jason Hickel has argued: “Poor countries are net creditors to rich countries. Aid serves 
as an illusion to mask this fact; it makes the takers seem like givers” (Hickel, 2014: 
np). While Hickel addresses development aid broadly, his claims are valid for global 
health specifically: financing programs to improve the health of the world’s poorest 
does a great deal to maintain the international relationships that allow wealthy 
countries to preserve systems of extraction. Without efforts to alleviate the effects of 
such exploitation, the governments of wealthy countries would likely be subject to 
massive protest in both wealthy and poor countries. To really improve the health and 
wellbeing of people around the world, Northern countries need to support a robust 
global financial regulatory system that does not allow for licit and illicit corporate tax 
avoidance, and that compensates poor countries and their citizens for their labor and 
resources. 
Nonetheless, leftist critics have been successful in pushing development banks 
to increasingly support government social spending, the use of local vendors and 
consultants for bank projects, and avoiding the enrichment Northern companies 
through bank loans. In the process, development banks have enrolled environmentalist 
 31 
 
and feminist critiques to continue to position themselves as essential organizers of 
international development in the face of strong academic and popular criticisms of 
their work; they have made environmentalism central to their work, and have taken 
over feminist languages of “empowerment” (Goldman, 2005; Sharma, 2008). In public 
health, the Inter-American Development Bank has been particularly explicit about 
moving away from market-based projects. The most recent internal evaluation of 
IDB’s health efforts argued that the very basis of the institution’s lending in the health 
sector – “a set of key reform measures, largely based on market instruments and 
incentives, defining the approach followed by the Bank during the 1995-2005 period” 
– could not lead to IDB’s goals of efficiency, quality, and equity in health systems 
(IDB, 2006: ii). Specifically, the evaluators argued: 
The conclusions and findings derived from each of the main 
reform measures supported by the Bank indicate that they 
contain sufficient limitations and drawbacks to suggest that, as a 
whole, this set of measures was unlikely to have been able to 
improve efficiency, quality or equity of the health systems of 
the Region (IDB, 2006: ii). 
 
IDB’s evaluators critiqued the very ideological basis of the institution’s market-based 
lending for public health. 
Low-interest loans for health projects do allow low-income countries the 
possibility of immediate financial resources for domestic public health programs, but 
internal evaluations of both the World Bank and IDB’s health sector work have 
suggested that the banks’ health efforts have not gone far towards improving lives 
internationally. World Bank evaluators have argued that even after the institution 
moved away from explicit privatizing efforts in the health sector in the early 2000s, 
the World Bank has pursued “irrelevant objectives” in health, often with 
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“unsatisfactory results” (World Bank, 2009: xvii). A 2009 evaluation conducted by the 
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group stressed that the percentage of projects 
deemed at least “moderately satisfactory” in the health sector – sixty-eight percent in 
2006 – had consistently lagged behind other areas of World Bank lending, with a 
growing divergence since the mid-1990s (World Bank, 2009: 19). This included 
“weak accountability in delivering health results for the poor,” in spite of the fact that 
“studies of the incidence of public expenditure have shown that in most countries, 
public health spending favors the non-poor; mere expansion of services cannot be 
assumed to improve access of the poor relative to the non-poor” (World Bank, 2009: 
xvi). The bank’s Internal Evaluation Group emphasized that without specific efforts to 
address access issues among the poor, increased public health spending usually 
benefits mainly the wealthy. 
 Development banks’ own evaluations have suggested that these institutions are 
not doing all that well in public health, based primarily on the institutions’ own 
espoused concerns for equity and serving the most marginalized. But these were also 
the priorities that development banks expressed in the 1990s when the institutions 
were pushing for (and often requiring) anemic government health budgets and the 
privatization of healthcare: the banks argued that their privatizing methods were to 
benefit the poor (Chapter 3). While the World Bank’s management has accepted that 
privatizing efforts often have detrimental effects, many within the institution continue 
to argue that the negative effects of structural adjustment projects resulted from 
incomplete applications of the prescribed reforms (Rogers, 2010; World Bank, 2005). 
Likewise, the critique of neoliberalism advanced by IDB evaluators is launched from 
 33 
 
within the framework of development banks’ own priorities and assumptions, although 
these differ substantially across the institutions’ networks. These evaluations maintain 
the concerns for quantitative and economic data that underlie the banks’ external 
publications and research, and the critique of privatization remains in a very limited 
form.  
Public health scholars have consistently highlighted the importance of wealth 
redistribution for improving the health and well-being of people who have been 
marginalized and oppressed (Fort et al, 2004; Marmot et al, 2008). These literatures 
have also suggested that broad social systems are crucial to supporting people who 
continue to face the effects of social exclusion beyond economics (e.g. based on 
personal networks, availability of time, etc.) (Birn and Starfield, 2007). Some 
development bank programs have specifically pursued these dual goals of income 
redistribution along with broad, supportive social services; the Basic Nutrition 
Program that I discuss in Chapter 5 (in its early years) is one example. In addition to 
these elements of wealth redistribution and expansive social services, an essential 
element of public health interventions lies in the ways such programs construct people 
and social relations. And while the World Bank and IDB ostensibly focus on 
respecting “local knowledge” and the perspectives of “project beneficiaries,” their 
approaches and priorities are still often rooted in patronizing or detrimental 
representations of the people they aim to help (see Chapter 5).  
In recent years the banks have put a great deal of effort into “conditional cash 
transfer” (CCT) programs, which provide cash grants to individuals and “households” 
dependent on recipients completing medical visits or other “desired health behaviors” 
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(Baird et al, 2016). IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program mobilized a similar logic by 
providing food vouchers only at post-natal visits, although the project avoided the 
market-based language of “incentivization” that CCTs usually mobilize. CCTs are 
built on the assumption that people should only benefit from social services when they 
behave in the ways that governing bodies deem acceptable. Since the 1980s, 
development banks have received intense criticism for their loan conditions, which 
have required poor countries to implement wealthy donors’ policy prescriptions at the 
expense of national sovereignty, and often with hugely detrimental consequences for 
poverty and national economies (Pender, 2010; Best, 2007; Abouharb and Cingranelli, 
2007; Stiglitz, 2002). But conditions at the individual level through conditional cash 
transfer projects are strongly reminiscent of conditions for national policy.  
A growing movement is pushing development agencies to provide people cash 
transfers without strings attached (Goldstein, 2013; Blattman et al, 2013; Kenny, 
2013).12 True to form, the World Bank and IDB have been quick to get involved in 
research on unconditional cash transfers (Hernani-Limarino and Mena, 2015; 
Blattman et al, 2013; Baird et al, 2016; Ozler, 2015). But the banks have also begun to 
frame a broad span of their previous work in terms of this new terminology, 
emphasizing social security programs as forms of unconditional cash transfer, and 
even framing universal healthcare as an unconditional transfer (World Bank, 2014). 
                                                12	Unconditional	cash	transfers	are	a	site	where	leftist	promotions	of	wealth	redistribution	overlap	with	economistic	visions	of	rational	choice	that	frame	such	projects	as	“an	attempt	to	test	one	of	the	simplest	ideas	in	economics	—	that	people	know	what	they	need,	and	if	they	have	money,	they	can	buy	it”	(Goldstein,	2013:	np).	This	is	similar	to	the	overlaps	that	Dean	Jamison	described	in	Chapter	3:	both	leftist	politics	and	strong	free	market	economics	lead	to	an	emphasis	on	individuals	knowing	better	what	they	need	than	do	development	institutions.	Some	development	practitioners	and	researchers	have	also	promoted	unconditional	cash	transfers	as	simply	a	more	efficient	means	of	administration,	not	subject	to	“leakages”	and	corruption	(e.g.	Muralidharan	et	al,	2013).	
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Nonetheless, these development banks are starting to promote the idea of wealth 
redistribution as an essential intervention for health and development. And while a 
broad vision of income redistribution may appear far too “activist” to expect of 
development banks, I would suggest that expanding the frameworks of possibility is 
essential to challenging the status quo. Global health efforts need to continue to 
highlight the massive funds that could be made available for wealth redistribution with 
improved trade policy and global financial regulation. 
*** 
But what is to be gained from studying a small part of such a large system of 
extraction – from studying the daily minutia within several health projects and within 
health division operations at two development banks? Some such “micro-level” 
analyses have revealed the broader logics of exploitation that infuse oppressive 
systems, with daily operations serving as a microcosm of systemic issues (Foster, 
2005; Petryna, 2005; Foley, 2009; Peterson, 2012; Erikson, 2012). My own study, 
however, highlights the mobile and shifting nature of late neoliberalism; it emphasizes 
the ways in which financial institutions are using health projects to address criticisms 
launched at the organizations, by transforming their previous market-based and 
privatizing health policies. Many of the banks’ most recent projects do not present the 
trappings of traditional economic neoliberalism, nor neoliberalism’s characteristic 
focus on systematized management and management of the self. While such values do 
infuse some bank projects still, this is far from universal. Late neoliberalism is here 
instead characterized by the combination of such logics with projects that are 
explicitly designed to move the financing institutions beyond their neoliberal image. 
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Understanding the topography of these practices can help scholars and activists alike 
imagine where and how efforts towards change might best be focused. 
I build my analysis in this dissertation through six subsequent chapters. In the 
first chapter I further introduce the histories of Guyana and of development banks that 
health projects encode in their subjects, and in the second chapter I show how 
development bank health work looks on a daily basis in Guyana and in Washington, 
D.C. In Chapter 3 I demonstrate how Guyanese healthcare workers have mobilized a 
framework of continuity to describe health system governance before and after 
structural adjustment in Guyana, and I argue that these frameworks are rooted in the 
similarity of discourses of socialist politicians in the 1970s and World Bank reformers 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this chapter I emphasize the very different 
functioning of neoliberalism in the global North and South, as a means of 
understanding the continuities that healthcare workers describe. In Chapter 4 I 
demonstrate the very different valuations of economic expertise that operate across 
development banks’ networks, focusing on approaches to cost-effectiveness analysis. I 
argue that cost-effectiveness analysis has been mobilized as an aspirational discourse 
within the banks’ research divisions, and I show how these visions are countered by a 
focus on democratic politics within operational divisions. Here the banks’ responses to 
widespread academic and popular critique underlie a racialized form of patronage 
politics. In the fifth chapter I show how Guyanese electoral politics combine with the 
politics of expertise within development bank headquarters to racialize indigenous 
Guyanese and construct culture as a biological phenomenon. While economic 
expertise has held little power in bank operations, cultural anthropologists and 
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specialists in indigenous law have shaped the ongoing marginalization of indigenous 
Guyanese. In the dissertation’s conclusion, I emphasize how development banks’ 
efforts to reformulate their neoliberal images have re-inscribed state racial codes in the 
bodies of Guyanese citizens, and I further consider what it would mean for 
development banks to be doing “a good job” in global health, arguing that the global 
financial and trade regulations supported by the banks and their funders are the largest 
ongoing impediment to health and equity globally. 
 38 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES AND RACIAL LOGICS: 
GOVERNING ACROSS DEVELOPMENT BANK NETWORKS 
 
  
 In the fall of 1978, over 900 members of the People’s Temple died in a mass 
murder-suicide in Guyana, most of them black Americans that had moved from the 
San Francisco Bay area to the Temple’s commune in Guyana’s Northwest—billed by 
the cult’s leader Jim Jones as a socialist utopia within a black-led socialist nation, a 
place to get away from the racism of the US and start anew. But in their discussions of 
this Guyanese utopia, the Temple’s leadership paid little attention to the accusations of 
racism between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese that have been so central to Guyanese 
electoral politics throughout the country’s post-independence period. That same year, 
in 1978, the Government of Guyana signed its first health loan with the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB): a USD nine-million-dollar loan to support the 
training of healthcare workers and infrastructural improvements at the country’s 
largest hospital. Although international financial institutions had expressed concern 
about Guyana’s increasing connections with the Soviet Union, they continued to lend 
to the Caribbean country throughout the 1970s. So how did this loan fit into the 
historical context of governance within Guyana and the IDB in the late 1970s? At the 
time, other international financial institutions were very little involved in public 
health. Why then did IDB, which has consistently followed the World Bank in its 
lending priorities and policies, begin providing health loans years before its larger 
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competitor-cum-colleague? In this chapter I demonstrate how the early histories of 
public health lending within the World Bank and IDB reveal the institutions’ concern 
for public health as a unique public relations issue, and I begin to demonstrate how 
these concerns have interfaced with Guyanese popular politics in shaping health 
programs. I emphasize that the dominant popular and academic framework of racial 
tension between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese has been essential to development 
interventions in the country, and I highlight the ways that these framings constrain 
possibilities for indigenous Guyanese. I begin by examining the shifting ideologies of 
governance shaping the World Bank’s growing attention to public health in the 1980s 
and 1990s, against concerns long expressed by its Executive Board. 
 
Development Banks and Global Health 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, international health circles were abuzz with 
commentary on the newly influential role of the World Bank in the field (Ruger, 
2005). A 1998 editorial in the American Journal of Public Health, for example, argued 
that “the WHO’s leadership role has passed to the far wealthier and more influential 
World Bank” (Silver, 1998: 728). Over the previous decade, the World Bank had 
begun to provide large amounts of financing for health projects, and had taken on a 
prominent role in establishing agendas for health aid internationally—through the 
institution’s research and reports, and through engagement in various global health 
fora, such as conferences and international meetings, which the World Bank often 
convenes.  
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Observers often suggested that the World Bank’s new position in global health 
was rooted in its financial power. But while development banks’ ability to mobilize 
large amounts of finance certainly impacted their influence in the emerging field of 
global health, the idea of the “wealthy” World Bank obscures the fact that the 
institution provides health financing almost entirely through loans, as opposed to other 
organizations’ grants; development bank financing ultimately has to be paid back.13 
This lending relationship contributes to development banks’ emphasis that they 
finance and oversee loans, rather than implement them. While the banks design the 
projects that they finance as a concerted process through their headquarters and 
country offices, these projects are officially implemented by the borrowing 
government, most often by a consulting firm hired under the banks’ conditions—
through which banks can shape project implementation (Rottenburg, 2009). 
And while the WHO had a full fifty years of experience in international health 
by the late 1990s, the World Bank had extremely limited involvement in the field of 
international health as little as twenty years before. The World Bank’s original focus 
was lending money to the governments of Western Europe for the reconstruction of 
roads and other physical infrastructure after the Second World War. However, with 
the United States’ Marshall Plan providing European governments with funding that 
did not have to be repaid, the World Bank moved quite quickly to start making loans 
for projects outside of Europe (Goldman, 2005).  
The World Bank was initially named the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), and it was established based upon the agreement of forty-
                                                13	Both	the	World	Bank	and	IDB	do	provide	some	grants,	mainly	in	the	form	of	“Technical	Cooperations”	that	pay	for	consultancies	to	prepare	further	loans.	
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four countries at the Bretton Woods Conference convened by the US government in 
1944, where the International Monetary Fund was also set up. While agreements at the 
conference were primarily influenced by the world’s imperial powers, which still 
controlled much of their colonial empires, the conference did include delegations from 
Latin American nations and some of the first countries that had attained independence 
from Britain – including South Africa and Egypt (Goldman, 2005; Kapur, Webb and 
Lewis, 1997). In the following years, these post-colonial countries joined other newly 
independent governments in calling for an institution that would provide loans at 
lower interest rates for countries deemed the world’s poorest; in 1960 the International 
Development Association (IDA) was established as a part of the World Bank that 
would provide such concessional loans. Several other organizations have been 
established under the umbrella of the World Bank Group since the IBRD was first 
established, including the International Finance Corporation, which was established in 
1956 with the goal of investing specifically in private sector activities. However, the 
IBRD and IDA alone form the institution known as the World Bank (versus the World 
Bank Group), and they focus on providing loans to governments. 
Michael Goldman has described how even after the establishment of IDA, the 
World Bank continued to follow a conservative lending strategy focused on the 
construction of roads, ports, and power plants, which the institution’s Wall Street 
investors imagined were most certain to produce capital to repay the World Bank’s 
loans.14 Goldman credits Robert McNamara, who became president of the World Bank 
in 1968 after his much-maligned stint at Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam 
                                                14	In	the	World	Bank’s	early	years,	almost	two-thirds	of	its	capital	came	from	World	Bank	bonds,	sold	to	such	private	investors	(Kapur,	Webb	and	Lewis:	137,	961).	
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War, for introducing a focus on “the absolute poor” and the need to make loans 
specifically focused on “poverty alleviation.” McNamara argued that the World Bank 
could expand its impact, influence, and lending by directly targeting the world’s 
poorest. Instead of lending only for large infrastructure projects aimed at improving 
economies writ large, the bank could make more loans by also lending for agriculture 
projects to address rural poverty, and for projects in education and in family planning, 
which McNamara emphasized as an aspect of population control. 
Although the World Bank’s Executive Board15 expressed concern about this 
new direction of lending for poverty alleviation, McNamara was able to make use of 
rhetoric from scholars in development studies such as Dudley Seers as well as 
postcolonial leaders like Indira Gandhi, along with a new emphasis on the 
quantification of poverty that he established within the World Bank (Goldman, 2005: 
72-73). McNamara was able to get initial support for work in population and rural 
development, and even some environmental programs, but the World Bank’s board 
was concerned that public health loans would be a public relations problem because 
denying such a loan could vilify the institution (World Bank, 1975). The Board 
expressed these concerns in their 1975 decision to forbid the World Bank from making 
stand-alone health loans, and the author of that 1975 report further explained to me the 
context of the decision when I met with him in the winter of 2013. 
Fred Golladay was the primary author of both of the first two internal World 
Bank reports regarding public health lending, the first in 1975 and the second in 1980. 
An economist of education by training and an assistant professor at the University of 
                                                15	The	World	Bank’s	Executive	Board	is	controlled	primarily	by	the	countries	that	contribute	the	most	funds	to	the	institution,	including	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
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Washington, he was recruited to the World Bank in 1975 to examine the possibility of 
the institution making loans for public health projects.16 Sitting in the living room of 
his spacious Washington, D.C. home, Dr. Golladay’s wife – a retired statistician – 
offered the two of us tea as Dr. Golladay reminisced about his first years at the World 
Bank. He argued that the institution’s board had been concerned that public health 
loans were “a bottomless pit”: 
 
FG: McNamara’s decision to make the bank a poverty-oriented 
development institution flew in the face of what everybody thought, and so 
there was a lot of resistance in ‘71, ‘72 to his initiatives in environment and 
population and rural development. And health was the last to come on 
board and it was the most controversial. The senior VP at the time was a 
man by the name of J. Burke Knapp. He and McNamara didn’t get along 
very well. Knapp was the old bank, McNamara was the new bank. And 
Knapp really thought that health was a bottomless pit; that if you opened 
yourself to requests it would have an emotional appeal, you’re doing good 
things, humanitarian things, but you wouldn’t really have a way of saying 
no that wasn’t embarrassing to the Bank. And it was so far from the 
original charter of the bank that he resisted. I may overstate his role in this, 
but there was that tension. 
 
AW: And do you think it was a question of return on investment? 
 
FG: No, it was about how do you discipline lending in this area. And there 
was the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health 
Organization sitting around in principle doing the same thing. 
 
Golladay argued that the concern about public health loans was not their return on 
investment, but the highly “emotional” character of public health (as he called it): how 
could the institution ever say no to a loan in such an emotionally-charged area as 
health? 
                                                16	Golladay	had	some	experience	working	on	health	issues,	but	he	stressed	that	health	and	education	are	very	similar:	“From	an	economists’	point	of	view	they’re	basically	the	same	sets	of	problems:	public	provision,	lots	of	subsidies	lurking	in	the	background,	a	lot	of	highly	emotional	content,	big	constituencies	on	both	the	providers	side	and	the	public	side;	kind	of	unmanageable	institutions	in	both	instances.”	
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 However, the World Bank had already begun substantial efforts in family 
planning, nutrition, and even disease control. One of the institution’s earliest public 
health interventions was the Onchocerciasis (river blindness) Control Program that the 
World Bank initiated in 1973 with the World Health Organization (World Bank, 
1975). For this project, the World Bank provided an initial $750,000 grant, and also 
worked to raise funding from the governments of Canada, France, the United States, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Iraq. The program originated as a 
vector-control project that would provide insecticide spraying in West Africa with the 
goal of opening new areas to settlement and agricultural production, but expanded in 
1987 to include “mass drug administration” under one of the world’s first large scale 
corporate pharmaceutical donation programs (Liese et al, 2010). 
But in light of the concerns of the World Bank’s Executive Board as to the 
public relations issues surrounding public health lending, the organization’s leadership 
came to the agreement in 1975 that the World Bank would not make specific loans for 
public health projects, although it would “clean up after itself” (FG Interview, 2013). 
The final version of Golladay’s 1975 report phrased it thus:  
The Bank has decided that, in the coming years, it will continue to 
strengthen its awareness of the health consequences of the projects it 
supports, and of opportunities for improving health that are available under 
present patterns of lending. In other words, while the health benefits of 
projects are expected to increase, the patterns of lending will remain 
basically unchanged. Although this implies that the Bank will be less 
deeply involved in health than if it had decided to lend for basic health 
services, the scope and potential of the policy is not to be underestimated 
(World Bank, 1975: 5). 
 
The report set out the policy that the World Bank would not make “stand alone” loans 
for public health, but it would make efforts to minimize negative health effects of its 
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projects; it would continue to include “health components” of projects in other sectors. 
Furthermore, the report emphasized that the institutions’ projects in water supply, 
sewage, and housing all had major public health effects (World Bank, 1975: 5).  
At the time, the World Bank, along with many people in the areas of its first 
rural development projects, had observed that irrigation projects could lead to major 
changes in the patterns of water and vector-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis and 
river blindness (Lee, 1985). As the World Bank’s first full-time “health specialist,” 
Fred Golladay was made responsible for reviewing all World Bank loans to identify 
any possible health risks, especially relating to such water and vector-borne diseases. 
The following year, in 1976, the World Bank hired its first medical doctor (Bernhard 
Liese), who joined Golladay and another economist (Caio Koch-Weser) on the 
institution’s first health team, which operated out of the new Office of Environmental 
Affairs. 
Tasked with helping project teams design and implement project elements, the 
team remembers offering services that were much appreciated by project planners 
across the World Bank (FG, CKW, BL Interviews, 2013).17 Five years later, in 1980, 
the World Bank’s board requested further review of the issue of health lending. And 
while Golladay’s 1975 and 1980 reports make very similar arguments regarding the 
economically productive nature of such interventions, the 1980 report he co-authored 
with Bernhard Liese led to the approval health lending by the World Bank, where the 
1975 report had not been successful. Golladay attributes the success of the second 
                                                17	Golladay,	Liese	and	Koch-Weser	all	emphasized	the	services	their	team	offered	in	ways	quite	similar	to	what	David	Mosse	(2011)	has	described	with	respect	to	anthropologists	at	the	World	Bank.	Mosse	has	argued	that	development	bank	staff	commoditize	forms	of	expertise	in	order	to	establish	themselves	and	their	specialties	within	the	organizations.		
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report to the retirement of the most vocal board member that had been opposed to 
health lending, as well as the growing acceptance in and outside of the institution of 
McNamara’s emphasis on poverty alleviation (FG Interview, 2013). 
When the World Bank began making loans for public health specifically, 
Golladay’s health group was moved into the institution’s population division, where a 
strong divide emerged between the small group of economists and physicians on the 
health team and the much larger group of demographers who had previously made up 
the population division. Golladay quipped: “I know something about mergers and 
acquisitions. What’s the old joke? If you make horse stew and add a rabbit, it still 
tastes like horse” (FG Interview, 2013). He emphasized that health lending played a 
very minor role within the population division. And although having a physician as the 
new division’s director in the early 1980s helped bolster the health aspect of the new 
Population, Health and Nutrition unit, Dr. John Evans18 left the World Bank in 1983 
and was replaced in his position by a long-time bank bureaucrat who again paid little 
attention to health matters per se (Simmons and Rushikesh, 1988).  
In the subsequent years, the institution multiplied its structural adjustment 
lending. International financial institutions had designed this new type of loan in the 
late 1970s as a means of responding to international economic crisis (Kapur et al, 
1997).19 The loans’ requirements for economic liberalization and privatization formed 
the basis of the emerging “Washington Consensus”: a set of policy prescriptions that 
had been broadly promoted by DC-based financial institutions and which have often 
                                                18	Dr.	John	Evans’	son	Dr.	Tim	Evans	is	now	the	Senior	Director	of	Health,	Nutrition	and	Population	at	the	World	Bank.	19	See	Chapter	3	for	further	discussion	of	structural	adjustment	projects.	
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been cited as the heart of neoliberal economics (Naím, 2002). While structural 
adjustment projects were not the purview of the World Bank’s health divisions, they 
had major impacts on public health: through decreased public health budgets as part of 
“public sector downsizing,” and also through increased poverty associated with the 
loss of public sector jobs, increases in commodity prices due to monetary reform, and 
the loss of many local businesses that were unable to compete with large foreign 
companies whose products no longer carried tariffs (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010).  
 In the 1980s, while development banks were making extensive structural 
adjustment loans around the world, the World Bank’s health division focused its 
efforts on providing loans for physical infrastructure of health facilities and for 
primary healthcare services such as the provision of essential medicines, but the 
division was not able to entice many governments to take such loans (Fair, 2008). 
When the World Bank underwent a major reorganization in 1987, health specialists 
were distributed throughout the regional and country offices, giving them more direct 
contact with client governments (Birdsall, 1992). But the 1980s also saw the 
leadership of the World Bank’s research divisions taking an increasingly market-based 
approach to the institution’s social programs. The same year as the World Bank’s 
reorganization, the research division published a report on Financing Health Services 
in Developing Countries, which was based on the assumption that public health 
spending in poor countries could not be increased; the report offered the solution of 
asking citizens to pay (either through fees or insurance) for care that benefits them 
directly as individuals, rather than society as a whole. The report stressed that 
“individuals are generally willing to pay for direct, largely curative care with obvious 
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benefits to themselves and their families” (World Bank, 1987: 2). This resort to private 
payment was a major shift from the promotion of broad social services and 
understandings of health as an essential aspect of domestic and international solidarity, 
which had wide international support less than ten years before—promoted in such 
international forums as the 1978 Alma Ata Conference.  
Following on the Financing Health Services report, in 1993 the World Bank’s 
research division produced a World Development Report on “investing in health;” 
although it represents a less wildly capitalist view of healthcare than the 1987 report, 
the 1993 WDR had much broader circulation and in public health circles it came to 
represent the World Bank’s conservative approach to health (see Chapter 4). And 
while many public health practitioners criticized the framing of health as a commodity, 
the World Bank’s central role in international governance and growing leadership in 
international health helped produce a sevenfold increase in the institution’s health 
lending from the late 1980s to the late 1990s (Nelson, 1999: 50). These loans were 
oriented primarily towards health system reform, promoting decentralization and often 
the institution of user fees, following World Bank researchers’ arguments that 
governments could not afford to provide free national healthcare and needed to 
supplement their resources by charging for services.  
At the end of the 1990s, the division was re-named Health, Nutrition and 
Population, reflecting the new centrality of health over population lending (Fair 2008, 
5). At that time, the division began lending substantially for HIV/AIDS interventions, 
and from 1997 to 2006 the division’s total lending multiplied from 6.7 billion USD to 
16 billion (IEG, 2009). However, a 2009 report by the World Bank’s Independent 
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Evaluation group argued that the World Bank had had limited impact through its 
health lending, due to “irrelevant objectives, inappropriate project designs, unrealistic 
targets, and an inability to measure the effectiveness of interventions” (IEG, 2009: 
xvii).  
The World Bank has in recent years recognized that the Washington Consensus 
is a “damaged brand,” and that the language of “market-based solutions’’ as the 
primary answer to development problems of all types is not well-met internationally 
(Naím, 2005; Birdsall et al, 2010). The institution has acknowledged that structural 
adjustment policies often had detrimental effects on the lives of poor citizens and even 
on national economies (see Chapter 3), and that user fees excluded large numbers of 
people from health services, even when the poor were meant to be exempt from the 
fees (Rogers, 2010; World Bank, 2005). The institution has increasingly framed health 
as a right which demands government investment, rather than purely a commodity to 
be economized—although economic efficiency and private healthcare continue to be 
central in the World Bank’s health research. The election of Jim Kim – a physician 
and cultural anthropologist by training – as the organization’s president has signaled 
the desire of the institution’s board to reform the World Bank’s widespread reputation 
for being more concerned with finance than development (Engler, 2012), as well as the 
central role of public health in this rebranding. 
Throughout this dissertation I examine how these shifting ideologies have 
shaped the practice of health programs both at the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. And although similar dynamics have shaped the health programs 
of the two institutions, there are some fundamental differences between the 
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organizations. When IDB was founded in 1959, the World Bank had already 
undergone major shifts in how it interpreted its mandate during its nearly fifteen years 
in operation, moving from a focus on post-war reconstruction in Western Europe to a 
focus on infrastructural investments in the rapidly decolonizing areas of the world. 
However, European powers continue to be overrepresented in the governing 
procedures of the World Bank even today, where France, Germany and the UK, along 
with the US and Japan, together hold forty percent of the Executive Board’s votes, the 
remaining sixty percent divided among both borrowing and lending countries. The 
importance of having a development bank led by borrowing countries was a key 
argument leading to the establishment of IDB in 1959 as the world’s first regional 
development bank (Tussie, 1995: 17).20 
Although the World Bank occupies a great deal of international attention, the 
Inter-American Development Bank provides a larger proportion of development 
financing in Latin America and the Caribbean. The two development banks have 
pursued very similar objectives and methods, and overlap strongly in their areas of 
focus in the Western Hemisphere. IDB has even been criticized by some of its 
shareholders for its lack of independent strategy, as the organization often follows the 
policy directions of the World Bank (Nelson, 1999). The movement of staff and 
consultants between the two institutions certainly contributes to the organizations’ 
alignment. But beyond the banks’ commonalities, scholars and policymakers have 
framed IDB as unduly “reactive,” arguing that instead of setting strategic policy 
                                                20	Although	IDB’s	institutional	structures	give	borrowing	countries	more	executive	power	than	they	have	at	the	World	Bank,	the	US	alone	holds	thirty	percent	of	the	votes	on	IDB’s	Executive	Board,	in	addition	to	the	country’s	substantial	diplomatic	influence.	
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directions, it reacts to ad hoc circumstances. IDB staff usually frame the organization 
instead as “attentive,” emphasizing the importance of member countries in shaping its 
programs: IDB does not tell its member countries what to do, staff often claim, but 
instead follows what borrowing countries ask. To support this argument, IDB 
employees often reference the decision-making procedures of the IDB Executive 
Board, where borrowing countries hold a majority of votes. 
While IDB followed the World Bank’s orientations to structural adjustment 
lending and privatizing programs in the health sector throughout the late 1980s and the 
1990s, IDB began health lending before the World Bank. As opposed to the World 
Bank, “social development” was a central aspect of IDB’s mission from its initial 
establishment. In the 1970s IDB began to make loans for physical infrastructure of 
hospitals and clinics (Nelson, 1999: 75). The first development bank health project in 
Guyana was a USD 8.8 million dollar IDB loan agreed upon in 1978, which provided 
for infrastructural improvements at Georgetown Hospital, as well as for the training of 
healthcare workers. And while both IDB and the World Bank have emphasized their 
evolutions away from seeing physical infrastructure as the heart of public health 
improvement, recent bank loans in Guyana look strikingly like the institutions’ earliest 
loans. Although program materials for IDB’s 2004 Health Sector Program focus on 
“organizational development and institutional capacity improvement,” only about one 
quarter of the loan’s twenty-three-million-dollar budget are devoted to these activities; 
the other $17 million dollars are for infrastructure (IDB, 2004). So while development 
banks’ approaches to public and private investment in health have shifted substantially 
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in recent decades, the practice of health as infrastructure has remained surprisingly 
resilient. 
This continuity in approaches mirrors the long timescale that connects the 
Guyanese government to past bank loans through repayment: this original 1978 loan is 
still being repaid by the Government of Guyana, even with the major debt relief 
programs that both IDB and the World Bank have put into place over the last fifteen 
years (IDB, 2016; IDB, 2017). Development specialist Shalmali Guttal has 
emphasized that such debt relief programs primarily serve to keep poor countries 
within the banks’ systems of loans and repayments, because the astronomical levels of 
compounding interest on earlier loans would otherwise lead borrowing countries to 
either revolt en masse or simply refuse to pay sums that multiply far more quickly than 
national economies (Guttal, 2000). In spite of these debt relief agreements, IDB 
remains Guyana’s largest creditor: debts to IDB alone account for 42.8 percent of 
Guyana’s external public debt (Cooperative Republic of Guyana, 2016: 9). 
Financing health projects through loans shapes the dynamics of development 
banks’ involvement in global health. These loans are a part of the broader international 
finance system; development financiers see these low-interest loans as a way of testing 
whether countries are “good performers” that follow the “discipline” of loan 
conditions and repayment schemes (International Development Association, 2002). A 
2002 World Bank report emphasized that such lending: 
has therefore often been seen by other bilateral and multilateral 
agencies as providing a signal to initiate or expand assistance 
programs, and, as countries develop, this becomes a signal to private 
capital markets as well (International Development Association, 
2002:4). 
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Here the World Bank frames health and development lending as an essential 
aspect of international financial growth, as a means of testing the “climate” for 
private investment. 
 But while health projects are shaped in large part by such institutional histories 
and ideologies, development bank logics and practices have varied substantially across 
the institutions’ networks: from research to operations, headquarters to country offices, 
and across the agencies and firms involved in negotiating, planning, and implementing 
projects. How then do development banks’ ideologies interface with governing logics 
across the institutions’ networks as the institutions plan and implement health 
programs? In Guyana, both popular and academic analyses have framed racial tensions 
between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese as the most essential dynamics of governance. So 
how do governing logics in Guyana interface with the knowledges and values at play 
in development bank health projects? To examine these relationships, I start by 
analyzing how the country’s racial politics have been conceived of by academic and 
popular analyses in Guyana and abroad, and how these popular politics have shaped 
approaches to public health in Guyana. 
 
Guyanese Governing Logics and the Politics of Race 
From speeches of elected officials to elementary school classrooms and the 
country’s national anthem, one hears of Guyana as a “land of six peoples”—a colonial 
racial stratification among so-called East Indians, Africans, Amerindians, Chinese, 
Portuguese, and Europeans (Spencer, 2007). These racial classifications are rooted in 
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Guyana’s labor history, which has been constructed by consecutive governments as a 
foundational framework for the independent Guyanese nation. Postcolonial theorist 
Shona Jackson has eloquently shown how post-colonial Guyanese elites have 
mobilized these racial stratifications in formulating notions of national belonging 
rooted in contribution though histories of “modern” labor: from the descendants of 
enslaved West Africans first brought to Guyana under Dutch rule in the mid-
seventeenth century, to those of indentured servants from India and Portuguese 
Madeira and laborers from Hong Kong brought to Guyana in the late nineteenth 
century after the abolition of slavery in the British empire in 1834 – twenty years after 
the British took control of the territories of Guyana (Jackson, 2012; Kwayana, 2002; 
Moore, 1987). The labor of Portuguese indentured servants thus distinguished them in 
Guyana’s racial classifications from “Europeans” who oversaw and disciplined the 
labor of others. 
As Jackson points out, this stratification left little room for indigenous 
Guyanese to claim belonging through the defining pair of arrival and colonial labor. In 
the all but absence of British settlers, especially after independence, Jackson 
demonstrates how “those brought in as forced labor” enact what she calls “settler-
Creole social belonging and material right” (Jackson, 2012: 11), which turns on the 
spatial division of coastland versus interior spaces. “Afro-Creole” and “Indo-Creole” 
populations, which make up over eighty percent of Guyana’s population, live in vast 
majority in and around the capital along the Atlantic coast. These spaces were 
expropriated from indigenous Guyanese for plantations and coerced labor; 
Amerindians now live primarily in the western regions that border Venezuela down 
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through the savannahs and forests close to the Southern border with Brazil (Jackson, 
2012; Bulkan, 2014). In using the terms Afro- and Indo-Creole, Jackson places 
emphasis on the narratives of Caribbean hybridization and labor history that are at the 
root of what she calls “Creole indigeneity”: a means through which the descendants of 
laborers brought to Guyana from West Africa and the Indian subcontinent have 
positioned themselves as the true “natives” of Guyana. But while I draw on Jackson’s 
insights, in this dissertation I use the terms Indo-, and Afro-, and indigenous 
Guyanese, which place greater emphasis on shared Guyanese histories across these 
groups. 
In the face of these racial frameworks, the government of Guyana has enacted 
discourses of pluralism since the country won its independence from Britain in 1966, 
relying especially on the symbolism of holidays and festivals, as historian Ramesh 
Bhagirat (forthcoming) has emphasized—from national holidays rooted in Christian, 
Hindu and Muslim traditions to commemorations of Indian indentured servitude and 
African slavery (Indian Arrival Day and Emancipation Day) and an Amerindian 
heritage month.21 However, these celebrations contrast with regular accusations of 
racism and “racialism” in Guyana’s electoral system—terms that Guyanese use 
regularly in describing voting practices and the distribution of government benefits 
based on racial party affiliation. Discourses of multiculturalism serve to counteract 
such perceptions of racial hostility and polarization. But amidst this “land of six 
peoples,” public discourses frame Guyanese politics as a division between just two: 
between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese and the political parties associated with each.  
                                                21	In	chapter	4	I	discuss	the	contrast	between	limited	space	for	indigenous	citizenship	claims	and	public	symbolism	of	“indigenous	culture.”		
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Control of the executive branch in Guyana has only changed parties twice in 
the country’s history: from 1966 until 1992 the government was controlled by the 
People’s National Congress, which has been understood as the party representing 
Afro-Guyanese. From 1992 until 2015, the People’s Progressive Party held control of 
the government, and has been understood to represent Indo-Guyanese. The excerpts 
below are characteristic of frequent editorials in Guyanese newspapers, which 
highlight the discourses underlying this framework of political and ethnic divides 
between Afro- and Indo-Guyanese.  
 
I am cognizant of the fact that racism has touched the lives of all Guyanese. 
However, Indo-Guyanese face the brunt of this problem. Indo-Guyanese 
must understand the propellers to this problem if we are going to safe guard 
ourselves… We rarely stand up for our rights. We rarely join the picket 
lines or engage in civil unrest, riots or similar aggressive behaviors even 
when we are abused. We almost never engage in street crimes and almost 
never menace another race / ethnicity. Our good nature portrays us as weak 
and so we are taken advantage.  
-Dr. Annie Baliram, Kaiteur News, August 2016 
 
Issues are not the overriding thing here, race is. For the Indian, whatever 
the complaint, it only affects black people. Therefore there are no outraged 
Indians. There is no reason for the Indian voter to be on the picket line, for 
even though he suffers the same humiliations, he identifies with the 
Government. 
-Milton Bruce, Stabroek News, October 2014 
 
Every Guyanese knows that race-relations in this country, especially 
between Africans and Indians, are being skillfully balanced on a knife’s 
edge; it’s a powder-keg waiting to explode at any time given the right 
conditions. In the circumstance, [Member of Parliament] Edghill’s remarks 
are akin to throwing gasoline on a smoldering fire…He is deliberately 
fanning the flames of racial hatred, bigotry and discord in this country, in 
an undisguised attempt to ingratiate himself with the PPP’s Indian-support 
base.  
-Osafo Lynch, Kaiteur News, June 2016 
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In addition to emphasizing the framework of division between Afro-and Indo-
Guyanese, these excerpts highlight claims to exploitation advanced by both groups, as 
well as the shifting racial terminology at play: while some Guyanese would refer to 
Indo- and Afro-Guyanese, others (or in other circumstances) would refer to “black,” 
“African” or “Indian.” 
Both in popular and academic accounts, Guyana’s history has been read 
through these racial divides. Historian David Hinds has argued that 
while other factors such as class, party politics, ideology, gender and 
political personality have been prevalent in the political process, these 
have been manifested within the context of the ethnic competition and 
conflict between East Indians and African Guyanese. In the final analysis 
ethnicity has been the dominant factor in shaping the country’s political 
evolution (Hinds, 2011: xi).  
 
While he acknowledges other factors, Hinds argues that ethnicity clearly wins out as 
the “dominant factor” shaping Guyanese history and politics. Sociologist George 
Danns has similarly argued that racial divides have determined fundamental 
government decisions in Guyana’s history such as country’s move to pursue 
independence alone rather than united with other Caribbean colonies; Danns argues 
Guyana’s Premier Cheddi Jagan rejected membership in the West Indies Federation in 
the early 1960s due to his concern over losing his East Indian majority if allied with 
largely Afro-Caribbean colonies (Danns, 2013). 
But alongside the framework of racial division, there has been broad popular 
recognition of the role of British colonialism in creating these racial structures. In 
2010, the government’s Minister of Home Affairs published a news editorial 
excoriating the British High Commissioner for his comments on race relations in 
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Guyana, emphasizing that Guyana’s racial divides were created by the British colonial 
government: 
The British High Commissioner, Mr. Wheeler, must be living in a fool’s 
paradise. For him to state publicly that the “politicized racial divide is 
hindering development in Guyana” is to either falsify history or to strike 
out on his own whimsical agenda. The High Commissioner must be 
knowledgeable of his country’s history of resorting to the divide and rule 
policy in the British colonies of which British Guiana was an integral part. 
The racial divide in this country did not emerge yesterday; it was 
imported, fostered and institutionalized by the British ever since they 
landed in the colonies which were eventually combined to form British 
Guiana…The British High Commissioner should put these historical facts 
in his pipe and smoke them. 
  -Clement Rohee, Stabroek News, July 2010 
 
Minister Rohee had strong words for the British High Commissioner, emphasizing 
racial divides as the result of explicit efforts on the part of the British. This public 
commentary on the role of the British colonial government in promoting racial 
division is rooted in scholarly analyses by David Hinds and Eusi Kwayana, who have 
described ethnically-based colonial land and labor policies that pitted indentured 
servants against emancipated African slaves (Hinds, 2011; Kwayana, 2002).  
Popular discourses in Guyana also draw attention to the role of British and 
American governments in destabilizing Guyanese labor coalitions in the 1950s. 
Guyanese newspapers have carried numerous stories and editorials on the topic in 
recent years, covering releases of formerly-classified primary documents as well as 
new secondary sources describing how British and American governments intervened 
in British Guiana in the late 1950s and early 1960s to help re-orient political divides 
away from labor issues and towards ethnic divides (Fletcher, 2010; Mars and Young, 
2004; Misir, 2009; Correia, 2016; Rabe, 2006). Such stories often reference the 1953 
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military intervention by British troops following Guyana’s first elections under 
universal suffrage, which led to suspension of the new democratic constitution based 
on the supposed threat of a Marxist revolution under Cheddi Jagan’s newly elected 
government (Premdas, 1979; Stabroek News, 2011). In this intervention, British 
intelligence officers worked to promote race-based coalitions working against leftist 
organizers.  
However, in recent years demographic changes have been challenging long-
held assumptions and racial calculus in Guyanese electoral politics (Bulkan, 2014). 
Amidst very little change in the total Guyanese population over the past four decades, 
the percent of Guyanese identifying as “East Indian” has dropped from forty-nine 
percent just prior to the PPP’s election in 1992 to thirty-nine percent in 2012. While 
growing numbers of Guyanese identify as “mixed,” there has also been substantial 
emigration among Indo-Guyanese (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2016). In contrast, 
populations identifying as “Amerindian” have grown steadily, from five percent of the 
Guyanese population just after independence to over ten percent in 2012 (see chart 
below from 2012 Census). The Guyanese-Canadian anthropologist Janette Bulkan has 
argued that growth of Amerindian populations has led to a conundrum of increasing 
government focus on Amerindians as targets of patronage politics, without recognition 
of indigenous groups as genuine political agents (Bulkan, 2014; see Chapter 5).22 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the PPP could depend on winning elections 
with extremely limited votes beyond their Indo-Guyanese base, but that is no longer 
                                                22	In	Chapter	4	I	address	how	these	electoral	politics	converge	with	expertise	politics	within	nutrition	projects	to	position	indigenous	culture	as	a	biological	phenomenon,	undermining	indigenous	agency	and	creating	a	biological	basis	for	discrimination.	
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the case; these shifting demographics were an important factor in the PPP’s loss of the 
executive branch in 2015 for the first time in twenty-three years. 
 
 
 
Source: Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 201623 
 
 
These intersections of race, colonial histories and electoral politics have 
certainly shaped public health in Guyana. Historian Ramesh Gampat has described 
how the colonial government moved to expand health services in the 1930s after the 
end of indentured servitude made labor scarce, and keeping laborers healthy became 
                                                
23 This chart is drawn from the most recent Guyanese census; rather than represent demographic shifts 
based on population percentages, it presents them based on tallies of total individuals: the report notes, 
for example, that in 2012 there were a total of 415 people in Guyana identifying as “white.” This 
approach highlights the extremely personalized nature of national politics when dealing with such a 
small population. 
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more important to colonial administrators than it had been previously. However, 
Gampat stresses that in the late colonial period health services remained oriented 
around the sugar estates rather than comprising any substantial form of broad public 
health service (Gampat, 2015). In this period all sectors were governed through a 
central legislative council and the colonial governor; no Ministry of Health as such 
existed until after independence (Williams, 1991). 
In 1970 Guyana’s first Prime Minister – Forbes Burnham – declared the 
country a “Cooperative Socialist Republic,” to be organized around agricultural and 
business organizations owned and run by their members. As I discuss in Chapter 3, 
Burnham promoted public health as a central aspect of socialist solidarity, and the 
1970 Constitution provided the right to free medical care for all citizens. Throughout 
the late twentieth century, the percentage of total government expenditure devoted to 
public health in Guyana remained in the middle of rankings in South America and the 
Caribbean (PAHO, 1994). Nonetheless, healthcare workers have described extreme 
scarcity in the Guyanese healthcare system throughout the late twentieth century, 
including shortages in basic drugs, surgical dressings, and antiseptics, as well as 
constant understaffing (Misir, 2015).  
Throughout most of Guyana’s independent history there has been high 
emigration among healthcare workers, especially as the US and British governments 
have actively recruited nurses and health aides from the Anglophone Caribbean since 
the early 1970s (Bach, 2003). However, Guyana did not have a medical school prior to 
1985; the PNC government had long deemed it a better use of resources to educate 
small numbers of physicians outside of the country (Ramnath, 1998). In the 1970s and 
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early 80s the Guyanese government supported small numbers of fellowships to train 
physicians in Cuba, Jamaica, and the Soviet Union, and also relied on employing a 
substantial cadre of Cuban physicians; in 1984, over half of Guyana’s physicians were 
either Cuban citizens or had been trained there (Doma-Nguez, 1989). Large numbers 
of Guyanese physicians continue to be trained in Cuba today: while Guyana had a 
total of 161 actively employed physicians in 2010, there were 301 Guyanese students 
in Cuban medical schools that year (USAID, 2010: 61). And of the physicians 
working in Guyana in 2010, over half were citizens of Cuba, China, or India (USAID, 
2010: 55). 
In spite of development bank efforts to promote private health services, public 
health services in Guyana continue to far outweigh private care with respect to 
spending, infrastructure, and employment. A 2010 USAID Health System Assessment 
emphasized how low private expenditure on healthcare is in relationship to total health 
expenditure in Guyana – only 12.3 percent as compared to the Latin America and 
Caribbean average of 43.17 percent (USAID, 2011: 8). However, the report also noted 
that the entirety of private health spending in Guyana is out of pocket because private 
health insurance is essentially non-existent (USAID, 2011: 8). Public health services 
are primarily funded by the Government of Guyana; in 2010, only 36 percent of total 
health expenditure was financed by international development agencies and donors 
(Persaud, 2010).  
This lack of health insurance coverage and minimal private payment for 
services runs against several of the central policy aims of both the World Bank and 
IDB over the last several decades. And while I have argued here that infrastructural 
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projects have been the most enduring form of health intervention that development 
banks have pursued in the face of the World Bank’s early concerns about health 
lending, the construction of health facilities has been closely bound up with the 
racialized electoral politics I have described here. In the following chapter I turn to the 
daily practices of development bank health projects, which often run counter to the 
policy prescriptions and self-representations offered by development bank 
headquarters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
‘NEGLECTED TROPICS’:  
PRACTICING HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT FROM 
GUYANA TO WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
 
At the fifth annual meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative in the fall of 2009, 
everyone was trying to get an invite to the Inter-American Development Bank cocktail 
party at New York’s Warwick Hotel. The bank was launching its Neglected Tropical 
Disease (NTD) initiative, and it had enrolled high-profile partners including the Miss 
Universe Organization and the Brazilian National Soccer Team. Many observers 
would just have to settle for coverage the following day: 
Beauty queens, politicos, and major international players were among 
over 100 attendees that turned out to celebrate this unprecedented 
commitment. … The crowd was incredibly enthusiastic, though some 
of the guests had only recently learned about the devastating impact of 
NTDs. Political consultant and strategist James Carville was overheard 
stating “This [issue] could really take off.” Paula Shugart, President of 
the Miss Universe Organization, emphasized how excited the Miss 
Universe Titleholders are to “get their boots on the ground—even if the 
boots have six inch heels” (End the Neglect, 2009). 
 
Such reports often read like fan blogs and gossip magazines, highlighting big names in 
US media and electoral politics and well-worn clichés of beauty queens in 
philanthropy. To all this fanfare, IDB was committing to “mobilize” $30 million 
towards NTD control in the Western Hemisphere, alongside the Global Network for 
Neglected Tropical Diseases—a coalition of NGOs working on NTD research and 
“applied solutions.” But while IDB and the Global Network linked their names to this 
large sum, these organizations were certainly not promising to offer the funds 
themselves; they would seek to raise the $30 million from “public and private sources” 
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(IDB, 2009). Large publicity events promising sums of money for global health 
interventions arose quite often in my research, but the monies came through much less 
often.  
Speakers at the 2009 event stressed that neglected tropical diseases—including 
soil transmitted helminths, Chagas disease, dengue, schistosomiasis, leprosy, and 
lymphatic filariasis—“produce extreme poverty through their impact on children’s 
physical and cognitive development, pregnancy outcomes and worker productivity” 
and “are some of the most common disabling and disfiguring diseases afflicting the 
poorest people living in the Americas” (IDB, 2009). Here speakers mobilized 
recurrent themes in IDB’s health messaging, including the idea that health issues 
among the poor lead to problems in mental capacity, and in people’s ability to work 
later in life—frameworks that I discuss in Chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation.  
The terminology of “neglected tropical disease” had become increasingly 
institutionalized over the years leading up to the IDB launch, after the WHO officially 
established a department under the title in 2005 (Savioli et al, 2011). In the years prior 
to that, several international meetings had drawn attention to “neglected diseases” tout 
court, especially in relation to the emergence of “the big three” (HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria) as a central focus of the millennium development goals 
(MSF, 2002; WHO, 2003; Caines, 2004). The addition of the term “tropical” makes 
these diseases seem more distant from sites of fundraising and planning like the IDB 
event at the Clinton Global Initiative, evoking an eighteenth-century notion of the 
“torrid tropics,” whose climate itself caused disease (Harrison, 1999), and the 
nineteenth-century “pathologization of space” that undergirded the idea of tropical 
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medicine (Naraindas, 1996). While some infectious disease specialists have stressed 
that it is not climate that is responsible for the prevalence of these diseases so much as 
poverty, the name has stuck, although so too has the description of NTDs as diseases 
of the “bottom billion”—referring to the world’s poorest billion people (Feasey et al, 
2009; Hotez et al, 2009). No one seems to question the term “neglected,” but that 
framework is also erroneous: it is exploitation rather than neglect that has been at the 
heart of the social and environmental conditions of poverty. 
Beyond the glitzy launches and high-profile partners, in 2009 IDB was also 
looking for countries to take their new NTD loans. The organization had recently 
contracted a Spanish consultant – a medical doctor with training in public health and 
epidemiology – to travel to several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
evaluate possibilities for NTD programs. She identified an ideal candidate for IDB’s 
first NTD loan component: Guyana had a recent history of efforts to eliminate 
lymphatic filariasis, and IDB was already in the process of developing a sanitation 
improvement program there. Improving sewage systems would address stagnant, high-
organic waters that form breeding sites for the culex mosquitos that transmit filariasis 
in Guyana, and this could be combined with further population-wide preventative 
treatment. By the time of my fieldwork four years later, the Government of Guyana 
had taken an IDB loan for a lymphatic filariasis project, and was in the process of 
rolling out the program’s “mass drug administration,” as I describe below.  
Throughout this dissertation, I examine the relationships of authority and value 
that shape health efforts across development bank networks. In this chapter I introduce 
the daily relationships at play in my fieldwork in Guyana and in Washington, D.C., 
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highlighting the dynamics of expertise, nationality, gender, personal connection, and 
rumor that make up project life. I describe the role of healthcare workers, 
administrators, anthropologists, and development generalists, etc. in Guyana’s 
Neglected Tropical Disease and nutrition programs, and I present an initial glimpse 
into the values revealed by project methods. I close the chapter by highlighting how 
the importance of quantitative and economic evidence amongst researchers at bank 
headquarters looks quite different from the relationships I described in the first 
sections of the chapter in bank operations, a topic I examine further in Chapter 4. To 
begin this exploration, I examine the interpersonal and interagency dynamics shaping 
my fieldwork with Guyana’s Neglected Tropical Disease loan in 2013. 
*** 
Trained as a public health nurse in Guyana in the 1990s, by the fall of 2013 
Nurse Jeffers had recently been appointed as the Ministry of Health’s supervisor on 
the new IDB Neglected Tropical Disease loan. She had often spoken to me about how 
much she loved working on the Ministry’s tuberculosis program before being 
transferred to NTDs, especially the close relationships with patients she developed as 
she conducted home visits week after week to observe patients’ TB drug therapy. But 
as the NTD project was taking shape, she lamented that the project seemed to be 
mainly inter-agency wrangling. The Ministry’s Chief Medical Officer was currently 
upset because no one from his team had attended a meeting on the NTD project held 
the week before at Guyana Water, Inc., the country’s publically-owned utility 
company. 
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“Ravi didn’t even mention the meeting to me,” Nurse Jeffers told me, referring 
to the new IDB consultant on the project. As we grabbed a mid-morning snack from a 
stand in the Ministry’s courtyard, Nurse Jeffers wondered aloud if Ravi’s behavior 
was rooted in his “bigger issues” with the Ministry. I knew the rumors she was 
referencing. Many people in the Ministry believed Ravi—a Guyanese 
ethnomusicologist-turned-national development specialist—had gotten his position 
with IDB by fabricating stories about financial mismanagement within the Ministry, 
positioning himself as necessary to proper management of the loan. Ravi did seem to 
be able to transform himself endlessly. After a career as a musician, in 2010 Ravi 
Sigward had won a scholarship to study “Applied Community Change” at the Future 
Generations Graduate School in West Virginia and had since maneuvered into a 
variety of areas of public service supported by international development funding. 
Ravi was one of the main reasons I was studying the NTD loan. A friend had 
introduced us the year before during one of my research trips to Georgetown, when I 
was trying to learn more about development agencies and public health in Guyana. 
During that first trip we’d spent many hours riding in the back of an open pickup truck 
to various project sites, discussing Caribbean activism, US politics, soca music and 
plans for the NTD project. But our relationship had rapidly deteriorated over the 
previous months, as the NTD project began to return poor coverage numbers, and as I 
grew closer with Nurse Jeffers and Ms. Mahmoud, the NTD project’s supervisor and 
administrator at the Ministry of Health. As tensions between Ravi and the Ministry of 
Health heightened, he no longer wanted to chat with me casually about the project, 
often querying why I wanted to know about project details. 
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Ravi had arranged a meeting the week before at Guyana’s government-owned 
water utility, which shares responsibility for implementing the NTD loan with the 
Ministry of Health, as well as the Ministry of Local Government, all overseen by IDB. 
The NTD project aims to eliminate lymphatic filariasis and control soil-transmitted 
helminths in Guyana both through environmental and preventative pharmaceutical 
interventions—combining major infrastructural interventions into Guyana’s sewage 
system with a “Mass Drug Administration” program.  
Prior to the IDB project, in 2003, the Government of Guyana had initiated a 
program to distribute salt fortified with diethylcarbamazine (DEC), a drug used to treat 
filariasis in many parts of the world since the late 1940s, which had just been added to 
WHO’s essential medicines list in 2002 (Kimura, 2011). Guyana’s DEC program had 
been heralded within the United States Centers for Disease Control and the World 
Health Organization as “the first program of its kind” pursuing the “unfulfilled 
potential” of DEC salt, offering the drug in the form of a food product akin to iodized 
salt, rather than as a pharmaceutical (Lammie et al, 2007). The Government of Guyana 
was even able to promote Caribbean business by negotiating with a company in 
Jamaica to produce the salt. While the DEC salt program was discontinued in 2007 
after problems arose in the production process, the “Get on the BUS” (Buy DEC salt, 
Use DEC salt, Share this information with family and friends) campaign had done a 
great deal to raise awareness of filariasis in Guyana—especially the idea that the 
permanent and massive disfigurations of the limbs associated with filariasis could be 
prevented (Persaud, 2013). 
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After visiting Guyana in 2009, IDB’s Neglected Tropical Disease consultant 
suggested that Guyana would make an ideal candidate for IDB’s first NTD loan, in 
large part because of the country’s history of filariasis intervention. But rather than use 
DEC salt, IDB’s program aimed to provide preventative medications to the entire 
population through a “Mass Drug Administration” of two drugs in pill form. The 
program would provide DEC and albendazole through a door to door distribution 
campaign conducted once annually for five years (IDB, 2010). Under a 1998 
agreement, GlaxoSmithKline had agreed to donate enough albendazole to eradicate 
filariasis globally, as part of a longer tradition of corporate donation of anti-parasitic 
drugs (Ottesen, 2000: 592). 
In the process of planning the IDB filariasis project, the goal of decreasing the 
prevalence of soil-transmitted helminths (STH) was added to the program because 
albendazole is also effective against these intestinal worms. Although filariasis is a 
mosquito-borne disease, it is caused by parasitic worms that are in many ways similar 
to hookworm and other soil-transmitted helminths: the microfilariae of lymphatic 
filariasis are transmitted via mosquitos, whereas STHs are most often transmitted 
either through vegetables grown in contaminated soil or through contaminated water 
(de Silva et al, 2003). And while STHs then infect the intestines, filaria causes 
permanent disfiguration when microfilariae block lymph channels and lymph fluid 
flows out into surrounding tissues. 
During its implementation, this NTD project was overseen for IDB by an 
Italian environmental economist based in the Guyana Country Office. In IDB 
documents and external publicity materials, he often framed the project as a part of 
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IDB’s focus on “multi-sectoral” efforts to “piggy back” health projects off the bank’s 
more well-known expertise in large scale infrastructure (IDB, 2010). Here population-
wide efforts in preventative medicine were supposed to capitalize on environmental 
interventions that would decrease the presence of filaria’s mosquito vector, as well as 
STH contamination, by decreasing sewage overflows and drainage backups in 
Georgetown. The resulting project included involvement from IDB, Guyana Water, 
Inc., the Ministry of Local Government, Guyana’s Regional Health Authorities, 
PAHO, Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation, the Ministry of Health’s Division of 
Vector Control, and the Ministry of Education. 
In the first months of my research, I spent weeks waiting for meetings that 
were constantly being rescheduled, or attending meetings where no decision could be 
made because the appropriate authorities were not present. One day near the end of my 
first five-month dissertation fieldwork stint Guyana, I attended an inter-agency 
meeting held in the main wooden building of the Ministry of Health, raised up by stilts 
like so many Georgetown buildings due to constant flooding and poor drainage. We 
met in the central board room, whose large stuccoed walls were empty apart from a 
picture of President Ramotar. I explained in my fieldnotes: 
 
Today we were finally able to meet with the Chief Medical Officer as part 
of the inter-agency steering committee, and the decisions we’ve been trying 
to settle for two months suddenly got decided in half an hour. The signs 
need to be large and orange, because Dr. Persaud (the CMO) says it is his 
favorite color. There was a lengthy discussion about the order of the 
institutional logos on the volunteer t-shirts, and the committee ultimately 
agreed that the logos would be presented in a square with IDB upper left, 
then the Ministry of Health, Guyana Water, Inc., and PAHO around 
clockwise. And the CMO wants there to be a jingle. He really liked the 
DEC jingle. But for me the most important part of the meeting was how the 
CMO treated Ravi. Sitting at the head of the huge rectangular table in the 
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Ministry of Health’s main boardroom, he constantly teased that “Ravi is 
angry because I’ve been taking so long” or “Ravi is angry because the 
coverage numbers have been bad.” The CMO quickly enrolled other 
committee members against Ravi without leaving them space to disagree: 
gesturing “right, Dr. Ceron?” and moving on before the PAHO 
representative could speak up. Dr. Persaud stated clearly that Ravi should 
not have access to the full filaria survey and population data because “Ravi 
is a good boy right now, but who knows how things will be” (Fieldnotes, 
18 Nov 2013). 
 
My fieldnotes betray some frustration with waiting so long for what seemed a very 
simple decision about the design of t-shirts for project volunteers. For months prior to 
the steering committee meeting, Nurse Jeffers and Ravi had held numerous formal and 
informal meetings: Ravi would visit to the Ministry of Health and I would help the 
two of them as they worked to determine key campaign messages, plan trainings for 
nurses and project volunteers, and identify vendors to produce publicity materials. But 
we had to wait weeks to months on every tiny decision to get input from the CMO.  
While international health analysts have often contrasted slow work rhythms in 
global health projects against supposedly Euro-American proclivities towards 
efficiency (World Bank, 2003; Chaudhury et al, 2006), the relationships of authority 
shaping this project’s temporal dynamics are not unique to postcolonial contexts. Our 
waiting speaks to the authority that the CMO held in project planning and the ways it 
manifested in the life rhythms of his staff and collaborators. The Chief Medical 
Officer held no official position on the NTD project implementing team, but few 
project decisions could be made without his input. He had played a central role in 
appointing Nurse Jeffers as the Ministry of Health’s representative on the project, and 
he was Nurse Jeffers’ direct supervisor. It was a tough work environment, where 
miniscule pay often didn’t come through on time, and vacation days often didn’t come 
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through at all. Many Ministry staff spoke of their work as “tight-rope walking”: any 
foul move and you could be sidelined despite years of service. But in their reference to 
the massive amounts of time devoted to t-shirt design, these fieldnotes also speak to 
the role that institutional branding plays in these development projects. Decisions 
about the layout of institutional logos were absolutely central to discussions 
throughout project planning. 
 The question of time and authority was also significant to relationships 
between the Ministry of Health and public medical clinics, whose staff were 
responsible for recruiting and coordinating teams of volunteers to distribute NTD 
medications door to door as the basis of the project intervention. Clinic staff often 
complained that the Ministry made unreasonable demands on their time, for example 
alerting clinics with only a day’s warning that their staff would need to be present for 
a day-long training with the Ministry. While project administrators emphasized the 
importance of nurses being trained on the transmission and clinical effects of filariasis 
and soil transmitted-helminths, as well as the NTD project’s methodology, clinic staff 
stressed that it disrupted work schedules substantially if nurses were meant to be in 
their clinics but were instead at a training. And while complaints about the Ministry 
often circulated amongst clinic staff, senior nurses also voiced their discontent directly 
to Ministry staff in inter-agency meetings and by visiting IDB project staff at the 
Ministry of Health to speak one on one.  
 After one such visit from a nurse regarding the project’s organization and 
communication, I sat with Nurse Jeffers and Ms. Mahmoud, the project 
supervisor and its administrator, in the cool of their office as they lamented the 
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problems that seemed to pile one on the next. On top of the nurses being upset, 
there were still people clamoring that they had not been paid their small daily 
stipend for volunteering in the Mass Drug Administration on the East Coast 
several months before. Nurse Jeffers and Ms. Mahmoud shook their heads as 
they commented that the project couldn’t even follow through to get these people 
a few dollars for transportation and for water during their work, when Ravi’s 
IDB salary was “fat like hell.” Like many of the volunteers, Nurse Jeffers and 
Ms. Mahmoud seemed to think Ravi was not managing project finances fairly, if 
not outright embezzling. Accusations of financial mismanagement often 
circulated in and around the development bank projects I studied, from Ravi’s 
accusation of Ministry staff that supposedly got him his job with IDB, to 
accusations that Ravi wasn’t paying volunteers, and claims of corruption in 
securing providers for IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program, which I discuss below. 
But while the dynamics of patronage are an essential element in the health 
projects I describe (Chapter 4), the accusations of corruption are equally 
important: they reveal expectations of governance, and serve as a popular means 
of critiquing relationships of inequality and exploitation (James, 2012; Smith, 
2007). In the following section, I demonstrate how such accusations of 
corruption have led to the early termination of Guyana’s flagship nutrition 
program, even in the face of great accolades for the project and its data practices, 
as I highlight the values and knowledge practices at play in Guyana’s Basic 
Nutrition Program. 
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Accusations, Data, and Guyana’s Basic Nutrition Program 
 In 2007, the Government of Guyana and IDB initiated a USD $5 million loan 
project that aimed to address childhood and maternal malnutrition through the 
distribution of micronutrient and food supplements, and though nutrition education 
campaigns and surveillance. The project was designed as a form of wealth 
redistribution that would provide citizens in the country’s poorest districts with 
income supplements in the form of food. But in addition to food supplements, the 
“Basic Nutrition Program” sought to distribute micronutrient supplements for 
consumption by pregnant women, infants, and young children. The project had 
obtained a license from Ped-Med Ltd. to produce the micro-nutrient “Sprinkles” that 
the small Canadian company had patented (Zlotkin et al, 2005). The IDB team chose 
to reformulate the content of the Sprinkles slightly to include iron, Vitamin A, Vitamin 
C and zinc for children, and folic acid, ascorbic acid and iron for pregnant women. 
Although previous nutrition surveys suggested that iron deficiency was the only 
micronutrient deficiency prevalent in Guyana, project planners decided that it was 
better to provide for possible unidentified problems than to go on a locally “evidence-
based” approach alone, as the project’s chief consultant phrased it. This was in stark 
contrast to the “data-driven” nature of the program broadly. As I describe below, the 
BNP mobilized data collection as a key tool to advance the project’s profile 
internationally. 
Income supplementation through food vouchers was a central aspect of the 
pilot Basic Nutrition Program as initially designed, but in 2012 the project began an 
extension that did away with the food supplements, leaving micronutrient Sprinkles 
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and education as the project’s primary interventions. The sprinkles were produced 
under Ped-Med’s license by a Guyanese company, the formerly public “Guyana 
Pharmaceutical Company,” which had been privatized in 1992, and had been owned 
by local conglomerate leader Bobby Ramroop since that time. In early 2013, I visited 
the “New GPC” factory to see how the Guyanese company produced the Sprinkle 
supplements, on the encouragement of a friend who worked as an assistant to 
Ramroop. Just a few weeks after my visit to the factory, one of the country’s most 
prominent newspapers -- Kaieteur News -- published a report accusing the Guyanese 
government of paying New GPC over a million US dollars-worth for drug products 
that had never been delivered (Kaieteur News, 2013). Rumors of corruption between 
the Ministry of Health under the People’s Progressive Party and Guyana’s New GPC 
pharmaceutical company had circulated for years, including accusations by the 
shadow Minister of Health who served during the PPP administration, and regular 
inquiries by Kaieteur News. That newspaper has examined several forms of corruption 
involving the two entities, including the Ministry of Health’s nearly sole-sourcing of 
pharmaceuticals from New GPC, “grossly above-market” prices being paid by the 
government to the company, deliveries gone missing, and tax manipulation (Kaieteur 
News, 2016; Kaieteur News, 2012b). Based on these inquiries, Kaieteur News has 
been under libel suit for its accusations that New GPC’s owner has colluded 
extensively with the PPP government headed by his close childhood friend, President 
Jagdeo, as well as subsequent PPP administrations (Kaieteur News, 2012).  
Although New GPC produced Sprinkles for the Basic Nutrition Program, I 
never heard anyone at the BNP offices speak of possible corruption within New GPC 
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or the Ministry. This contrasted sharply with the way project staff discussed other 
failures of the Ministry of Health, for example when they argued that the Ministry had 
abandoned a nurse who had fallen ill, stressing that the Ministry would not look out 
for people who gave their lives to it. But the director of the Health Sector 
Development Unit, where IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program was administered, was 
deeply embroiled with the PPP leadership, and staff were careful of criticisms that 
might implicate the director in any way. But in the months following the 2015 
election, it became more and more difficult for BNP administrators to avoid the issue 
of the New GPC’s dealings, as the BNP moved to the center of public rumor and 
accusation. Several news articles suggested that the Guyanese government might have 
to repay large portions of the BNP’s 2010 loan-extension, as IDB was beginning an 
inquiry regarding funds that had not been accounted for (Balgobin, 2015; Kaieteur 
News, 2015). Under the new government, audits revealed large inconsistencies 
between the BNP’s accounts paid and the supplies of micronutrient sprinkles delivered 
by New GPC. The sprinkles are a central aspect of the program, and the project’s 
yellow and red sprinkle packets are a common feature in health centers, at health fairs, 
and at various public events, where they get handed out liberally alongside pamphlets 
on anemia, breastfeeding, and the role of fathers in childcare. Although the project 
began in a small set of health centers in districts with high poverty rates, the 2010 loan 
extension allowed the program to be expanded nationally. But following the post-
election concerns about financial mismanagement, the Government of Guyana 
formally requested that the $3 million USD that had not been disbursed be 
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transformed into a project for “Sustainable Housing for the Hinterland,” and the BNP 
was brought to an end (IDB, 2015). 
The Basic Nutrition Program had received great accolades from the PPP 
government and from IDB, and had even been awarded a “Development Impact” 
award from the U.S. Treasury in 2012 (IDB, 2012). The program devotes substantial 
funds to monitoring and evaluation, which has helped provide the quantitative data on 
reductions in childhood and prenatal anemia, as well as overall malnutrition, that have 
formed the basis of this widespread attention. Research has been a major focus of 
Social Development, Inc., the Guyanese consulting firm that has coordinated the 
project: its principle investigators hold PhDs in nutrition and in cultural anthropology 
from Cornell and Cambridge. As a part of the Basic Nutrition Program, they have 
conducted research into rates and causes of malnutrition among indigenous Guyanese 
(see Chapter 5), measuring the impact of community nutrition counselors on 
breastfeeding rates, and investigating changes in young mothers’ nutrition 
“Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices” based on different counseling approaches and 
printed publicity materials.  
Research under the BNP has been used to generate several spin-off loans, 
including the World Bank-financed “Hinterland Feeding Program” initiated in late 
2007. Both the BNP and the Hinterland Feeding Program attracted regular visits from 
researchers at IDB and the World Bank. In November 2013, for example, a group of 
IDB researchers from headquarters and from the Brazil country office came to 
interview project implementers in the clinics, the Health Sector Development Unit, 
and at the central Ministry of Health in preparation for a research report on IDB’s 
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health initiatives. The team stayed at Guyana’s Pegasus Hotel, a 1970s hotel that had 
not been much renovated, and ate at road-side stops and fish shops, welcoming me to 
join the team. The Brazilian physician and young Venezuelan health economist on the 
team set a casual tone for their visit, joined by the headquarters representative, an 
American straight out of his undergraduate degree in development studies. Their ways 
of addressing each other felt caring and sincere, without the glad-handling efforts at 
feigned informality I often felt at World Bank headquarters. Their visit barely made a 
ripple among BNP staff from the Ministry, who seemed happy to talk about the 
program, but quite unconcerned with the research. Although the visit from a group of 
foreign development agency staff and consultants was quite usual to Ministry staff, 
their visit struck me, as I mentioned in my fieldnotes: 
When they got to the gate of the Ministry of Health, Jonathan (the 
HQs rep) talked to the guard to sign them all in. Denise and Nancy 
stood aside, chatting in Spanish, positioned next to a sign explaining 
the Ministry’s Dress Code. The sign read “LADIES NO: Short pants, 
armless dress or tops, thin straps, tights, midriff or tube tops, jerseys 
or t-shirts with indecent language or art” and below that “GENTS 
NO: Short pants, armless vests, jerseys or t-shirts with indecent 
language or art.” Both Denise and Nancy were wearing sleeveless 
tops, but they strolled easily past the guards, no concern from either 
side. Of course, these rules are only for Guyanese. But there’s been 
extensive public debate on the dress code since the reports that 
patients have been turned away from Ministry of Health properties for 
not passing the dress code. I saw a student-produced TV spot last 
week emphasizing the gendered and colonial roots of the propriety 
standards behind the dress code, which asked “Why does the Ministry 
of Health have a dress code when its toilet looks like a scene from 
Outbreak the movie?”24 
 
Seeing Denise and Nancy next to the Ministry’s dress code emphasized to me the 
different gendered standards at play between Guyanese women and foreign 
                                                24	Fieldnotes,	12	November	2013.	
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development agency staff. But here “foreign” was not in the sense implied in 
Guyanese creole, where foreign refers solely to North America:25 Nancy was 
Venezuelan of mixed indigenous descent, and Denise a tall Brazilian woman, although 
I would guess that she was rarely taken for Brazilian in Guyana. I had quite regularly 
been asked if I was Brazilian, and I understood the subtext that was often behind the 
inquiries; while there were some powerful Brazilian families in Guyana, Brazilian 
women with my skin tone had a reputation for working in nightclubs and various 
aspects of the sex trade. These dynamics of race and gender were significant for 
relationships of authority within development bank projects, and for my own 
interactions in my research. Northern economists often shared thoughts with me so 
much more readily than the Guyanese nurses who were rightfully concerned about 
how my work might affect their jobs and lives. While I was often read as Brazilian 
during my fieldwork in Guyana, I was not often taken as Guyanese; Nurse Jeffers was 
not the only one who suggested it was because of my light eyes: “Get some sunglasses 
from Giftland,” Nurse Jeffers suggested, “and people won’t know you’re not a 
Putagee,” referring to Guyanese of Portuguese descent. Many people told me it wasn’t 
my skin tone or features that marked me as foreign, so much as a weariness in my eyes 
that would have marked me as Guyanese but which I was missing. And while amongst 
older white male development staff I operated as a young, mixed-race American 
woman, among Guyanese it was often my American identity that stood out 
                                                25	Savitri	Persaud	(2015)	has	written	of	the	difficulty	of	navigating	the	dual	identities	of	being	Guyanese,	raised	in	“farren,”	describing	for	example	the	subtle	comments	of	a	taxi	driver	suggesting	she	wasn’t	really	Guyanese,	making	her	want	to	scream	out:	“I	belong	here!	I	am	not	just	from	farren!	This	is	where	my	native	string	was	cut!	I	am	Guyanese	and	Guyana	is	my	home!	Mi	belang	hay!”		
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immediately. So when one of my closest friends, a Guyanese-Bahamian IT consultant, 
heard a man on the street call me “red woman,” he teased that I could be happy the 
fellow had recognized my mixed African roots: red was a term for light-skinned black. 
That this research trip, led by two South American women, lacked the pomp of 
many other bank missions was not surprising to me. The visit of an IDB operations 
team later that year was a much more formal affair, enough so that I was not permitted 
to join for most of it. The day before the operations team visit, project staff were 
rushing around the BNP offices in the public hospital complex and at the Guyanese 
consulting firm responsible for implementing the project, whose offices were on the 
other side of town. Project staff were calling for reservations at various restaurants, 
making sure that meetings with senior Ministry leaders were set, and reviewing recent 
project reports. The BNP project team leader for IDB was based in Trinidad; he had 
grown up there, and had completed degrees in public administration, law, and 
business, before studying hospital administration and becoming a “social sector 
specialist” for IDB in 1998. Since he was meant to be the “on the ground” presence for 
IDB’s nutrition project, he made visits regularly to Guyana, but the missions retained a 
feeling of stiffness each time – in dress, in speech, and in protocols. 
But the more relaxed feeling of the fall 2013 IDB research mission does not 
reflect the identities of research and operations broadly at World Bank and IDB 
headquarters. At the World Bank, researchers are generally based at the D.C. 
headquarters, and make infrequent field visits. A greater percentage of IDB staff are 
based in country offices, as part of the institution’s efforts to be “closer” to borrowing 
countries than are other financial institutions (Nelson, 1999). Operations staff from 
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both banks joke that the researchers are buttoned-up academics, out of touch with the 
daily realities of getting projects to work. Although there is often a light-heartedness 
to meetings of researchers, who laugh at their own self-described “wonkiness,” there 
are markers of greater formality in their interactions: meetings planned with more 
advanced warning, more prescribed meeting agendas, etc.  
Research divisions are also dominated by men. Observing a 2015 research 
meeting on conditional cash transfers held at the World Bank’s main DC headquarters 
building, I remarked in my fieldnotes that all of the nine speakers were male: 
As the panelists took their places around the table, I couldn’t 
believe that every single one of them was male. Perhaps my 
perspective is skewed after studying the banks in Guyana. The 
IDB Country Chief is a woman, the Ministry of Health’s NTD 
coordinator is a woman, the vast majority of nurses and volunteers 
implementing both projects are women, etc. Certainly many of the 
most senior positions in Guyana’s Ministry of Health are held by 
men, but that has not been the case with IDB and World Bank 
visiting consultants on the filariasis and nutrition projects, which 
have often been women with PhDs and other doctoral degrees. 
 
I considered at that time whether my surprise at the all-male panel, heightened by the 
large number of panelists, was shaped by my recent experiences in Guyana. I must not 
have remembered the panel I had attended in that same building three years before, 
where the World Bank had co-hosted a panel with a DC think-tank, the Center for 
Global Development. That all-male panel had eleven members, although they were 
quite mixed in their national backgrounds: from India, the US, Botswana, the UK, 
Uganda, and Mali, plus introductory remarks by World Bank President Jim Kim, an 
American who had been born in Korea.  
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Beyond the gender dynamics at play, these two meetings were also significant 
moments in my research for examining the types of expertise and evidence that were 
valued in different spaces of the banks’ networks. The first panel was a public event, 
held as part of the 19th International AIDS Conference, and framed as a debate 
amongst “development celebrities” (Over, 2012) regarding the following proposition: 
“Continued AIDS investment by donors and governments is a sound investment, even 
in a resource constrained environment.” Before and after the panel, the moderator 
asked the audience for a show of hands in support of each side; based on these votes, 
at the end of the event the moderator declared those arguing against the motion to be 
the “winners” of the debate. Mead Over, a long-time World Bank health economist, 
later accounted his “win” to his mobilization of data against his adversaries, the well-
known economist Jeff Sachs, and the UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibé. 
Over argued that:  
The audience seemed to be moved by Michel Sidibé’s argument 
that AIDS spending had engendered and subsequently fueled global 
social progress and tempted by Jeff Sachs’ assertion that resources 
can be cajoled or wrested from the rich to meet all possible health 
needs. But neither of them adduced evidence to support the 
proposition at hand. In fact, both argued, Michel implicitly and Jeff 
explicitly, that the proposition be discarded so that the debate could 
be held on different premises and with different metrics. I suspect 
that many in the audience…were a bit put off by Jeff and Michel’s 
decision not to play by the rules. This left an opening for Roger and 
me, which we had luckily prepared for: An evidence based 
argument. If Michel and Jeff had bombarded the audience with 
impressive statistics, like ART’s 96% prevention rate of HIV-
negative partners from the HPTH 052 trial or the Granich et al 
finding that AIDS could be eliminated in South Africa within 
“only” 40 years by a $100 billon test-and-treat program, the 
proponents would have held onto, and perhaps gained, adherents 
(Over, 2012). 
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Over’s comments emphasize his own concern with statistics, and his perception, based 
on long experience at the World Bank, that efforts to reformulate a problem are largely 
unsuccessful in the face of such statistics, even when advanced by an economist with 
as much credibility as Jeffery Sachs. But such a concern with quantitative evidence 
was nowhere to be found in the relationships of project operations that I describe 
above and in the project planning and implementation I analyze in the following 
chapters. While many bank researchers advance an ideal of calculated, rational 
prioritization and project design, my own work highlights the personal relationships 
and dynamics of authority at play in development bank health projects beyond 
economic tools and market logics, like those I have begun to describe in this chapter. 
In the following chapters, I further analyze the relationships among such 
researchers and operations staff in the World Bank and IDB, examining the 
knowledges and values at play in various arenas and how they come to interact in the 
planning and implementations of public health projects. First, in Chapter 3 I examine 
the ways that healthcare workers narrate the history of development bank-led reforms 
in the Guyanese health sector, highlighting how shared elements of socialist and 
neoliberal discourse underlie healthcare workers’ tales of continuity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NARRATING HEALTH AND SCARCITY:  
GUYANESE HEALTHCARE WORKERS, WORLD BANK 
REFORMERS, AND SACRIFICE AS SOLUTION FROM 
SOCIALIST TO NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Sitting upstairs in the administrative wing of Georgetown Public Hospital 
Corporation—Guyana’s largest hospital, Matron Williams spoke of the changes she’d 
seen during forty-five years working in the country’s public health system. “Matron” 
was a title rooted in the British system, she reminded me, but everyone continued 
using it even after her position was officially renamed “Director of Nursing” over a 
decade ago. Names changed, she noted, sometimes reflecting more substantive 
changes than others. When she had first started volunteering at the hospital as a high 
school student, even Guyana didn’t have its current title—it was still British Guiana, 
about to gain independence that year in 1966. Ten years later, Matron Williams had 
finished nursing school and was working in the trauma ward at Georgetown Hospital. 
It was a tough time for public health in Guyana, she explained: 
They were nationalizing everything and there was a lot less being 
spent…People were of course dissatisfied, we had a lot of migration. Once 
people could get out, they’d get out (AC Interview, 2015). 
Matron Williams attributed tight public health budgets in the 1970s to socialist 
reforms focused on nationalization and cost control. However, she went on to argue 
that these were much like health system reforms initiated in the late 1980s under 
structural adjustment agreements with the World Bank, and Guyana’s move from a 
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socialist to a market economy. She stressed that in both cases budgets were tight and 
her friends and colleagues continued streaming out of the country. 
In this chapter I analyze how healthcare workers like Matron Williams narrate 
their experiences of Guyana’s public health system from the country’s socialist period 
through its market transition. While this process of “adjustment” involved massive 
cuts in public employment and spikes in poverty, healthcare workers surprisingly 
don’t recall much change between socialist and capitalist systems; instead, they have 
emphasized continuity in public health governance across these periods. Does this 
framework of continuity simply reflect healthcare workers’ efforts to provide a 
narrative arc to their lifelong careers, or do these narratives describe unexpected 
connections between socialist and neoliberal governance? In the case of the later, do 
such connections represent an encroachment of neoliberal values prior to the end of 
socialism, or do they reflect continuities in values across self-proclaimed differences 
in ideology? In what ways have healthcare workers’ recollections aligned with the 
discourses of socialist officials and neoliberal reformers, and where have they 
differed? And how have these narratives and discourses varied in relation to material 
conditions in Guyanese public health? In order to examine these relationships, in this 
chapter I draw on oral histories with Guyanese nurses, physicians and health 
administrators, as well as archival records of socialist politicians and World Bank 
reformers, and various assessments of the Guyanese health system from the 1970s 
through the 1990s. I investigate how healthworker narratives, official discourses, and 
conditions of scarcity tell the story of the capitalist transformation of healthcare in 
Guyana led by development bank structural adjustment programs. 
 87 
This chapter responds to literatures within political and medical anthropology 
STS, and sociology that have refined understandings of late capitalism by highlighting 
the often-surprising connections between neoliberal and socialist governance and 
knowledge practices (Bockman, 2011; Eyal, 2000; Kipnis, 2008; Brotherton, 2008). 
Johanna Bockman (2011) has demonstrated the essential role of socialist practice and 
economic theory in the development of neoliberalism through neoclassical economics, 
and Gil Eyal (2000) has emphasized the centrality of Czech socialist thought in 
developing neoliberalism’s concern for civil society. A growing body of literature has 
suggested that tools and values integral to socialist systems have been taken up by 
reformers in the neoliberal tradition, and have played a central role in what Eyal has 
called the bricolage of neoliberalism (Eyal, 2000; Bockman, 2015; Collier, 2011). 
Similarly, scholars have shown that socialist systems often incorporated substantial 
elements of individualism, along with other values and methods associated with or 
rooted in capitalism (Lampland, 2016, 1995; Kharkhordin, 1999).  
These literatures have focused primarily on intellectual histories of Eastern 
Europe. In this chapter I bring together analyses of governing discourses with 
narratives of experience to examine relationships between socialist and neoliberal 
governance in the global South. I situate this work between broad theorizations of 
neoliberalism which have paid little attention to the dynamics of location (Wacquant, 
2012; Brenner et al, 2010; Brown, 2003), and the many theorizations of neoliberalism 
in specific sites (e.g. Ong, 2006). I draw attention to dynamics in Guyana that suggest 
very different dynamics of neoliberalism in the global North and South. I highlight 
differences in the ways that socialist and neoliberal public health have imagined 
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healthcare for Guyana’s wealthy, but I emphasize how the context of material scarcity 
and histories of extraction have produced important continuities in governance, 
making the relationship between socialism and neoliberalism in Guyana and much of 
the global South differ significantly from that in the global North, where ideological 
changes enable much larger shifts in the resources made available for health programs. 
Beginning from healthcare workers’ narratives, in this chapter I highlight how 
ostensibly neoliberal values of efficiency and individual responsibility (Rose, 1999, 
2007; Shamir, 2008; Zigon, 2010) have been key discursive tools for both Guyanese 
socialist politicians and World Bank reformers instituting market reforms.26 I argue 
that recognizing discursive similarities helps interpret popular experiences of 
governance and the descriptions of continuity offered by Guyanese healthcare 
workers. I emphasize that in the face of ongoing scarcity and across major shifts in 
governance, Guyanese citizens continue to be offered a very similar recipe of 
sacrifice. 
 
Oral History, Narrative, Experience 
Within my research methods outlined in the dissertation’s introduction, this 
chapter is based on oral history methods, including interviews conducted between 
2013 and 2015 with forty-six health professionals and administrators (nurses, nurse’s 
aides, midwives, and physicians) who worked in the health sector in Guyana during 
both the socialist period of the 1970s and after marketization in the late 1980s. I 
selected interviewees through snowball sampling focused on distribution in racial and 
                                                26	While	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	did	provide	limited	structural	adjustment	financing	in	Guyana,	the	institution’s	involvement	in	laying	out	specific	policy	prescriptions	for	Guyana	has	been	much	more	limited	than	the	World	Bank,	which	forms	the	focus	of	this	chapter.	
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regional background as well as professional path. My research has been based 
primarily in the capital city, where much of the country’s healthcare system is focused, 
but I have also conducted interviews and ethnographic work in several small villages 
(St. Cuthbert’s Mission and Yupukari), across the densely populated coastal areas 
outside of Georgetown, and in several larger cities (Linden, New Amsterdam). I also 
conducted interviews with Guyanese healthcare workers who emigrated to the US. 
From physicians to nurse’s aides, and rural to urban settings, this group represents a 
wide range of experiences, but across these many sociodemographic factors, 
healthcare workers consistently narrate their experiences of public health governance 
over the last several decades through a lens of continuity. 
This analysis does not interpret data from oral history interviews as a direct 
representation of the past or of Guyana’s overall experience of structural adjustment.  
Healthcare workers’ memories and narratives have certainly been shaped by their 
subsequent experiences, as well as the politics of collective memory (Bunzl and 
Berdahl, 2010; Cole, 2001; Watson, 1994). In the context of Guyanese public health, 
likening governance before and after Guyana’s market transition is a recounting of the 
past and a political position that serves to discredit the current government’s narratives 
of progress. And although my interviewees have experienced a wide array of 
backgrounds, these men and women’s history of employment means they do not 
represent Guyana’s poorest, who were certainly the most affected by the shifts of 
structural adjustment (Campbell, 2002). Nonetheless, these oral history interviews 
provide a significant window into the experience of Guyanese healthcare workers, and 
the frameworks through which they interpret and narrate their experiences 
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(Chamberlain, 2007; Hoffman and Hoffman, 2007). Focusing on healthcare workers 
allows me to examine experiences of health governance from the perspective of 
individuals who have engaged daily with Guyana’s public health system over several 
decades. 
Because people interpret their experiences through widely-circulating 
languages and frameworks, I couple my oral history with an analysis of official 
discourses drawn from archival sources (including annual reports, policy papers, 
strategic planning documents, topical reports, speeches, and news coverage) from the 
National Archives of Guyana, the holdings of the Pan-American Health Organization 
at the University of Guyana, and from the personal files of a variety of current and 
former high-level administrators in the national health system. These methods allow 
me to analyze themes in healthcare workers’ recollections across political and racial 
affiliation, and to cross-reference lived experiences with themes emerging in archival 
documents. The discourses of public officials I highlight here are one of several 
factors influencing healthcare workers’ narratives, including the effects of memory 
noted above. 
In the first section of the chapter I demonstrate how healthcare workers have 
emphasized continuity across major shifts in governance taking place within their 
lifetimes. In the following section I demonstrate how Guyanese socialist politicians 
promoted efficiency, responsibility and sacrifice as key principles for public health, 
and I argue that these discourses have been reflected in the perspectives of healthcare 
workers—in the public health pamphlets they’ve developed, in their engagement with 
elected officials, and in oral history interviews. In the third section of the chapter I 
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show how World Bank reformers have mobilized languages framing sacrifice as a key 
to public health efficiency that are strikingly similar to the discourses of socialist 
politicians—discourses that shape healthcare workers’ narratives of continuity in 
public health governance. But even as neoliberal reformers join in promoting the 
values of efficiency and sacrifice, they imagine a very different distribution of 
responsibility across Guyanese society, along with quite distinct visions of the past 
and ideal futures.   
 
Shifting Governance, Continuing Scarcity 
Standing under the floodlights in front of the grandstand at Georgetown National 
Park, waves crashing on the seawall not 300 meters away, Prime Minister Forbes 
Burnham addressed a large crowd: 
On this twenty-third day of February 1970, we become the first 
Cooperative Republic in the world. Four years ago we committed to build 
Guyana for Guyanese with our own hands. Now we commit to a new 
political and economic path (Burnham, 1970: 2). 
 
That day Burnham officially declared Guyana a “Cooperative Socialist Republic,” to 
be organized around agricultural and business organizations owned and run by their 
members. But the crowd was much smaller at a May Day celebration held two decades 
later in the same location, where President Hoyte declared that a new agreement had 
been signed with the World Bank supporting liberalization of Guyana’s economy 
(Khan, 1990). This agreement was part of the World Bank’s structural adjustment 
programs designed to confront the growing debt “crisis” (Roitman, 2013) through 
quick disbursements tied to large-scale adjustments in national economic systems—
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especially marketization (Gershman & Irwin, 2000). But while these two declarations 
presaged very different periods of governance—between Guyana as a self-declared 
socialist republic and Guyana undergoing market reforms guided by international 
financial institutions, healthcare workers frame shifts between the two periods as 
having little real effect in their lives and in Guyana’s health system, often voicing 
comments like the following: 
People say Burnham was a dictator, but not much changed after 
Burnham’s time. Our salaries were still frozen, staff kept migrating, and 
there was never enough money to service regions outside of Georgetown. 
But we always made do. 
 -Nurse Phillips, midwife 
 
They’re the same policies over and over again. The government now 
promotes health fairs where you can take an active role in knowing about 
your health and taking care of your own health; it is the same as 
Burnham’s old socialist self-help. 
-Dr. Singh, pediatrician 
 
The continuity of frozen salaries, miniscule budgets, lack of staff, and a repeated turn 
to self-help before and after adjustment emerge constantly in healthcare workers’ 
tales, in spite of the very real negative consequences of structural adjustment for 
health in Guyana—especially the rapid spike in poverty caused by monetary 
devaluation in the late 1980s (Campbell, 2002). 
At one level, healthworker narratives reflect Guyana’s unique experience of 
adjustment: while poverty and expenditure statistics have varied a great deal according 
to their sources (Thomas, 1993), it is clear that Guyana did not implement drastic cuts 
in its health budgets following the initiation of structural adjustment agreements with 
international financial institutions in 1989, as opposed to many other countries. 
Guyana’s public health expenditures fluctuated slightly as a percentage of GDP 
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throughout the 1970s and 80s, correlating to overall growth in real per capita spending 
through the 1970s and decreases in the 1980s. However, health spending rose from the 
mid-1980s through the period of adjustment (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Selected Health Indicators, Guyana 1970-1995 
  1970 1975 1979 1984 1987 1992 1995 
Government Health Expenditure 
(%GDP) 2.33 2.15 3.22 2.79 2.09 3.2 2.5 
Government Health Expenditure 
(per capita 1998 USD) 21.86 27.08 38.44 28.01 21.45 55.1 44 
Physicians per 10,000 population   1.7 1 1.6 2 2 2.7 
Infant Mortality per 1,000 live 
births 55.4 54.3 53.5 51.4 49.4 44.5 41.4   
Source: PAHO 1992, 1998 
 
The Guyanese government also avoided implementing some of the most detrimental 
policies associated with adjustment and health, such as user fees.27 But Guyana is not 
the only country in the region that has been able to avoid massive cuts to its health 
budgets as a part of adjustment agreements; both before and after adjustment, the 
percentage of total government expenditure devoted to public health in Guyana was 
firmly in the middle of rankings in South America and the Caribbean (PAHO, 1998). 
Nonetheless, poverty and unemployment increased sharply in Guyana in the years 
following adjustment (Campbell, 2002).  
At a deeper level, healthcare workers’ narratives of continuity suggest that 
                                                27	Public	health	scholars	have	consistently	shown	that	charging	people	at	the	point	of	public	health	services	in	low-income	countries	excludes	people	from	health	coverage,	even	when	there	are	fee	exclusions	for	the	poor	(Nyonator	and	Kutzin,	1999;	Kou,	1997;	Gilson	and	McIntyre,	2005).	While	scholars	disagree	as	to	how	healthcare	should	be	financed,	for	example	through	tax-based	as	opposed	to	private	healthcare	insurance,	there	is	quite	str28	This	commonality	speaks	to	Wendy	Brown’s	arguments	that,	far	from	“hollowing	out	the	state,”	neoliberal	capitalism	has	positioned	the	state	as	a	key	actor	in	its	systems	of	extraction	(Brown,	2003).	
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even in the face of negative impacts of adjustment (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010) and 
across shifts in spending, funds and services have been extremely limited throughout 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and governing actors have turned to 
similar discourses of responsibility, efficiency and sacrifice to narrate these 
limitations. But the importance of material scarcity does not imply that governing 
ideologies do not matter: activist challenges have continued to demonstrate that a turn 
to sacrifice and efficiency are not the only means of addressing such scarcity. Indeed, 
the distribution of these burdens looks quite different in the discourses of socialist 
politicians and World Bank reformers—as described below. 
 
Socialist Narratives 
 Shortly after declaring Guyana a “Cooperative Socialist Republic,” Forbes 
Burnham introduced a clause into the development of the new Republican constitution 
that would not only guarantee “the right to free medical attention” for all citizens, but 
which set out the duty of citizens “to participate in activities designed to protect the 
health of the nation” (Constitution of Guyana, 1970: ch. II, art. 25). That same year 
Guyana’s Ministry of Health established a strategy for the upcoming decade, 
highlighting the provision of free healthcare as a fundamental principle of the new 
Republic (Government of Guyana, 1970). But rather than depend on the government 
for curative care, the strategy emphasized that the citizens of Guyana needed to 
embody the nation’s central principle of self-help, in this case through preventative 
care. Nutrition and hygiene were especially important, including pre- and post-natal 
care to address the “unacceptably high” rates of infant mortality, which were the 
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highest in the Anglophone Caribbean. Malaria had essentially been eliminated with 
DDT spraying over the previous decade, the report noted, but diseases of infancy were 
a primary concern, as were pneumonia and bronchitis, diarrhea and enteritis. 
 This version of self-help was rooted in individual responsibility and autonomy, 
as Burnham explained in a 1973 speech: “the gospel of self-reliance, the unalterable 
aim to make the small man a real man – the arbiter of his own fate” (Burnham, 1973: 
2). In discussing the 1970 health plan, Burnham argued that this self-reliance was 
crucial to improved public health: 
It was at first hoped and expected that, in constructing health facilities 
like those in Leonora and Corentyne, it would have been possible to 
provision more health posts. It was not possible, and we admit it. What 
has been done instead has been to encourage the villagers in all of these 
areas to indulge in self-help. The performance of self-help in this 
country has been a phenomenon (Burnham, 1970: 9). 
 
Burnham stressed that in light of the government’s inability to provide services, 
individual action would have to play a central role, and he encouraged Guyanese to 
engage in self-help both through direct self-care, and by joining together in projects to 
improve the physical infrastructure of health facilities and water systems. But party 
leaders stressed that self-help was not about government failure; it was about 
efficiency. The Minister of Finance, for example, argued: 
The criticisms about the health programme seem to imply that there 
must be some high cost prestige hospital and there must be a large 
number of specialist doctors running all about the country or deployed 
throughout the country. …What is needed is the training of local people 
to address and prevent ailments in their communities, who can provide 
an adequate and efficient service, which does not require the attention 
of highly skilled people (Hoyt, 2014 [1970]: 31). 
 
Here self-help is presented as a value not only because of the autonomy it allows, but 
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also because of the efficiencies it provides. 
Party leadership stressed that taking advantage of local resources was a crucial 
aspect of self-help. The Ministry of Health echoed this message, for example in a 1981 
nutritional pamphlet that promoted the use of cassava instead of imported wheat 
products, arguing for a return to the country’s Amerindian heritage as a model of lean 
living and good use of resources:  
Cassava has been a staple of the Amerindian diet for centuries, even 
before the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Americas. It is a gift 
given to Guyana by the native people. Although cassava originated in 
Amerindian diets, today it is truly Guyanese. In Guyana’s history, 
cassava came to be used by various plantation labourers including 
slaves, Indian indentured servants, and other ethnic groups brought to 
work on the plantations, making a bridge across these ethnic groups. 
Still today, cassava can be a bridge connecting all Guyanese 
(Kirkpatrick, 1981: 4). 
 
The authors of this pamphlet promoted a nationalist vision of nutrition based on the 
idea of Amerindians as an ancient people whose customs could link Guyana to its pre-
colonial past and at the same time provide an alternative to the impositions of 
plantation society. In this vision, sacrificing the now-standard comforts of imported 
wheat flour would help Guyanese learn to make more efficient use of resources; 
personal nutrition was to offer a crucial form of self-help for maintaining public 
health. 
 These public health narratives promoting self-help and the use of local 
resources also picked up on the recurring language of sacrifice in public discourse, 
reflected in fora such as Prime Minister Burnham’s speech at Guyana’s Fourth 
Republic Day, where he stressed:  
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The times are serious. Not only have all of us, including the Prime 
Minister, to make the sacrifice of foregoing many a luxury to which 
we have grown accustomed, but which is unnecessary for living, but 
also we shall all have to bring our productivity in whatever task we are 
involved, to a new high... This is a period that will try men’s hearts, 
limbs and energies… I can see the silver lining as the cloud begins to 
break, but a herculean effort, of which I know we are capable, is 
required to remove the dark cloud entirely and leave over us the clear 
sunlit sky of prosperity (Burnham, 1974: 7). 
 
The Prime Minister invoked Biblical imagery to support the importance of sacrifice, 
hinting at the Promised Land hidden behind the current clouds of economic difficulty, 
and emphasizing that a temporary sacrifice would soon lead Guyanese to bathe in the 
warmth of prosperity. 
 But while socialist politicians offered this as short-term sacrifice, it was an 
ongoing message throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It was sacrifice offered in the name 
of efficiency: not just belt-tightening, this was learning to live better for the long-term. 
Almost ten years after Burnham’s Republic Day speech, Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid 
offered a similar message: 
I hear Guyanese say they’re starving. What he means is he’s not 
getting a particular item he’s become used to…Development has its 
pains. Unless we can appreciate the pains of development, we will all 
go around in the old ways and will remain with ignorance and poverty 
(Correy, 1982: 6). 
 
Reid argued that the pains of sacrifice would help Guyanese move on from “the old 
ways” of colonialism and dependency, allowing them to turn to local resources and 
emerge a more efficient, and self-sufficient nation. 
These official discourses are central to the recollections Guyanese healthcare 
workers offer of this period. Many nurses recall their efforts to improve public 
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nutrition in the face of national economic difficulties, and food import restrictions that 
the Guyanese government had put in place to promote local production, greater 
efficiency, and national sovereignty. These nurses often speak of developing Ministry 
of Health recipe books to help Guyanese substitute rice flour into dishes traditionally 
made with wheat flour, to confront restrictions on the importation of wheat. In a health 
system essentially devoid of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, nutrition was 
the central tool available to healthcare workers, and today they speak of nutrition as a 
tool of self-help for public health. 
Lorna Smith, for example, had gone to do her master’s degree in nutrition at 
the University of London in the late 1970s, and she remembers returning to Guyana 
with enthusiasm for the nationalist project and her role in it as a member of Guyana’s 
health corps. Nurse Smith hadn’t grown up among Guyana’s elite, but she had 
frequented the halls of Georgetown Hospital, where her grandmother was a laundress. 
“Two places I’m comfortable: hospitals and universities,” she told me on multiple 
occasions. Nurse Smith grew up primarily with her grandmother, who she describes as 
a stern woman who dealt with innumerable challenges with her mixed Afro-Guyanese, 
Amerindian, and Chinese heritage. Lorna stressed to me that it was this spirit in the 
face of challenge that—even when she was a young, newly trained nurse—gave her 
the confidence to speak her mind to such influential politicians as Forbes Burnham. 
Upon completing her studies, Lorna wrote a letter to President Burnham stressing how 
nutrition could be used towards the sacrifices of development. She described to me: 
So I heard this rumor in the Ministry that they were going to export all 
the rice to get foreign exchange, and instead increase the production of 
provision [starchy root vegetables] and I said “this is gonna be crazy,” 
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so I slapped my chest and I wrote a little letter to the President, 
Burnham, and I said to him, I understand the difficult position that he’s 
got himself in, it is not the best idea to export the rice, but if he wishes 
to then he ought to supplement to make sure, because the provision 
doesn’t have a high calorie density, so make sure that other things are 
available to increase the calorie density. For instance, make sure that oil 
is cheap so that we could at least fry. So I gave him a whole set of ways 
that he could possibly make it work (LS Interview, 2015). 
 
For Nurse Smith it was clear that as a nutritionist—even one without high rank in the 
Ministry of Health—she could help make healthy life possible with limited resources. 
And indeed, President Burnham responded by requesting that she sit in on subsequent 
parliamentary debates regarding agriculture and nutritional policy. Years later in our 
interviews, Nurse Smith echoed official discourses in arguing that sacrifice was in fact 
generative, referring to the 1970s as the “Golden Age” of nutrition in Guyana, where 
people were willing to experiment with any and all ideas for new sources of calories 
and nutrients, food preparation techniques, etc.  
 Across lines of racial and political affiliation, the healthcare professionals I 
worked with in Guyana, and those who had emigrated, recalled nationalist pride in 
their work. However, the challenges of tight budgets were evident as well. Nurses 
consistently told me of washing, powdering, and repackaging latex gloves for re-use in 
the 1970s. Healthcare workers also recall how their salaries were frozen and collective 
bargaining was brought to an end during this period. While unions and the labor 
movement had played a central role in Guyana’s independence efforts, Burnham’s 
PNC government undermined the power of unions by promoting the doctrine of “party 
paramountcy.” Under this 1974 policy, the party became the primary decision-making 
body in the country, above all state organs. Organizations such as unions were no 
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longer invited to contribute to negotiations and decision-making (Rose, 2002). And 
while many healthcare workers lamented a dwindling national spirit in subsequent 
decades, they also emphasized how the tight budgets, understaffing, and frozen 
salaries they associated with Guyana’s socialist period persisted through the structural 
adjustment projects of the late 1980s and early 1990s, as I show in the following 
section. 
 
Narrating Adjustment 
In 1979 the World Bank established the structural adjustment loan as a new 
instrument meant to disburse money quickly to the many postcolonial countries where 
international economic recession and associated increases in oil prices were making it 
impossible to pay for crucial imports (food, medical supplies, etc.) with revenues from 
exports, let alone repay the large debts they had accrued from extensive lending by 
commercial and development banks during the 60s and 70s (Bockman, 2015). 
International financial institutions including the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund increasingly provided structural adjustment loans throughout the 
1980s, with the largest number of them negotiated late in the decade, such as the one 
Guyana signed in 1989—four years after Burnham’s death (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 
1997). 
In negotiating adjustment loans, the World Bank required that countries fulfill 
policy requirements aimed at “macroeconomic restructuring,” which were 
implemented as a fairly standard package focused on trade liberalization (eliminating 
subsidies for local goods and industries and reducing taxes on imports), monetary 
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adjustment (altering exchange rates, usually by devaluing currency), and the 
privatization of national holdings such as transportation or logging ventures. World 
Bank staff argued that these interventions would strengthen borrowing countries’ 
economies, promoting efficiency in local industry through competition with foreign 
firms and through private rather than public ownership. Critics of structural 
adjustment, however, have made it clear that removing import taxes and devaluing 
currency in post-colonial and post-socialist countries undermined local industry by 
making goods from multinational companies much less expensive than those produced 
locally, that privatization often happened at public expense, that reducing the size of 
the civil service left huge numbers of people unemployed, and that adjustment 
programs on the whole did little to improve the economic situation in borrowing 
countries, in spite of the hardships they created (Sparr et al, 1994; Abouharb and 
Cingranelli, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002). 
Throughout the 1980s the World Bank continued to revise its strategies and 
rhetorics supporting structural adjustment, but the institution’s policy documents, loan 
agreements, and public statements continued to focus on the need to limit government 
intervention in light of the supposed greater effectiveness and efficiency of private 
systems for managing both economic and social issues. Accompanying this 
repudiation of government management, however, is a focus on government as the key 
site of solutions. Here World Bank staff converged with Guyanese socialist politicians 
in offering governmental budget management as an essential tool for achieving better 
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futures.28 The World Bank often emphasized state policy as the essential variable for 
improving the health of Guyana’s economy and its citizens. A 1995 World Bank 
report notes, for example: “By 1988, Guyana's economy was in dire straits. As a result 
of a long period of state intervention, mismanagement, and public sector domination, 
the economy had declined by about one-third in over a decade” (World Bank, 1995: 
ii). The report links public management with mismanagement, highlighting the two as 
the essential economic problem in Guyana. The authors then provide the solution of a 
structural adjustment loan focused on “liberalization of domestic pricing and trade 
policy, to improve climate for private investment,” “streamlining of the civil service,” 
“rationalizing investment programs of public enterprises,” and “privatizing selected 
public enterprises” (World Bank, 1995: ii)—a standard package of liberalization and 
privatization. 
 World Bank staff also argued that individual action was crucial in the face of 
scarce resources. A 1990 report, for example, stressed that with overwhelming needs 
in the health sector “at a time when public spending in general cannot be easily 
increased—indeed, it must be curtailed…The Government needs to disseminate 
information and create incentives for efficient consumption and delivery of health 
services” (World Bank, 1990: 10). Here the institution’s reformers stress that 
individual consumption of health services needed to be improved. World Bank staff 
and consultants offered individual action as the complement to “reducing government 
responsibility for the kinds of health services whose benefits are captured primarily by 
                                                28	This	commonality	speaks	to	Wendy	Brown’s	arguments	that,	far	from	“hollowing	out	the	state,”	neoliberal	capitalism	has	positioned	the	state	as	a	key	actor	in	its	systems	of	extraction	(Brown,	2003).	
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the recipients of the service” (World Bank, 1990: 11). That is, public resources should 
not be expected to cover health services for the benefit of individuals, including 
“monitoring the growth of infants, and much of antenatal and perinatal care” (World 
Bank, 1990: 11). And while this emphasis on government efficiency through citizens’ 
self-help is reminiscent of Burnham’s ideas on efficiency, the World Bank’s version 
differed in one significant way: the World Bank framed this reliance on individual 
action through a market-based “willingness to pay”—that citizens would be willing to 
pay for health services that benefit them individually. The World Bank’s framing of 
self-help through community action is even more in line with 1970s socialist visions; a 
1991 World Bank report stressed that “individuals should take on a more proactive 
role through providing ‘shared labor’ in areas such as the maintenance of health 
facilities” – exactly the type of shared labor promoted by Burnham (World Bank, 
1991: xii). 
By the late 1980s the World Bank had acknowledged the negative health impacts 
often resulting from adjustment programs (e.g. Cornia et al., 1987), but the institution 
argued that these short-term difficulties were necessary for “long-term growth” 
(World Bank, 1986: 58).  World Bank documents made clear that the devaluations and 
budget cuts involved in Guyana’s adjustment program would most certainly make it 
more difficult for poor Guyanese to achieve adequate nutrition and environmental 
health. A 1992 report stressed that “macroeconomic stabilization processes are needed 
for growth” in spite of the increased poverty they would cause; the report suggested 
counteracting such negative effects by providing funds for health and nutrition in poor 
Guyanese communities (World Bank, 1992: 13). The “Social Impact Amelioration 
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Program” (SIMAP) that the World Bank financed was meant to “assist the 
Government of Guyana in cushioning the social costs of the adjustment process,” 
allowing the government to implement politically unpopular reforms: 
It is understood that the adjustment process can entail adverse social 
impact in the short-run. Programs must be designed to serve priority 
needs of Guyana’s most vulnerable population groups, especially in 
health, nutrition and social welfare… An infusion of resources in social 
services would improve the ability of the Government of Guyana to 
implement the difficult adjustment measures (World Bank, 1992: 12). 
 
Here development is again presented as having necessary ‘pains’ – in this case short-
term “adverse social impact.” That is, World Bank programs were based on the idea 
that Guyanese would need to accept increased poverty in order to reach prosperity. 
And although government programs could work to counteract such pains, these 
difficulties were understood as inherent in progress towards a better future. 
 As in the 1970s and 80s, Guyanese citizens were told that these pains would be 
short-term, and that they were necessary for a good life. The Guyanese government 
echoed World Bank reformers, promising citizens that government austerity programs 
would lead to a better future, as in this 1992 government publication:   
the austere medicine of an IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Program is crucial for the movement of an economy from a state of 
crisis to one of recovery. However, not only is adjustment a crisis 
response, it is the very key to development (Danns, 1992: 17).  
 
As Guyana’s socialist politicians had promised, market reformers argued that this 
“austere medicine”—while painful at the time—would allow the country to reorient 
around efficient practices, leading to future prosperity.  
 But even as the discourses of socialist politicians and World Bank reformers 
converged on the values of efficiency, individual self-help, and sacrifice, they 
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diverged significantly in the ways they envisioned enacting these values. World Bank 
reformers sought efficiency not so much in the limitation of health services across 
society, but by promoting private payment, and their understanding of sacrifice fell 
squarely on the poor, who would shoulder the supposedly short-term burden of 
increasing poverty in the name of long-term macroeconomic growth. This differs 
substantially from Burnham’s emphasis on shared sacrifice and lean-living for all 
Guyanese. 
Currency devaluations and layoffs in the public sector under Guyana’s Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP), as its structural adjustment effort was known, certainly 
made life difficult for many in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Thomas, 1993). One 
article on Guyana’s adjustment process describes people “waking up one morning to 
find [their] savings virtually worthless and [their] jobs barely paying enough to put 
food on the table” (Meeker-Lowry, 1995: 33). The consumer price index multiplied 
more than ten times between 1986 and 1990, and efforts to ‘streamline the civil 
service’—as bank loan proposals and project documents called the layoffs (e.g. World 
Bank, 1995: 2)—left many unemployed, especially since eighty percent of the 
country’s jobs had been in the public sector prior to structural adjustment (Thomas, 
1993). The effects of the Economic Recovery Program on nutrition were central to 
political debates in Guyana at the time, with street protestors carrying signs dubbing 
the ERP “Empty Rice Pots” (Ishmael, 2012). 
These major shifts make it all the more surprising that healthcare professionals 
working in Guyana in the 1970s to the 1990s do not recall much change in the health 
sector with structural adjustment. As noted earlier, Georgetown Public Hospital’s 
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long-time Director of Nursing—Matron Williams—highlighted similarities between 
austerity in the 1970s and under World Bank structural adjustment agreements. She 
stressed how in both periods she and her colleagues had to work hard to get even basic 
food items: in the 1970s waiting in distribution lines and bartering with neighbors, in 
the 1990s depending on family and friends in the US and Canada to send goods in 
cardboard barrels because prices locally were so high, making Guyana “the world’s 
greatest importer of barrels,” as people often joked (AC Interview, 2015). The 
healthcare workers I interviewed often likened tight budgets in the health system to 
their own home economies. Speaking of their frozen salaries, nurses and auxiliaries 
quickly moved to speak of the processes of acquiring “basic goods” like flour, 
emphasizing nutritional challenges for the population and likening them to limited 
budgets in the health system. 
A 1993 World Bank report emphasizes that salaries grew both for upper and lower 
level nursing staff and physicians between 1985 and 1992, with an intermittent decline 
just after adjustment began in 1989 (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Monthly Health Sector Salaries 1985-1992 (1985 G$) 
  1985 1991 1992 
Medical Officer (physician) 2266 1715 4370 
Ward Sister 1052 831 1212 
Staff Nurse/Midwife 819 775 1037 
  
Source: World Bank, 1993 
 
Oral histories help place these numbers in context, emphasizing that in spite of these 
shifts, salaries were extremely low both before and after adjustment. Table 1 
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demonstrates a decrease in the number of physicians in Guyana during the 1970s, but 
an increase during the late 1980s and through the period of adjustment. None of my 
interviewees recall layoffs in the health sector in the late 80s or in the 1990s following 
structural adjustment. Instead, nurses, physicians, and administrators all stressed to me 
the difficulties with filling the positions that were open both before and after 
adjustment. Keeping healthcare professionals in the Guyanese health system has 
consistently been a problem, especially because both British and American 
governments have actively recruited healthcare workers from the Anglophone 
Caribbean since the 1970s (Bach, 2003). This migration happens at a major loss to the 
Guyanese government, which provides education for healthcare workers free of 
charge, in exchange for three to five years of service. 
The Ministry of Health’s former Director of Planning, Andrew Whitney, described 
Guyana’s heath system to me as “training healthcare workers for export” throughout 
the late twentieth century. Mr. Whitney had worked in health human resources since 
1972; he started work straight out of secondary school as a clerical officer in the 
Ministry of Health’s Personnel Department. Mr. Whitney stressed to me: “in Guyana 
we’ve long been hemorrhaging our human resources, and training healthcare workers 
for export. Structural adjustment may have made it more acute, but it was the 
continuation of a long process” (AW Interview, 2015). He argued that although 
structural adjustment may have made it slightly more difficult to supplement staff in 
the 1990s, emigration and open posts were major problems reaching back in time well 
before the 1989 adjustment reforms. 
Healthcare workers also spoke of continuities in tight budgets, but not in terms of 
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access to high tech machinery or instrumentation; securing such basic items as gloves 
and bandages has been a challenge. Nurses, physicians and administrators all 
emphasized the difficulties that arose in the late 1980s when they could no longer 
resort to washing and reusing latex gloves in the age of AIDS. Nurses also regularly 
referred to the difficulties they faced in implementing health programs both before and 
after adjustment, where budgets could not even cover petrol for transportation to run 
educational and vaccine programs outside of the capital city. These discourses, which 
focus on continuity in health system management, point to significant commonalities 
in the way healthcare workers have interfaced with systems of governance before and 
after adjustment, emphasizing how remote many healthcare workers feel from the 
policy decisions that affect their lives and work: they dismiss high level changes as 
simply ‘more of the same.’ But these narratives also reflect the continuities in official 
discourses on self-help, sacrifice and the pains of development described in this 
section, as well as ongoing challenges from activists and critics—as I discuss below.  
 
Continuity and Critique 
Official discourses of austerity have not been accepted quietly by Guyana’s 
population. Both in Guyana’s socialist period and during its market transition, critics 
have challenged limited social spending and associated emphases on self-help and lean 
living. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, opposition parties and trade unions criticized 
Burnham’s austerity policies in their pamphlets and at rallies; well-known scholar and 
activist Walter Rodney, for example, highlighted how the government’s approaches 
punished the poor and working classes for the mistakes of the wealthy. A 1982 
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pamphlet from the Working People’s Alliance epitomized this, calling government 
representatives “local nabobs and parasites who advocated austerity and socialism 
from the roofs of their military guarded palatial homes” (Persaud, 1986: 63).  
Similarly, members of Guyana’s opposition parties were vocal in their critiques of 
the structural adjustment agreements signed with the World Bank by the People’s 
National Congress (Ferguson, 1999). Cheddi Jagan, the head of the People’s 
Progressive Party, rooted his critiques in his own experiences as Chief Minister of 
Guyana’s first internal self-government beginning in 1961, where cost-control 
measures had led to rioting, a general strike, and the intervention of British troops in 
1962. By the 1980s Jagan was reversing the logic that World Bank staff and 
consultants had used in promising prosperous futures for Guyana through the pain of 
structural adjustment. Jagan argued: “the macro-economic policies…virtually forced 
upon developing countries as part of programmes for stabilization and structural 
adjustment are geared to achieving a quick, short-term improvement in the balance of 
payments, safeguarding the interest of international commercial banks” (Jagan, 1996: 
3). Jagan stressed that structural adjustment programs were not aimed at long-term 
growth at all, but at short-term protection of the interests of international banks. He 
went on to argue that in light of the long relationships of exploitation of the 
developing world, resources from imperial powers should be made available to 
improve ailing economies, rather than depending on reforms in post-colonial 
countries. 
Guyana’s economic situation throughout the late twentieth century left the country 
with few options aside from severe cost-control. But, like Jagan in the late 1980s, 
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critics have continued to argue that other responses are possible, and that Guyana’s 
hardships are rooted in international economic systems that extract raw goods, as well 
as people and labor, from the post-colonial world, for example through policies that 
attract healthcare workers from Guyana to the US and UK. These actors have 
advocated a response to international economic exploitation that does not simply 
resort to policies of sacrifice in the post-colonial world, but which would target the 
roots of exploitation by reforming international policies on trade and access to capital. 
Members of Guyana’s governing socialist party joined in these critiques at an 
international level in the 1970s and 1980s, promoting a reorganization of trade 
relations through such bodies as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Brotherson, 1989). However, these international discourses diverged 
from those through which party leaders narrated limited spending to the Guyanese 
population—through an emphasis on efficiency, responsibility, and sacrifice. 
 
Conclusions  
 In spite of the major shifts involved in Guyana’s transition to a market 
economy in the late 1980s, Guyanese healthcare workers today emphasize continuity 
in the Guyanese public health sector before and after structural adjustment; they speak 
of tight budgets and limited staff, but they also highlight the similarities of official 
discourses promoting lean living and self-help. These narratives of continuity are 
shaped by experiences of ongoing scarcity: while public health budgets have 
fluctuated, Guyana has continued to deal with extremely limited resources and a 
marginalized place in the world economy. Successive governments have turned to a 
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language of sacrifice to legitimate limited social services, offering Guyanese citizens 
instead the moral values of efficiency and self-care. However, activist challenges have 
continued to highlight that such discourses of sacrifice and efficiency are not the only 
means of governance in the face of material scarcity. Indeed, even as socialist 
politicians and World Bank reformers have turned to similar discourses, their visions 
of sacrifice and efficiency have been built on very different distributions of 
responsibility. 
The continuities in discourses and narrations of health governance that I 
describe here speak to Sean Brotherton’s (2008) examinations of socialist and 
capitalist forms of healthcare in Cuba. Brotherton argues that in twenty-first century 
Cuba, private forms of capital are not creeping in from the margins to undermine 
socialism, but are instead an essential part of Cuba’s contemporary socialist 
healthcare. Policy debates have often centered on whether similarities in socialist and 
capitalist systems arise because one of the two systems has been incompletely fulfilled 
(e.g. Rodney, 1990). My focus has not been on such ideal-types, but on the discourses 
and narratives of governance in self-proclaimed socialist and capitalist systems. 
Discursive convergences here should not be taken as the incomplete enactment of 
socialism, or the encroachment of neoliberal values into socialist Guyana; instead, 
they reflect significant overlaps in concepts and conditions that often exist between 
socialist and neoliberal systems, shaping continuities in lived experiences under 
diverging forms of government.  
Examining recollections and discourses of governance in Guyana’s health 
system from its socialist period through its transitions to a market economy 
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emphasizes that, throughout the late twentieth century, various actors have attempted 
to sell Guyanese citizens on the idea of short-term struggle towards future prosperity. 
Burnham’s socialist party promoted the idea of sacrifice towards a future of communal 
solidarity, whereas structural adjustment was rooted in the idea that short-term 
increases in poverty would allow for long-term economic growth through integration 
into international markets. In both cases, these visions promoted the idea that short-
lived pain would teach Guyanese to lead better, leaner, independent lives—and that 
government programs would provide the pathway to these imagined futures. In both 
cases, sacrifice is offered as a means towards long-term efficiency—not only a stop-
gap measure. Here the values of individual responsibility and efficiency reach back 
beyond twenty-first century neoliberal austerities. The contexts of extraction and 
material scarcity in the postcolonial world shape such historical convergences in ways 
unlike the history of governance in the global North, where public resources have been 
much more expansive. Socialist and neo-liberal discourses of self-help have certainly 
diverged in their imaginations of autonomy: the former has promoted individual 
responsibility as a means of avoiding reliance on the imperial North, whereas the later 
has advocated individual autonomy in avoiding citizens’ reliance on the state. 
However, in Guyana these discourses have converged in promoting individual 
autonomy as an inherent moral value in the face of a state deemed unable to provide 
expansive health services. But activists have continued to demonstrate that local cost-
control and self-help are not the only solutions to exploitative international economic 
systems; redistribution of wealth and far-ranging reconceptualizations of trade, 
responsibility, and international relations are possible. 
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Development banks themselves have transformed many of the health policy 
proscriptions they advances in the 1990s. In the following chapters I further explore 
the nature of development bank health interventions in Guyana and internationally in 
more recent years: in Chapter 4 I show how the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank have promoted economic tools and analysis for global public 
health, but I argue that the use of such tools has been rooted primarily in aspirational 
discourses of the institutions’ research divisions, which do not align with the 
knowledges and values at play in operational divisions and negotiations with 
Guyanese healthcare workers and government representatives. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ASPIRATIONS AND ECONOMICS:  
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS, PATRONAGE POLITICS, 
AND GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH  
 
 
“Health care policy making has become increasingly dominated by 
economic perspectives, to the point that some health ministries are run 
by economists rather than public health specialists!” 
-Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Textbook of International Health 
(2009) 
 
“I think the 1993 WDR changed the conversation between ministries of 
finance and ministries of health by suggesting to the ministries of finance 
that this ministry of heath was not just a black box and that there could be a 
dialog with respect to how efficiently the money was being spent and the 
ministries of finance had legitimate grounds to ask questions about whether 
the ministry of health was getting its priorities right.” 
-Long time World Bank health economist on the World Bank’s 
1993 World Development Report (WDR) Investing in 
Health  
 
 
 
In the late 1980s, Rafael Nunes became the first Brazilian to receive a PhD in 
health economics, and he returned from his doctoral studies in the US to begin 
teaching courses in health finance at the University of Sao Paolo’s medical school. 
When I met him in Washington, D.C. twenty-five years later, he had spent most of his 
career working as a health economist for the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and he stressed to me how much he felt these institutions had 
contributed to transforming global health during this time—a transformation in the 
very intellectual bases of global health, especially the centrality of economic concepts, 
he noted. He spoke of his early years teaching health economics in Brazil, when 
students and health professionals often argued that his work went against the 
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fundamental principles of medicine by prioritizing economic efficiency over human 
life. But Nunes contrasted this with what he called the subsequent “universalization” 
of health economics in medical education internationally, arguing that students around 
the world now clamor to get a space in the economics courses for health practitioners 
offered by the World Bank. 
Nunes’ claim that tools and methods from the field of economics have become 
increasingly influential in global health is borne out by analysis of global health 
research and policy literatures, which now abound with discussions of opportunity 
costs, cost-effectiveness analysis, and demand modeling (Reubi, 2013; Adams, 2013). 
Some analysts have critiqued the use of such economic tools as a reductive and profit-
driven approach to public health, whereas others have heralded it as a crucial move for 
efficiency, but both groups have attributed the prominence of economic expertise to 
the new centrality of the World Bank and other international financial institutions in 
setting international health priorities and in implementing global health interventions 
(Adams, 2013; Thomas and Weber, 2004; Birn et al, 2009; Jamison et al, 2006: 2015). 
These claims have been based largely on the involvement of development banks and 
their staff in international meetings, publications, and other global health forums, 
where development banks have often promoted the importance of economic tools and 
rationalities for public health. But how do economic tools operate in the practice of 
development bank health projects and programs? How do they enact and shape the 
relationships of power at play in the institutions? These questions are essential to 
understanding how economic tools and rationalities are impacting global health 
projects and the lives of the people ostensibly meant to benefit from them.  
 116 
In this chapter I examine these questions by focusing on the set of economic 
tools most commonly used in public health, investigating how they operate across 
development bank networks. Health economists refer to this group of tools, which 
includes cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, as simply “economic evaluation” 
or “economic analysis.” These tools present methods for analyzing the economic 
efficiency of health interventions, and since the early 1990s many development banks 
have advocated their use for prioritizing which health programs should be funded both 
publically and privately.  
Cost-benefit analysis is a well-known tool that requires comparing project 
costs and benefits in the same metric – most commonly monetary value. For every 
dollar spent on preventative medication for cardiovascular disease, for example, how 
much money does one save by averting the cost of treatment and lost days of labor on 
the part of a patient? With cost-effectiveness analysis, however, costs can be measured 
against a health outcome; for example, one could measure how much it costs to avert a 
case of malaria (the health outcome) through the distribution of insecticide-treated bed 
nets versus through case-management with chloroquine (Morel et al, 2005). Health 
economists have long recognized the moral and practical obstacles in putting monetary 
values on human health, challenges which make cost-benefit analysis for health quite 
difficult. By comparing costs against specific health outcomes, cost-effectiveness 
analysis avoids the need to attribute such monetary values to health benefits, and for 
this reason it has been the most common of these economic analyses used in public 
health over the past several decades (Drummond et al, 2005).  
In this chapter I trace the role of economic expertise through networks of the 
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World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank by focusing on the discourses and 
practices surrounding economic evaluation, examining how and where these tools get 
mobilized and towards what ends. In doing so I examine the politics of expertise in 
these networks; that is, I examine the forms of expertise that come to be prioritized in 
various spaces, the processes through which this occurs, and the actors and values that 
get privileged or sidelined along the way. I move across several organizational divides 
within development banks: from headquarters to country offices in Guyana, and 
research to operations, highlighting the very different ways and extents that economic 
analysis gets used and produced at different points in these networks.  
This analysis responds to literatures in “critical global health” emphasizing that 
technical tools—especially tools of economic calculation—are an essential site for 
investigating the values governing today’s public health and international 
development. This chapter speaks directly to Vincanne Adams’ (2013) assertion that 
the use of randomized control trials and other tools of “evidence-based global health” 
has transformed healthwork from a relationship of care to one of “buying and selling 
truth and reliability” through neoliberal economic rationalities (Adams, 2013: 55). Are 
development banks similarly commoditizing global health through cost-effectiveness 
analysis? This chapter also responds to David Reubi’s call “for researchers to go 
beyond neoliberal structural adjustment policies and start telling other, different stories 
about the economisation of global public health” (Reubi, 2013: 223). Reubi 
emphasizes that logics of market competition, economic efficiency and individual 
entrepreneurialism operate far beyond the privatizing measures of structural 
adjustment. But what role do economic tools like cost-effectiveness analysis play in 
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enacting such logics within global health? Reubi’s work has emphasized that the 
intellectual lineages of taxation in public health do not match standard stories of 
neoliberal privatization, but this chapter highlights a different mismatch: between the 
ways that development bank researchers and policymakers have promoted cost-
effectiveness analysis for public health, and the near absence of these tools from the 
practice of project planning at both the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. While both banks have policies requiring the use of such 
economic analyses, projects are consistently approved without them, and operational 
teams have often sidelined economic analyses in setting priorities for health lending. 
This contrasts with the use of economic analyses in the banks’ more traditional 
infrastructure sectors, where cost-benefit analyses are judged to provide essential 
information for operational practice.  
In emphasizing the differing ways that economic analyses have been valued 
across bank networks, my analysis speaks to the work of STS scholars such as Sheila 
Jasanoff (1990, 1990b) and Shobita Parthasarathy (2017), who have highlighted the 
very different kinds of knowledge that come to be valued in various arenas of 
governance. My analysis also speaks to development studies literatures on the 
seemingly fundamental contradictions inherent to the idea of international 
development—for example those emphasized by Dan Smith (2003) between the goals 
of development funders and implementers, or those described by Richard Rottenburg 
(2009) between “official” representations of the sovereignty of borrowing 
governments and the “unofficial” control exerted by development banks. But rather 
than focus on how alignment across difference (Smith, 2003) or the work of 
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consultants (Rottenburg, 2009) allows development actors to continue their efforts 
towards divergent goals, I focus on the divergent knowledges and values operating in 
specific spaces of the banks’ networks. That economic analysis is surprisingly absent 
from the banks’ practices of planning, implementing and evaluating projects leads me 
to examine in greater detail exactly how economic expertise is being mobilized across 
these networks and how the power of economic expertise is intertwined with other 
forms of power, such as electoral politics and the politics of race. In doing so, this 
chapter brings together the above literatures in development studies and STS of 
institutions with the work of medical anthropologists and sociologists such as Ruha 
Benjamin (2013), Ian Whitmarsh (2008), Duana Fullwiley (2011), and Anne Pollock 
(2012) showing how health and medicine continue to operate in constructing 
relationships between race and nation. 
In this chapter I examine the pathways of cost-effectiveness analysis through 
both the research side of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank and 
through the operational divisions where the planning and implementation of projects is 
based—moving between fieldwork at bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. and with 
the banks’ country offices and Ministry of Health in Guyana. In the first section of the 
chapter I demonstrate how bank publications and policies since the early 1990s have 
prioritized economic analysis as a key form of expertise for global public health. In the 
second section I show how this emphasis on economic analysis amongst the banks’ 
research divisions has contrasted with the priorities of operations divisions and the 
implementation of projects in Guyana, where democratic politics have been given 
greater credence, even as projects move into the realm of patronage politics. In the last 
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section of the paper I argue that the aspirational visions of economic calculation 
advanced by bank researchers in the face of operational practice highlight the very 
different entanglements of racial, electoral and expertise politics across the banks’ 
networks. 
 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis as Public Health Message 
Early in 1994 Dean Jamison received a phone call in his UCLA office: it was a 
colleague from Cape Town telling him that perhaps he should reconsider his 
upcoming talk at the university there. “Look, they really don’t want you, they don’t 
like you here,” she said, explaining that he wasn’t much welcome, considering the 
World Development Report that he had directed for the World Bank the year before 
(DJ Interview 2015). Jamison was then a professor of public health at UCLA, and had 
already been receiving intense criticism throughout the previous months from many of 
his closest friends and colleagues regarding the report, which was widely received as a 
conservative manifesto for international health—advocating a more prominent role for 
private health providers and a reduced set of services to be provided by national 
governments. Jamison had completed his PhD in economics at Harvard under the so-
called “father” of health economics, Kenneth Arrow, before going to work at the 
World Bank in the mid-70s, and had recently taken part-time leave from the World 
Bank to pursue this professorship at UCLA. But in 1992 Jamison came back to work 
full-time at the World Bank on the report – the first and only time this flagship annual 
World Bank publication has focused specifically on public health. 
The 1993 World Development Report Investing in Health has become one of 
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the most well-known and controversial publications in global health in the last several 
decades (Sridhar, 2007; Jamison et al, 2013). The report presented economic 
arguments for seeing public health as a “productive investment” (e.g. through 
improving worker productivity) as well as economic methods for determining how to 
best invest private and public funds in this area, although the report focused largely on 
the later. Jamison and his team advocated using cost-effectiveness analysis to 
“maximize efficiency in purchasing health" (DJ Interview 2015) by identifying 
interventions which would return a great deal of ‘health’ in relation to their cost. This 
would be measured by comparing the cost of various interventions against the 
numbers of years of life that the interventions would save, according to the 
calculations of public health experts. In order to take into account interventions that 
improve quality of life without extending it, however, the report advocated using the 
metric of the Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY). This metric takes into account 
total years of life saved as well as years lived with chronic pain or other “disability.”29 
Calculating the effect of an intervention in DALYs involves a weighted measurement 
in which non-lethal disease states (e.g. neck pain) are measured as a percentage of a 
year of life lost, and then added to the total number of years of life saved through 
interventions in lethal diseases. 
Both in criticism and praise, many observers have credited the World Bank for 
development of the DALY, although the metric was mainly developed by Chris 
Murray—a health economist and physician at Harvard at the time, and Alan Lopez—a 
                                                25	The	DALY	arose	in	close	relationship	to	the	“Quality	Adjusted	Life	Year”	(QALY)	in	a	period	when	debates	regarding	definitions	of	quality	of	life	were	central	to	bioethics	literatures,	but	before	“disability”	had	become	a	broadly	politicized	term.	
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demographer at WHO (Brennan et al, 1993; Barker and Green, 1996; Misra, 2006). It 
was, however, the World Bank’s 1993 World Development Report that first 
popularized the DALY, leading to extensive debates in international health circles 
regarding the measurement and its associated assumptions as to the value of various 
forms of life. What percentage of a year of life lived with a missing limb, for example, 
would be equivalent to a year of disease-free life? Can one really rank certain forms of 
human life as more valuable than others, and try to transform these value judgements 
into quantitative measures? For example, the 1993 World Development Report 
advocated weighting the economically “productive” years of life (i.e. when people are 
generating income) as more valuable than years of life saved for the elderly, which 
was a highly controversial stance (Sayers and Fliedner, 1997; Arensen and Nord, 
1999). 
The 1993 World Development Report added intellectual support to ideas that 
had been circulating within the World Bank for some time. As early as the mid-1970s, 
when the World Bank was first considering lending for health projects, internal bank 
reports had argued that public health interventions often produce financial returns 
outweighing initial investments. Since the late 1970s the World Bank had also been 
supporting the idea of selective primary healthcare, advocating that governments 
provide a small set of basic health services rather than aiming to provide a large 
array.30 Similarly, the DALY built closely on the “Quality Adjusted Life Year,” a 
                                                
30 In response to the 1978 Alma Ata conference where governments declared their commitment to 
broad public provision of primary healthcare and to “Health for All by the year 2000,” the World Bank 
and the Rockefeller Foundation organized a 1979 conference held to consider a more circumscribed 
provision of public health services. The conference was based around Julia Walsh and Kenneth 
Warren’s now well-known paper advocating selective primary healthcare involving a limited package 
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measurement that had been in use since the 1970s in the field of health economics. 
However, the 1993 WDR circulated widely outside of both the World Bank and the 
field of health economics, bringing the debate on DALYs and cost-effectiveness 
analysis into the broader field of international health policymaking where such 
specific concepts from health economics had not much entered previously (Barker and 
Green 1996, Misra 2006). 
The World Bank published several other reports alongside the 1993 World 
Development Report that have also been foundational in the growth of cost-
effectiveness analyses in global health research. While working on the 1993 World 
Development Report, staff in the health division at the World Bank were also 
preparing the report Better Health in Africa, which likewise promoted the idea of a 
basic package of health services that governments and international donors could 
provide at low cost – a series of health interventions that would be selected based on 
their economic efficiency (World Bank, 1994).  
In 1993 the World Bank also published the first edition of the Disease Control 
Priorities (DCP) in Developing Countries report, which presented cost-effectiveness 
analyses of numerous health interventions in an effort to help priority setting in 
“highly resource-constrained low- and middle-income countries” (Jamison et al, 
1993). The DCP has become the central reference on cost-effectiveness in global 
health, although in large part based on its second edition, which was developed as 
follow-up collaboration with the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the 
United States National Institutes of Health. This report set out a list of the ‘top ten best 
                                                                                                                                       
of services that would be more ‘practical’ regarding the health services that governments could provide 
(Walsh and Warren 1979). 
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buys’ in global health, identified as the most cost-effective interventions in terms of 
cost per DALY averted.31 While the list included long-time essentials of primary 
health care such as immunization, nutrition, maternal education, and monitoring child 
health, it also included quite a distinct set of priorities including traffic regulations to 
divert injuries from road accidents, a focus on comprehensive HIV prevention and 
treatment, and tobacco taxation. 
The World Bank produced numerous such reports and also events 
(conferences, workshops, etc.) in the mid 1990s promoting the idea that governments 
and donors should use cost-effectiveness analysis as a primary means of determining 
which health interventions to fund. However, this idea was not without resistance even 
within the World Bank. During the writing of the 1993 World Development Report, 
several World Bank economists argued that the report’s use of cost-effectiveness 
analysis countered the idea of free-market economics. In their view, it was not the 
place of policymakers to determine spending based on an explicit process of 
prioritization among health interventions; a policymaker’s role was to establish a 
financial architecture that would guide people’s behavior and health expenditure. 
Some World Bank economists even argued that the 1993 WDR represented a Stalinist 
approach to health because it advocated determining priorities through central 
planning rather than market mechanisms. That report’s lead author explained: 
So all I tried to say is “look if it is Stalinist, we tried to make it an 
intelligent Stalinism, but central planning is the right way to think about 
resources in the health sector.” That group of people thought, “you get 
the prices right, the institutional arrangements and the economy right 
                                                31	Because	the	measurement	of	DALYs	is	based	on	calculations	of	how	many	years	of	life	would	be	lost	without	intervention,	health	interventions	are	measured	for	how	many	years	of	lost	life	are	“averted.”	
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and everything will work itself out for health, you don’t need to plan 
what interventions to buy, the system makes you do what’s best, you 
don’t as a central planner know what’s best.” But the left buys into this 
argument as much as the right. The right puts it forth as a free-market 
argument, the leftists all talk about it as  “communities know what’s 
best, you don’t need technocrats at the center telling communities what 
to do.” The right-wing people say “individuals” – they’re not inclined 
to say “communities” – “individuals know what’s best for them; 
empower individuals and you don’t have to get your central planning 
apparatus in place to tell individuals what to do.” So the left and right 
come out in very much the same place (DJ Interview 2015). 
 
Jamison noted that the World Bank’s approach was criticized from many perspectives; 
while numerous observers have described the report as a conservative, economistic 
force in global health (Chapman and Pfeiffer, 2013; Adams, 2013), many economists 
within the World Bank actually criticized the report for lacking sufficient backing in 
free-market economics. 
 Jeff Hammer has been one of the most vocal critics of the World Bank’s 
promotion of cost-effectiveness analysis as a tool for setting priorities in public health 
spending. In the early 1990s Hammer was an economist in the World Bank’s division 
of Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP), and he was a member of the team 
responsible for the first edition of the Disease Control Priorities (DCP) in Developing 
Countries report. However, Hammer opposed the very basis of the idea that cost-
effectiveness analysis should guide government investment in health. The DCP, he 
explained: 
had nothing to do with markets, had nothing to do with market failures 
or anything an economist would look at. It was counting up pros and 
cons (which would be the costs), and then they made up something 
about the outcome – it wasn’t benefits – it was a health outcome, which 
was so anti-economic (JH Interview 2015). 
 
Hammer argued that basic principles of economics would lead governments to 
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examine markets as a way to guide investment. These principles would also emphasize 
the benefits that people have expressed through their health behavior (i.e. where they 
have actually chosen to spend their money), rather than health outcomes arbitrarily 
determined by physicians and other “experts.” And governments ought not necessarily 
devote their investment in health to the least expensive interventions, he argued, but to 
those where private systems failed; it might actually be the most expensive 
interventions where insurance fails, for example, in which case that would be the best 
site for government intervention. 
 Both within the World Bank and in subsequent publications, Hammer 
criticized the “cost-effectiveness thinking” laid out in documents such as the 1993 
WDR and DCP for not prioritizing public goods (Hammer and Berman 1995, Hammer 
1997). For example, leukemia treatment is more cost-effective than environmental 
control of dengue, even though Hammer stressed that any economist should see that 
leukemia treatment is a completely private good in that its benefits “accrue to the 
individual,” whereas the environmental control of dengue is a public good that 
benefits anyone in areas that have been cleared of the mosquito vectors. Hammer has 
argued that the failure to recognize such basic tenets of economics has been 
characteristic of the World Bank’s approach to global health, where he suggests that 
physicians and other health professionals have tried to harness the credibility of 
economics without knowing its basic principles. Economists who have been based in 
the World Bank’s health division have been pulled away from mainstream economic 
thinking, he stresses, and have not been able to impose reasonable applications of 
basic economics. Rather than using economics to make specific decisions about 
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particular situations and contexts, these practitioners have attempted to use 
economistic language to promote broad conclusions about which health interventions 
should be priorities internationally.  
In the early 1990s Hammer tried to rally economists outside of the World 
Bank’s health division to counter the World Bank’s growing focus on cost-
effectiveness analysis. But while many World Bank economists disagreed with the 
health division’s use of economic principles, they were on the whole unwilling to take 
on a major battle with the health division over how to handle a health topic.32 
Throughout the 1990s the World Bank continued to push for setting priorities in 
global health based on the most cost-effective interventions. This focus on cost-
effectiveness analysis for public health also grew within other international 
institutions, including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which in 1996 
hired one of the principal authors of the 1993 World Development Report to lead IDB 
work on cost-effectiveness and priority setting (Bobadilla 1998).33 
The reports and events that the World Bank and Inter-American Development 
                                                32	Hammer	explained:	“The	trouble	I	had	at	the	Bank,	I	would	say	things	even	simpler	than	this	and	my	economist	colleagues	would	say	‘well	yeah,	who	would	say	anything	other	than	that’	and	therefore	they	didn’t	get	excited	about	it.	And	so	they	would	just	let	the	health	people	say	anything	because	they	didn’t	know	anything	about	health…	LP	was	representing	the	chief	economist’s	office	and	I	went	and	said	‘they	don’t	do	public	versus	private,’	which	is	really	‘why	does	the	government	get	involved	in	anything,	why	is	the	market	failing’	–	people	maybe	rely	on	that	a	little	too	much	as	a	baseline,	but	government	is	there	to	do	collective	action	that	people	can’t	do	on	their	own,	that’s	the	whole	point	of	government	as	far	as	I	can	see,	and	that	is	the	basis	of	a	lot	of	economics	and	I	said	‘they	just	do	these	silly	mechanical	calculations’	and	LP	said	‘boy	the	guy	seemed	like	he	was	smart	but	he	must	be	really	off	the	wall	because	no	one	would	say	this	kind	of	stuff,’	and	then	he	read	it	and	said	‘oh	my	god,	that’s	what	they’re	saying,’	and	that’s	when	we	started	becoming	friends”	(JH	Interview).	33	Early	in	the	following	decade	the	World	Health	Organization	also	began	to	make	cost-effectiveness	analysis	central	to	its	approaches	to	public	health,	for	example	through	its	CHOICE	program,	which	aims	to	help	countries	set	priorities	by	using	this	economic	tool.	The	program’s	guide	to	cost-effectiveness	analysis	has	become	a	central	reference	used	in	the	global	health	literature,	especially	as	the	standard	setting	the	threshold	at	which	interventions	should	be	deemed	“cost-effective”	(Edejer	et	al,	2003;	Marseille	et	al,	2015).	
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Bank have produced over the past twenty-five years regarding cost-effectiveness 
analysis have been led by staff in research divisions of the banks’ Washington, D.C. 
headquarters. However, the practices and priorities of these researchers differ quite 
substantially from bank staff, consultants, and government officials working in 
operations both at bank headquarters and in borrowing countries. Although some staff 
do move between positions in research and operations, many researchers have never 
worked in operations, and have quite a different outlook than the operational staff who 
actually plan and implement loans. In the following section I look to the relationships 
surrounding cost-effectiveness analysis in operations, focusing on prioritization and 
project planning in Guyana. I start with a scene on an August 21013 day at Guyana’s 
Ministry of Health. 
 
 Operations, Economics, and Democratic Politics? 
 Sitting in an air-conditioned meeting room, blue-tinged neon lights overhead 
and the sound of soca music on the radio of a car passing by on Brickdam Street, the 
directors of the Ministry of Health’s seven program areas jotted notes on the 
consultant’s presentation.34 Guyana’s Ministry of Finance had arranged an initiative 
with the World Bank to implement a new software tool meant to help governments 
plan their health budgets by prioritizing spending on the most cost-effective health 
interventions. 
 After the World Bank consultant – an older Pakistani economist in a crisp 
white shirt and dark suit – finished his presentation on the results of the budgeting 
                                                34	This	scene	is	drawn	from	fieldnotes	August	18,	2013.	
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exercise, the director of the Health Ministry’s Disease Control Program spoke up. The 
middle-aged, Afro-Guyanese physician began: “Can you please go back to your slide 
regarding the demographic information you’ve applied through the software?” The 
consultant flipped back to a slide with two charts. The first listed Guyana’s racial 
breakdown: 43.5 percent Indo-Guyanese, 30.2 percent Afro-Guyanese, 9.1 percent 
Amerindian, 16.7 percent Mixed. The second presented historical population 
information as well as a forecast of population growth, covering together the period 
from 2006 to 2026.  
The Disease Control Program director continued, “I have to say that your 
population predictions don’t seem at all likely.” They were based on an out of date 
census, she noted, and a series of flawed population studies by Guyana’s Bureau of 
Statistics. The racial and electoral politics of her claims were not lost on those in the 
room. Although she did not mention it explicitly, it was clear that she referred to 
widely-circulating accusations that the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), popularly 
understood as the party of Indo-Guyanese, was manipulating population statistics to 
obscure rapid emigration. Many people outside of the PPP argued that the true 
statistics would reflect the scale of discontent with PPP governance during the past 
nineteen years during which the party controlled Guyana’s executive branch. And the 
PPP was in a particularly tenuous position at the time. While the PPP had won 
elections by large margins in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in 2011 the PPP was only 
narrowly able to retain control of the executive branch despite losing the popular vote, 
because the majority vote was divided among opposition parties. 
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 Gina Arjoon sat close to the presenter during the 2013 meeting on health 
prioritization. She had just graduated with her master’s in health economics from the 
University of York, making her the only person with a degree in health economics out 
of the 751,223 residents of Guyana – if the World Bank and the Guyanese 
government’s numbers were to be trusted. Gina had returned from England to work in 
Guyana’s Ministry of Health, and she had been placed on the project team 
implementing the World Bank health budgeting software tool. But in spite of the 
cachet of the World Bank and the group of foreign and Guyanese economists on the 
project team, Gina explained that the team “could never get the buy-in from the 
Ministry of Health program heads; they didn’t believe the output of the tool” (GA 
Interview 2015). In subsequent conversations and correspondence, the World Bank 
project team stressed to the Ministry of Health program heads – most of them 
physicians and epidemiologists who had completed advanced degrees in Cuba and 
Russia – that the tool had been tested internationally and that it incorporated the most 
up to date expertise in health economics. The program heads, however, questioned the 
numbers and the assumptions on which the economic tool was based. The directors 
disagreed both amongst themselves and with the project team on the birth-rate 
projections necessary to planning future health services, and they strongly disagreed 
with the priorities that resulted from the tool’s implementation: that non-
communicable diseases needed to be prioritized more in relation to the Ministry’s 
current focus on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  
The process of running the budgeting tool and debating its results fulfilled 
requirements contained in two World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 
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loans. These loans required that Guyana’s Ministry of Health have a mechanism for 
incorporating best practices and cost-effective measures into its strategic planning. But 
while both of the banks had planned for this health sector prioritization process to 
inform their priorities for upcoming loans, the lack of credibility of the tool amongst 
the directors of the Ministry of Health meant that its results were by and large left 
aside; as Gina Arjoon described it “it just sort of fell off the map.” This suggests the 
important role that Ministry of Health representatives can play in setting priorities for 
loans, although all development bank negotiations are coordinated through Guyana’s 
Ministry of Finance, who serves as the country’s representative to the development 
banks. But health professionals have expressed concern that the Ministry of Finance 
has negotiated loans directly with health staff in the banks with little input from the 
Guyanese Ministry of Health. 
Close to the time of the prioritization exercise, the Government of Guyana was 
developing a national development strategy focused on environmental sustainability, 
in concert with a $250 million agreement with the Government of Norway that would 
provide compensation for keeping deforestation in Guyana at a minimum. This “Low 
Carbon Development Strategy” (LCDS) came to serve as the platform of the 
incumbent People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in the 2013 national elections, and 
although it stated that “investing in healthcare” was still a government priority, many 
members of Guyana’s public health community feared that health spending would be 
minimized in efforts towards green development. 
 While the World Bank health prioritization exercise rooted in cost-
effectiveness analysis didn’t get the “buy-in” of Guyanese health officials, the PPP’s 
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Low Carbon Development Strategy became the basis for planning loans with both the 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) over the next several 
years. In the case of the later, the LCDS became the guiding principle for the “Country 
Strategy” that IDB develops every four years with each country that it lends to, laying 
out the sectors and projects that will be the focus of loans during the upcoming four 
years. Although the health sector has been a central pillar of every Country Strategy in 
Guyana since the mid-1990s, the 2012-2016 Country Strategy moved to a focus on 
energy and natural resources rather than public health. The director of Guyana’s IDB 
Country Office explained:  
It was an easy decision since we have limited resources, we cannot do a 
bit of everything, and doing a bit of everything would give us a weak 
portfolio. It doesn’t mean that it’s not important; it means it is not what 
is prioritized with our resources…So we were able to have a very 
focused approach on energy, because government has requested us to 
focus on energy and we really felt it was important, and the board has 
commented on that, that it was in line with what the country was doing 
with the LCDS. We did not want to have something that was not in line 
with the orientations that the government was giving, so natural 
resources was a natural movement. Then we have the dialogue sectors, 
which are water, transport, etc., which were chosen based on how 
relevant they are to the LCDS and to past work we have done (SM 
Interview, 2013). 
 
Here the IDB Guyana director – a Haitian education specialist – argued that the LCDS 
was representative of what the Government of Guyana had prioritized, and she 
suggested that the government’s electoral mandate gave these priorities democratic 
credibility. However, in a published evaluation of Guyana’s programs, IDB 
headquarters had already criticized the Guyana country office for not incorporating 
economic evaluation into planning its Country Strategy. This led to a major 
disagreement between IDB’s evaluation division, its board, and the Country Office; 
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the Guyana office had argued there that the broad lines of lending need to be based in 
the program of the country’s government rather than the bank’s growing emphasis on 
economic projections. But the country office was eventually overruled when IDB 
established new institutional guidelines for developing country strategies, which 
formalized and underscored the institution’s policies requiring economic evaluations 
in the planning of country strategies (IDB Office of Evaluation and Oversight, 2012). 
The fact that the director of the Guyana Country Office continued to stress electoral 
accountability so strongly even after her office had been publically rebuked by IDB’s 
management points to the very different ways that expertise and electoral politics are 
intertwined in different spaces of bank work. While bank researchers and evaluators 
can recognize the importance of democratic priorities and move between emphasizing 
economic evaluation and political context, people working in operations confront the 
daily exigencies of negotiating loans with governments, keeping racial and electoral 
politics front and center – as the following section highlights. But this difference 
between bank publications and operational programs does not represent a simple 
disjuncture between discourse and practice. Rather, it reflects the very different ways 
that expertise politics play out across bank networks. To examine this further, I start 
with one of my first outings with the Neglected Tropical Disease project team in 
January 2013. 
 
Patronage Politics 
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 We arrive in a vehicle marked with a large government seal.35 The Ministry of 
Health driver lets the eight of us – me and several volunteers and staff members from 
the Ministry of Health – unload from the minibus, all wearing t-shirts marked with 
government seals. We’ve arrived in Mahaica, a town on Guyana’s coast about a 45-
minute drive east of the capital. Over the next four hours we will visit each of the 
wooden houses on the town’s quiet roads, speaking to citizens about the dangers of 
lymphatic filariasis and soil-transmitted helminths, distributing preventative 
medications to anyone over the age of two willing to consume the pills in front of us, 
and recording the name, age, and gender of each person who does. Volunteers have 
packaged individual doses of albendazole into small plastic bags, but they are sure to 
carry the bottle emblazoned with the GlaxoSmithKline label. The diethylcarbamazine 
citrate tablets come in a blister pack, foil marked with Sanofi’s logo.  
 As we spent hours packaging the doses the week before in the airless annex 
building at the public hospital complex, a young member of a church group had 
commented that these were expensive medications, and an older Red Cross member 
laughed that for once you can get something other than paracetamol from the Ministry 
of Health. The international brands of the medications are central to the credence of 
the project, but the most important branding is most definitely that of the Government 
of Guyana. Between volunteers' shirts and bags, the program banners, and the arrival 
of teams in government vehicles, the outreach efforts are a carefully-orchestrated 
effort to ensure that citizens feel the presence of the incumbent government. That has 
been clear in planning meetings at IDB and at the Ministry of Health in previous 
                                                35	Taken	from	fieldnotes	January	13,	2013.	
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weeks. When the chief IDB staff contact on the project, casually remarked that a 
newspaper article covering the Mass Drug Administration did not even mention IDB, 
the Chief Medical Officer snapped that this was rightly so – this was a Government of 
Guyana project, with support from IDB, he stressed. The Minister of Health grumbled 
in a meeting several weeks later that this was something the government had been able 
to accomplish in spite of the obstructionism of the opposition party. 
 Under the IDB-financed project, the Government of Guyana aims to distribute 
these preventative medications for “neglected tropical diseases” to every one of its 
citizens over the age of two, starting in the capital region. In this election year, the 
incumbent People’s Progressive Party highlights the work it has done to provide for 
the health of its citizens – all of its citizens, it stresses in pointing to the house-to-
house campaign. But there is a relationship of exchange, the campaign suggests: it is 
the obligation of Guyanese citizens to contribute not only to their own health, but to 
that of their compatriots by taking the pills and thus removing the reservoirs of this 
“secret infection” that lie within the bodies of four percent of the Guyanese 
population. At the volunteer trainings held with various community groups in the 
weeks leading up to the MDA, trainers stressed the importance of making it clear to 
every home and every citizen: even if you feel healthy, you can be infected, and you 
can spread this to others. In national news media, the head IDB consultant on the 
project, the Ministry of Health coordinator, and public officials all argued that the 
project should be a national communal effort: everyone has to join in for the health of 
the entire nation (Grainger, 2014; Stabroek News, 2011b; Government Information 
Agency, 2016). These messages draw on early twentieth-century public health 
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messages emphasizing the new germ theory (Leavitt, 2014), and equally long-standing 
efforts to promote health and medicine as a central form of citizenship and national 
participation (Chakrabarty, 1992; Prakash, 1999; Bashford, 2004). 
However, the rhetoric of national unity through medicine in Guyana’s NTD 
project contrasts with very regular accusations that the People’s Progressive Party has 
for the past twenty years funneled the benefits of development projects to Indo-
Guyanese, who form the party’s base in a highly racially-stratified electoral system. 
Across these divides, the incumbent government attempts to make foreign medical 
expertise packaged into tablets serve as electoral currency. Government 
representatives will come to your door and provide you free of charge with top-grade 
medications that will save you from disfiguring disease, the campaign stresses 
(Haynes, 2016). This is framed through a language of cleanliness: pairing cleanliness 
of environment with cleanliness of body. While project materials stress that the city’s 
“insanitary state” makes it a literal breeding ground for culex mosquitos, the project’s 
managers mobilize internationally-circulating public health discourses as they speak of 
“mop up” efforts to return to areas of low coverage: the image is one of project staff 
cleaning up remnants left behind in initial efforts. The branding of the project as an 
offering from the Ministry of Health has been the most consistent concern throughout 
project planning, and publicity materials have been at the center of project planning 
discussions much more often than strategies for avoiding re-infection, transmission 
between dyssynchronous waves of the project in neighboring regions, etc.  
But how do bank staff and consultants make sense of these dynamics in the 
face of claims regarding the importance of economic calculation? In the following 
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section, I argue that analyses of power offered by development bank staff themselves 
are an essential aspect of how economic knowledge operates in development bank 
health projects. 
 
Legitimacy, Aspirations, and Constructing Global Health 
 Economists at World Bank and IDB headquarters have often argued that party 
politics like those described above distort the use of government and donor funding, 
directing money away from the most economically efficient projects and towards 
those which elected officials anticipate will win them the most votes. While this 
framing of party politics as “distorting” is common in the institutions’ publications, at 
times the banks’ researchers acknowledge the importance of democratic politics in 
setting public health priorities, and they suggest that such expressions of popular 
opinion need to be weighed against the results of economic analysis. In this section I 
analyze how economists at the banks’ headquarters move between these two 
discourses—a “technocratic” versus a “democratic” vision of project planning, on the 
one hand presenting electoral politics as a corrupting force in project design and on the 
other hand presenting these politics as the rightful context within which democratic 
priority-setting must be conducted. My informants have shifted between these 
discourses in ways strikingly similar to what Ashmore et al (1989) have described of 
British health economists as early as the 1980s. I argue that these discursive moves 
regarding the relationship between economic analysis and electoral politics present a 
significant aspect of how economic tools are being used in the health work of these 
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banks: in constructing and reflecting understandings of the possibilities of global 
health. 
*** 
Like many of his IDB colleagues, Gabriel Jackman presents a technocratic 
vision in stressing the importance of economic evaluation for countering simple 
political calculus in development bank projects. The Trinidadian economist – trained 
in the UK and the US at the University of Kent and at Georgetown University – has 
been working in various capacities at IDB since 1980. He argues that without 
economic analysis, project planning amounts to borrowing governments conducting 
political analyses of the following sort: “Is my populace asking for healthcare? Will I 
get more votes from healthcare or a metro, or from balancing my budget and 
controlling my spending?” (GJ Interview 2015). Significantly, he emphasizes electoral 
calculus: these too are forms of knowledge and calculation. Mr. Jackman argues that 
loans have often been planned based on implicit vote projections by incumbent 
governments. But cost-effectiveness analysis, he notes, allows both governments and 
development agencies to make decisions based on economic evidence and explicit 
priorities in order to achieve the greatest overall benefit for money spent. 
 Economists like Mr. Jackman continue to echo frameworks presented over the 
past twenty years in World Bank and IDB publications promoting cost-effectiveness 
analysis for health. A 1998 IDB report, for example, noted: 
The current decision-making process in the public sector, which is 
based on implicit criteria, is unsatisfactory because of a lack of 
transparency and distortions in the allocation of resources. With few 
exceptions, establishing priorities is heavily influenced by political 
pressures and delegated to health managers who often have serious 
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conflicts of interest. Such is the case of hospital managers who want to 
expand the degree of sophistication and size of their medical facilities, 
but have no incentives to use hospital resources to provide the most 
cost-effective services to their patients. Moreover, in many countries, 
public sector health institutions spend most of their money in urban 
areas, often at the expense of the rural populations' access to health 
care. A more subtle way of setting priorities is through the 
underfunding of recurrent and maintenance costs which leads to 
deterioration in the quality of care (Bobadilla, 1998: 4). 
 
The report argues that cost-effectiveness analysis makes the criteria for decision-
making explicit, as opposed to political decision-making processes – both in terms of 
electoral politics (with the undue influence of urban voters) and the politics of 
personal and professional advancement (healthcare professionals setting priorities in 
their own interests). These technocratic ideas appear again and again in bank 
publications, such as the 1993 World Development Report, which explained: 
There are several reasons why developing countries fail to allocate 
sufficient resources to cost-effective health interventions… At a 
fundamental level, the distribution of political power explains much of 
the misallocation of government resources for health. The urban 
population is better organized than rural groups and more vocal in 
demanding health facilities and services. Similarly, middle-class 
workers in wage employment, who frequently belong to powerful trade 
unions, are more effective than self-employed farmers and workers in 
the informal sector in lobbying for government-subsidized health 
benefits. Health professionals are also often better organized than the 
population they serve, and in promoting their own interests they may 
make the health system less efficient. Despite these problems…success 
can be accelerated, as newly available information makes it clear how 
costly misallocation is” (World Bank, 1993: 69). 
 
This foundational World Bank document stressed that electoral politics are often 
responsible for “misallocation,” understood as the dedication of public funds to health 
interventions with low cost-effectiveness. The report’s authors highlight the lobbying 
power of interest groups such as labor unions and healthcare professionals as a crucial 
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aspect of such politics. Cost-effectiveness analysis, the report argues, allows decision-
makers to avoid such party politics and instead prioritize the greatest social good for 
money spent. 
 But in light of broad criticisms by public health practitioners regarding the 
banks’ economistic approaches to decision-making, both the World Bank and IDB 
have increasingly presented another “democratic vision” of project planning, 
acknowledging the importance of democratic politics and preferences in setting public 
health priorities. The 2006 edition of the Disease Control Priorities in Developing 
Countries report, for example, notes that “a frequent, often justified, criticism of cost-
effectiveness analyses is that they address only one of many criteria that could be used 
to evaluate health interventions;” the report goes on to argue that cost-effectiveness 
analyses have to be weighed amongst “epidemiological, medical, political, ethical, and 
cultural factors” (Jamison et al, 2006). The DCP presents the graph below to 
demonstrate how cost-effectiveness analysis can be combined with the priorities of 
policymakers for serving different constituencies, using the Disability-Adjusted Life 
Years (DALY) measurement discussed above. 
 
Source: Jamison et al, 2006 
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The authors propose preparing an “indifference curve” to describe political 
preferences. For example, if deciding between funding Parkinson's disease treatment 
and expanding malaria programs, the indifference curve would represent the 
“willingness of policymakers to trade off health improvements in children (malaria) 
versus the elderly (Parkinson’s)” – represented by the dashed curve above (Jamison et 
al, 2006). The indifference curve can then be combined with cost-effectiveness ratios 
to determine optimal levels of government investment in each intervention: 
When the price of buying a unit of health to treat Parkinson's is 
relatively high in terms of cost per DALY averted, the relatively flat 
(solid) budget line applies, and the optimal balance of investment in the 
two interventions is at point X. If the cost of buying a unit of health to 
treat Parkinson's is relatively low, then the steeper (dashed) budget line 
applies and the relative allocation of resources is represented by 
point Y. Therefore, policy makers would allocate relatively more 
resources to treating Parkinson's when the price of buying a unit of 
health through this intervention is relatively low, and they would 
allocate fewer resources when the price of health obtained through this 
intervention is relatively high (Jamison et al, 2006). 
 
Here, the authors acknowledge that cost-effectiveness analyses should be weighed 
against the specific preferences of policymakers who have been vested with 
democratic authority. However, the authors attempt to frame such political preferences 
within a highly calculated, quantitative model. This vision contrasts markedly with the 
visions of planning advanced by the banks’ operational staff, such as the director of 
the IDB country office in Guyana discussed above, who frames project planning as a 
flexible and ongoing negotiation centered on the goals and values of the governments 
to which IDB makes loans. 
 Beyond their publications promoting the importance of cost-effectiveness 
analysis for public health, both IDB and the World Bank have policies requiring 
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economic evaluation in project planning. Over the last several decades both the World 
Bank and IDB have received severe criticism regarding the extent to which they have 
been able to achieve their own goals of economic and social development. In order to 
demonstrate and attempt to ensure the effectiveness of their work, these institutions 
have established rules and procedures meant to guarantee the appropriate design of 
projects. Such rules have made up an essential aspect of attempting to convince donor 
countries to continue providing funds. For example, in preparation for an upcoming 
request to donors for a “replenishment of funds and increased capital for lending” in 
2009, the IDB worked to create a “Results Framework” emphasizing development 
effectiveness (IDB, 2009b). As a part of these efforts, the IDB established new rules 
for evaluating projects in their planning phase, which introduced a requirement that all 
projects present an economic analysis before they can be approved. Although IDB had 
had requirements for economic analysis previously, ensuring the use of cost-
effectiveness or cost-benefit analyses before project approval was not standard 
practice throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s (RI Interview 2015). 
Members of the committee responsible for elaborating IDB’s new rules 
stressed to me that they had envisioned a more flexible set of standards than those 
eventually made official policy. The institution’s internal planning group had 
recommended a system in which loan proposals would receive points for various 
analyses conducted during planning, and proposals over a certain point total would be 
financed. The planning group felt that this system would have allowed space for each 
project team to determine the most important analyses for each specific project. 
However, when the policies went for approval by the institution’s Executive Board, 
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IDB’s US representative pushed for a requirement that every project include a cost-
benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis prior to approval. Although this became official 
policy, it hasn’t been much put into practice. Likewise at the World Bank, economic 
analyses have long been officially required for project approval, but managers and 
senior leadership within the institution have not enforced these policies. Officially 
projects must contain either a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis, but projects 
are consistently approved without either (World Bank IEG, 2010 – see discussion 
below). 
Although economic analysis policies were initiated as part of the push for 
“results” to ensure ongoing funding of development banks, there is more at play in the 
banks’ promotion of cost-effectiveness analysis than a straightforward search for 
legitimacy in the eyes of donors. These economic analyses are central to how 
economists at the banks understand what they can offer to global health, and what they 
enjoy in it. Cesar Ezra, for example, has worked as an economist for the World Bank 
and IDB since the 1990s. He explains:  
I would say that a good summary of what I do is that I help 
governments prioritize investments. As you know, probably, this 
applies also to the US, but as you know in developing economies 
everything is a priority, so if you talk to a water expert, health 
specialist, education specialist, private sector expert, whomever you 
bring to the table, they would be able to give you convincing arguments 
that their field is or should be the priority and therefore decision-
makers when they receive all this information it is a problem because 
when everything is a priority nothing is a priority and nothing gets 
done, so my job is to use the tools of economics to try to bring to the 
table some evidence-based information that helps you make decisions, 
so I like to think of myself as someone who can give you a good idea of 
trade-offs and opportunity costs, right, ‘if you do this, you stop doing 
that’ and from that perspective cost-benefit analysis is one tool, one 
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powerful tool that helps you provide that evidence-base (CE Interview 
2015). 
 
Cesar considers cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses a central aspect of what 
he can offer to international development as an economist. Many bank economists also 
describe the joy they take from conducting such analyses, noting the intellectual 
stimulation of trying to consider how these economic evaluations can be done better, 
especially in light of limited data. For example, how should one extrapolate data 
between countries? What should count as a benefit? However, these practitioners 
argue that project timelines and the politics of developing projects mean that economic 
analyses don’t have much space to influence project design. Two economists in IDB’s 
health division explained to me:  
PI: The government and the bank join to decide “we’re going to do a 50 
million dollar health loan in Jamaica” and most likely the government 
of Jamaica will know that they want to build two hospitals in Kingston, 
so it is going to be very hard to do an economic analysis that says “you 
shouldn’t,” or that “you should do one in Kingston and one in another 
place,” or that instead of building hospitals you should invest in 
primary healthcare. That’s very, very hard. So at the end of the day I 
think ninety plus percent of economic analysis have been to justify 
what has already been decided. 
 
DP: I would say, if we’re being so honest about it, it is more of an 
academic exercise to have some support for your argumentation and to 
fulfill our requisite rather than really influencing any decisions. 
 
PI: In that sense, as an academic exercise, we’ve been having a lot of 
fun in saying “ok, how do you think we should go about doing the 
economic analysis: which benefits do we count” for example… But I 
don’t think we can say any project has really changed because of the 
economic analysis; it’s the other way around (PI and DP Interview, 
2015). 
 
Pablo and Diana stress that although economic analysis doesn’t have much power at 
the level of planning projects, the two of them continue to enjoy the process. Diana 
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has even started an initiative to establish specific guidelines for economic analysis in 
the health sector, since she finds that IDB’s standards for economic evaluation in 
health and education remain too aligned with the standards for infrastructure and 
transport: financial benefits are more central to analyses in those sectors, she 
suggested.  
Economists at World Bank and IDB headquarters not only see economic 
analysis as a crucial aspect of what they can contribute to global health, and it is also 
something they enjoy in their work. Economic analysis forms a central aspect of how 
health economists at the World Bank and IDB envision the possibilities of global 
health; one of the key roles it plays in these institutions is in creating and reflecting 
these aspirational visions. And as the banks’ health economists often lament that 
economic analyses do not have much power to substantively shape the process of 
project design even within their own institutions, they stress the influence of party 
politics, but also the rapid cycle of projects and a lack of data and funds for economic 
analysis. A 2010 report by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
bemoaned the absence of economic analysis in project planning, and attributed this 
specifically to the rise of lending in health and associated sectors, where the report 
suggests that cost-benefit analysis is difficult. The opening lines of the report read: 
Cost-benefit analysis used to be one of the World Bank’s signature 
issues. It helped establish the World Bank’s reputation as a knowledge 
bank and served to demonstrate its commitment to measuring results 
and ensuring accountability to taxpayers. Cost-benefit analysis was the 
Bank’s answer to the results agenda long before that term became 
popular (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010: ix). 
 
The report argues that economic analysis was once central to the World Bank’s 
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identity, but that these tools have been used decreasingly over the previous several 
decades. In spite of Word Bank policies requiring economic analysis in project 
planning, the report found that the number of projects completing economic 
evaluations dropped from seventy to twenty-five percent of all World Bank projects 
between the early 1970s and the early 2000s. The report also found that during its one-
year sample period in 2008, of all the projects that cited cost-effectiveness as the 
standard for approval (versus cost-benefit analysis), not one project conducted an 
actual cost-effectiveness analysis. The report stressed that while infrastructural 
projects continue to conduct cost-benefit analyses, health projects referenced cost-
effectiveness analyses but did not actually make use of them. The report caused a 
major stir at the World Bank, and rumors flew that its author was pushed out of the 
institution as a result of revealing the “public secret” of the lack of economic 
evaluation in World Bank projects.  
 The 2010 Independent Evaluation Group report did not much examine why 
economic analyses weren’t being conducted, beyond citing the difficulty of cost-
benefit analysis in “health and the social sectors.” However, my discussion above 
emphasizes that operational staff often feel they don’t have time or money to conduct 
the analyses. One World Bank consultant stressed: 
Team leaders are given a budget for project preparation—about US$90K 
for most projects. With this budget they have to do everything—paid for 
consultants that help design the projects, travel, environmental impact, 
and the CBA among more uses of funds for project preparation. A proper 
CBA could be very expensive if primary data is needed. For this reason, 
Bank projects seldom collect primary data for the CBA. In the private 
sector due diligence of a project is between 2-3% of the project cost, for 
the current health project that would represent US$4-6 million, which as 
you can see does not compare well with US$90K. 
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Ironically, then, the tradeoffs of economic analyses (i.e. the economic benefits that 
such analyses could yield) don’t appear to hold weight across projects and their 
various stages; the benefits that could arise from implementing more cost-effective 
projects can’t get a project planning team any more money for their task. Many project 
planners feel it just isn’t worth putting a lot of money into an analysis that isn’t going 
to change which projects get financed, since project planners don’t see these economic 
analyses as crucial for the actual design and implementation of projects. From my 
observations of inter-sectoral meetings within bank headquarters and country offices, 
and my interviews with bank staff who have moved between sectors, it appears that 
health project planners see the quantification of effectiveness in this sector as elusive, 
whereas infrastructure planners generally see cost-benefit analysis as offering broadly 
faithful representations of reality that are significant for daily operational decisions.  
These implicit calculations shape the valuing of economic tools in the project 
planning stage, where project planners and the institution’s senior management have 
by-passed official policies requiring cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. 
These operational calculations are distinct from the great importance placed on 
economic analyses by the banks’ researchers, but also from the priorities of country 
office representatives negotiating loans with the Guyanese Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Health. In these spaces, different knowledges and values come to be seen 
as relevant. 
 
Conclusions 
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 Since the early 1990s, both the World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank have led major efforts advocating for the use of cost-effectiveness analysis in 
setting priorities for public health spending in poor countries. In publications and at 
conferences and workshops, development bank researchers have argued that cost-
effectiveness analyses allow both governments and development agencies to prioritize 
health spending on the interventions that will yield the greatest improvements in 
health for the least amount of money. Publications and initiatives led by the World 
Bank and IDB have played a major role in the growing centrality of cost-effectiveness 
analysis in global health literatures, from academic journals to development blogs. 
 Over the last several decades, staff and consultants at these two development 
banks have promoted the use of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses for 
guiding the design of health projects in part as a way of legitimizing the institutions’ 
health programs in the eyes of the banks’ donors, using such calculations to argue that 
the banks make good use of their funds in pursuing only the goals with the greatest 
return on investment. However, the promotion of economic analysis as a decision-
making tool is also driven by the aspirations of global health practitioners and 
especially the hopes and visions of health economists employed by the banks. In spite 
of these two banks’ repeated emphasis over the last quarter century on the use of 
economic evaluation for decision-making in global public health, my research reveals 
that even within the Word Bank and IDB, cost-effectiveness analysis does not play a 
major role in planning and implementing the institutions’ loans.  
 Ashmore et al. have emphasized that the “successful application of health 
economics depends on acceptance by, and support from, non-economists within the 
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system of health care” (Ashmore et al., 1989: 10). That is, health economists have to 
convince healthcare providers and administrators that the tools of health economics 
can actually be helpful, in order for these economic tools to be applied in practice. 
Health practitioners in Guyana, however, resisted the authority of economic analyses 
for health priority setting. But this difference between bank publications and 
operational programs does not represent a simple disjuncture between discourse and 
practice. Rather, it reflects the very different ways that expertise politics play out 
across bank networks. In Guyana, health officials took issue with the assumptions and 
conclusions of the World Bank’s economic planning software. Rather than focus 
project prioritization on such tools, the IDB Country Office in Guyana emphasized 
planning projects based on the priorities of the incumbent government, which included 
a form of patronage politics, enrolling foreign medical expertise packaged into pills 
and distributed in an effort to win votes. But my research at bank headquarters 
emphasizes that economic tools are not used any less in Guyana than in other country 
offices and operational projects. And while the patronage politics I describe are part of 
a problematic system of electoral politics that has concentrated wealth in very few 
hands in Guyana, I do not argue that the presence of these politics has necessarily 
resulted in worse programs than would result from greater reliance on economic or 
other expertise. I do not interpret these politics as a corruption of expert negotiation. 
Rather, I see the interweaving of racial and expertise politics in Guyana as an ideal 
window for examining how these forms of expertise interact more broadly. 
 Researchers at bank headquarters offer economic analysis as the answer to 
party politics, offering a technocratic vision in arguing that these tools allow them to 
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identify the projects with the greatest benefits across society – without the undue 
influence of interest groups. In reports, in blogs, and in interviews these practitioners 
often present economic analysis as the rational, scientific remedy to the irrational 
politics of international development. However, health economists working in these 
two banks also move between framing politics as a corrupting force and as the rightful 
context within which cost-effectiveness analyses must be weighed against local values 
and priorities. I have argued that these discursive moves are a significant aspect of 
how economic tools are being used in the health work of these international financial 
institutions: economic expertise operates as a tool in constructing and reflecting 
understandings of the possibilities of global health. 
  At times researchers acknowledge that democratic politics ought to be taken 
into account when considering how to weigh the results of cost-effectiveness analyses, 
but development bank staff and consultants most often envision a highly calculated 
field that contrasts markedly with the visions expressed by the banks’ operational 
employees. Staff and consultants in operations consistently highlight the importance of 
making loans work in close collaboration with borrowing governments that have their 
own politics, priorities, and approaches. These visions speak to very different 
knowledges and values at play across development bank networks, even within a 
single project. Amongst the institutions’ researchers, economic analysis holds great 
sway. But economic analysis does not hold the same preeminence in operations, where 
economists regularly lament the absence of economic evaluation, despite the banks’ 
policies requiring these analyses. In operations, party politics are front and center. This 
is not to say that “traditional Politics” have no place at development bank 
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headquarters; the strong influence of the banks’ US representatives in developing the 
institutions’ policies makes that clear. Nor is it to say that economic analysis has not 
influenced the banks’ operational priorities at a broad institutional level, shaping the 
areas of intervention that the organizations see as institutionally significant. It does, 
however, highlight a very different intertwining of expertise politics and electoral 
politics across the banks’ networks that goes beyond a straightforward power of either 
the one or the other, and it suggests the importance of examining the differential 
intertwining of these forms of politics within various spaces of global health.  
 While economic expertise has become incredibly powerful in many spaces of 
decision-making in global health and more broadly, economic tools have been 
mobilized to quite different extents and towards very different ends in different sites – 
including within the work of such centers of economic expertise as development 
banks. But while economic knowledge has not been as central to health projects as one 
might expect from the histories and discourses of development banks, the banks’ use 
of anthropological expertise has been equally surprising. In the following chapter I 
show how anthropologists—in spite of their sensitivity to dynamics of power—have 
played a key role in the continued marginalization of indigenous Guyanese through 
bank health projects. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BIOLOGIZING CULTURE, RACIALIZING INDIGENEITY: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND LEGAL EXPERTISE IN 
GUYANA’S BASIC NUTRITION PROGRAM 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that, amidst tensions surrounding the authority 
of economic calculations and government priorities, IDB’s Neglected Tropical 
Disease program has constructed its “Mass Drug Administration” as an act of national 
unity, bringing together all Guyanese to care for themselves and their fellow citizens 
by eliminating parasite reservoirs hidden within and among them. I argued that the 
incumbent People’s Progressive Party mobilized the project in direct opposition to 
claims that their party had cared only for Indo-Guyanese; the project instead promoted 
a form of patronage politics offering benefits to the entire population across racial 
groups. The NTD project operates at the national level, but it is focused on the capital 
and coastal regions, as project planners have argued that filariasis is not a problem in 
Guyana’s “interior.” However, over half of the health loans provided to Guyana by the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in the last ten years have 
focused specifically on “Amerindian health” in the Southern and central regions of the 
country that coastlanders call “the hinterland.” In this chapter I examine the 
knowledges and values underlying this focus on the health of indigenous Guyanese. 
Does such attention simply reflect high rates of poverty and health problems among 
indigenous Guyanese? Is it an enactment of a new development focus on indigeneity 
(Hodgson, 2001; Shah, 2007)? Or an example of internal colonialism (Moore, 1970; 
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Stone, 1979; Gutierrez, 2004)? And how has such disproportionate focus on 
indigenous Guyanese affected relationships of power in Guyana? 
 Building on the work of Michel Foucault, STS scholars have emphasized the 
role of scientific analyses and public health interventions in constructing populations, 
which are essential tools of governance. Jenny Reardon (2004), for example, has 
emphasized how racialized populations and forms of governance have been 
coproduced through the Human Genome Diversity Project. But while biologists have 
often argued that racial categorizations simply read social divides onto biology, such 
racial categories continue to play a central role in medical and public health research 
and practice. In this chapter I examine how development bank nutrition projects in 
Guyana have constructed indigenous health and nutrition as a problem: I investigate 
the dynamics that shaped this problematization (Foucault, 1997; Lakoff, 2008; Hodžić, 
2016), and the ways these constructions in turn shape racial dynamics in Guyana. I 
argue that this focus on indigenous health is rooted in the interaction of two legitimacy 
problems across development bank networks: the first surrounding social justice and 
focused on bank headquarters, and the second rooted in the expertise of Guyanese 
electoral politics. I highlight the ways in which anthropological and legal knowledge, 
and also expertise in the racial codes of the Guyanese state, get mobilized in 
addressing divergent legitimacy problems, and I emphasize the role of these 
knowledges in the ongoing biological racialization and marginalization of indigenous 
peoples. 
This analysis speaks to the work of STS scholars and political theorists such as 
Shobita Parthasarathy (2017) and Jacqueline Best (2014), who have emphasized how 
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international institutions respond to challenges to their legitimacy through efforts to 
reformulate their knowledge practices. Here I turn to the work of both historians of 
science and critical race theorists to conceptualize the ways in which various forms of 
expertise have been mobilized in addressing legitimacy problems through indigenous 
health programs. Critical race theorists such as Dolores Delgado Bernal (2002) have 
argued that knowledge and experience of dynamics of race in various contexts operate 
are forms of expertise that are often unrecognized. I build on this work to emphasize 
the importance of reading the expertise involved in the deployment of state racial 
politics alongside the values inherent in the mobilization of more codified forms of 
expertise such as anthropology and law. To investigate the later, I turn to the work of 
historians of science such as George Stocking (1968; 1987), Thomas Trautmann 
(1997), and Helen Tilley (2007), who have emphasized the essential role that physical, 
linguistic and cultural anthropology have played in creating racial categorizations in 
many parts of the world since anthropology’s earliest developments in the mid-
nineteenth century. The histories of anthropometry (Bates, 1997), and the treatment of 
culture as a biological phenomenon (Kevles, 1985), are front and center in the Basic 
Nutrition Program that I analyze in this chapter. In examining the mutual mobilization 
of anthropological and legal knowledge, this chapter speaks as well to the work of 
anthropologists and legal scholars Annelise Riles (2001; 2006) and Sally Engle Merry 
(2003) on the interfaces between law and anthropology. 
 In this chapter I examine the knowledges at play in the problematization of 
indigenous health in Guyana. In the first sections of the chapter I demonstrate how 
expertise in Guyanese electoral politics became influential in IDB health project 
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planning, moving IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program away from initial analyses that 
emphasized high malnutrition among the incumbent government’s main voting bloc. I 
show too how indigenous history has been a key tool of legitimacy in Guyanese 
electoral politics. I then show how international challenges to development banks’ 
treatment of indigenous peoples have led IDB and the World Bank to seek 
anthropological and legal knowledge on indigenous peoples. In the final section of the 
chapter I demonstrate how these forms of expertise operating across the banks’ 
networks have aligned in promoting a focus on Amerindian nutrition, and in 
constructing indigenous Guyanese culture as a biological risk. 
 
Selective Racialization and Guyana’s Basic Nutrition Program 
In late 2002, the Government of Guyana signed a five-million-dollar loan 
agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank in support of a large-scale 
national nutrition program. The Basic Nutrition Program (BNP), as the project was 
known, aimed to provide the central elements of a nation-wide nutrition program 
focused on women and children. Its planners argued that malnutrition was especially 
damaging for these groups, leading to life-long effects on children’s immunity and 
health, as well as a heightened risk of maternal hemorrhage—the leading cause of 
maternal death globally (IDB, 2002: 2).36  
The program aimed to address malnutrition in Guyana through national 
educational campaigns, paired with the distribution of food and micronutrient 
supplements, and the implementation of national data systems for nutrition and growth 
                                                36	Throughout	the	project,	women	and	children	were	offered	as	a	pair,	with	women	taken	as	key	caretakers	and	the	categories	of	“women”	and	“pregnant	women”	often	freely	interchanged.	
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surveillance. While both the World Bank and IDB had been involved in nutrition 
efforts in Guyana since the early 1990s, project planners emphasized that the BNP was 
the first stand-alone nutrition project financed by either bank in Guyana. Previous 
projects had created structures to distribute food supplements along with other social 
services, and had not been integrated into the Ministry of Health. The BNP, however, 
emphasized the importance of treating nutrition as a public health issue and integrating 
nutrition programs with primary healthcare and health education (IDB, 2002: 8). The 
program’s original loan proposal attributed past project failures to a lack of such 
integration, and emphasized that nutrition is an essential driver of health, “associated 
with up to 56% of all childhood mortality” (IDB, 2002: 2). 
The production of such loan proposals is an essential element of the work of 
project design: in this process the framework of project goals and methods emerges, 
and in these documents the project’s explicit and implicit logics become evident. The 
BNP loan proposal was prepared by a project team of four economists and one legal 
specialist – one from the Guyana country office and the rest based in Washington, 
D.C. Although all of the economists were “social sector specialists” who had worked 
in various areas of food policy and welfare programs, only one was a health economist 
by training. For specific area expertise in nutrition, the team enrolled several 
nutritionists as consultants during project design, and based the loan proposal closely 
on the consultants’ reports. Their final report followed the standard structure of IDB 
loan proposals, opening with a discussion of Guyana’s “macroeconomic context.” The 
team’s economists argued that liberalization and privatization had bolstered the 
country’s economy in the 1990s, but they suggested that “development has been 
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recently held back by external shocks and political problems,” including “a 66% 
government sector salary increase triggered by a major public service strike” (IDB, 
2002: 1). Here project planners’ visions of social justice begin to reveal themselves: 
living wages for government workers are framed as an impediment to economic 
growth, rather than an essential aspect of social solidarity. But even as project planners 
dismissed the needs of government workers, they demonstrated acute attention to a 
different set of justice issues that had become popular in development circles: the 
distribution of the benefits of national economic growth. Project planners stressed that 
marginalized peoples are often excluded from the gains of national economic 
expansion, and that special attention to “vulnerable populations” is thus necessary. 
In addition to this “macroeconomic context,” the loan proposal presented an 
analysis of “national nutritional context.” Amongst the principle factors shaping 
nutrition, the project team first emphasized the importance of ethnicity, which they 
argued was one of the most central factors impacting nutrition in Guyana. The 
proposal argues: 
Ethnicity appears to be a decisive factor; overall malnutrition is 
greatest among the Indo-Guyanese and least among the Amerindian 
populations, attributable to the duration of exclusive breastfeeding and 
infant feeding practices (IDB, 2002: 3). 
 
Drawing attention to ethnicity as a “decisive factor” in nutrition, the proposal 
highlighted nutritional problems especially among Indo-Guyanese; the authors 
contrasted this with the nutritional status of indigenous Guyanese, whose levels of 
overall malnutrition were the lowest in the country.  
 But in spite of this initial framing, the project did not ultimately focus on Indo-
Guyanese during its implementation. Instead the project’s implementers chose to study 
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and target Amerindians, the group with supposedly the lowest rates of overall 
malnutrition in the country. From the original 2002 Basic Nutrition Program loan, 
over the next eight years, project implementers came to worry about the ways that 
“Amerindian culture” was being translated—through nutritional practices—into bodily 
difference, including “poor mental development” among indigenous Guyanese (e.g. 
IDB, 2008). To understand this transformation and its selective racialization, I start by 
examining how the loan proposal’s initial framing of Indo-Guyanese nutrition arose. 
 
Project Planning and Indo-Guyanese Ethnicity 
In its original loan proposal, the Basic Nutrition Program drew attention to 
nutritional problems among the country’s Indo-Guyanese majority: a framing drawn 
directly from a consultant report produced during project planning. One year prior to 
completion of the BNP loan proposal, in 2001, IDB had hired a consultant to begin 
conceptualizing the central elements of a large-scale nutrition program that was to 
become the Basic Nutrition Program. IDB’s Social Protection Division had hired Dr. 
Emilio Alcaide, a Chilean nutritionist, to review the extant data and identify the key 
nutritional issues in Guyana. After a review of data quality from several World Bank, 
WHO and UNICEF studies, Dr. Alcaide concluded that “the prevalence of 
malnutrition in Guyana presents a clearly atypical distribution, which is different than 
that observed in the immense majority of countries” (emphasis in original; IDB, 2001: 
6). He stressed that in Guyana the rate of acute malnutrition was extremely high in 
relation to chronic malnutrition, and he suggested that the country’s unique ethnic 
composition might explain this. 
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In his analysis, the Dr. Alcaide made use of three measures of malnutrition: 
weight for age, weight for height, and height for age. He explained that these were the 
most up to date international standards, as opposed to the fragmented systems used in 
the Caribbean up through the 1980s – including Boston and Iowa tables from the US, 
England’s Tanner system, and the Sempé system from France. While weight for age 
reflects broad trends in malnutrition, he noted, low weight for height reflects acute 
nutritional shocks. A child may have had excellent long-term nutrition and good 
growth, but short-term lack of nourishment can lead to a low weight in relation to the 
child’s height. Height for age, alternatively, can reveal chronic malnutrition, where 
long-term lack of nutrition leads to what nutritionists call “stunting” – when a child 
does not grow to heights deemed normal for their age. To evaluate “normal” growth, 
nutritionists typically measure height against international standards, as I discuss 
further below. 
Based on his revisions of the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF data, Dr. 
Alcaide compared Guyana’s rates of malnutrition first to selected countries in central 
and South America, then to Caribbean countries, and finally to selected countries in 
Asia and Africa, each time focusing on countries with gross national product similar to 
that of Guyana. Dr. Alcaide stressed that in all these comparative cases, the rate of 
chronic malnutrition has been much higher than acute malnutrition, always at least 
two-fold, but in many of cases chronic malnutrition outweighed acute malnutrition by 
five or ten times. Most of the South American comparators had numbers similar to 
Ecuador, where acute malnutrition was measured at 2.3% of the population and 
chronic malnutrition at 26.7%. According to all three of the studies conducted in 
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Guyana over the previous ten years, the country’s rates of both chronic and acute 
malnutrition hovered around 11%. In countries with levels of acute malnutrition 
similar to this, such as Indonesia or Kenya, the levels of chronic malnutrition have 
been much higher – 42.2% in Indonesia and 33.6% in Kenya, the consultant report 
stressed (IDB, 2001: 6). 
Dr. Alcaide recognized that errors in measurement or analysis could explain 
Guyana’s unique situation, but he suggested it was unlikely that three studies would 
come up with such similar numbers erroneously. Instead, he emphasized the 
importance of ethnicity, which he argued was the strongest variable explaining 
malnutrition rates in Guyana. He noted that on all measures, Amerindian populations 
had the lowest rates of malnutrition. In addition to ethnicity, Dr. Alcaide analyzed the 
effects of sex, age, and geography – including costal/interior and rural/urban divides. 
Out of all of these demographic factors, and across all malnutrition measures, the 
strongest effect (p<0.02) was in ethnicity, where Indo-Guyanese had almost five times 
the rates of overall malnutrition compared to Amerindian populations (IDB, 2001: 11). 
In his preparatory report for the IDB, Dr. Alcaide made use of ethnic 
categorizations from a 1994 World Bank report on nutrition and poverty in Guyana. 
These categories included: Indo-Guyanese, Afro-Guyanese, Amerindian, Mixed, and 
Other (World Bank, 1994b). However, Dr. Alcaide also used the raw data set that had 
informed the 1994 World Bank report. That data set was drawn from the 1993 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey and Living Standards and Measurement 
Survey conducted by the World Bank, in conjunction with Guyana’s Statistical Bureau 
and the United Nations Development Program. The original 1993 survey reported data 
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according to slightly different categories – termed “race” (as opposed to “ethnicity”) 
and divided among: East Indian, Negro/Black, Chinese, Portuguese, Amerindian, 
Mixed, Other (HIES, 1992). This classification is much closer to the popular racial 
categorizations underlying common reference to Guyana as the “Land of Six Peoples” 
(see Chapter 1), although it omitted the distinction between “Portuguese” and 
“European” rooted in divides between Portuguese indentured servants and European 
colonists. 
However, Dr. Alcaide presented his report in Spanish, and translated “Indo-
Guyanese” from the 1994 World Bank report to “Hindu” in his own 2001 report. Indo-
Guyanese are most certainly not universally Hindu, even by family tradition. Almost a 
fifth of the Indo-Guyanese population identify as Muslim, in addition to substantial 
numbers who are Christian or do not identify with any sect (Guyana Bureau of 
Statistics, 2016). The 1993 survey from which Dr. Alcaide drew his nutritional data 
did include data on religion, in addition to race/ethnicity. But Dr. Alcaide did not 
choose to analyze the nutritional data according to religion. Here and at many other 
points in the project, it was not religious difference, so much as ethnic difference that 
was deemed relevant: first by World Bank staff reporting on the 1993 study (World 
Bank, 1994), later by Dr. Alcaide (the IDB project design consultant), and consistently 
throughout the project’s implementation. In spite of data on religion being provided 
alongside the source of his data on nutrition and race, Dr. Alcaide chose not to include 
religion in his analysis of demographic factors. This is surprising, as religious 
practices can affect people’s decisions regarding nutrition, for example through fasting 
practices and food norms.  
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The IDB loan proposal completed the following year replaced the term 
“Hindu” with “Indo-Guyanese,” but the proposal did retain Dr. Alcaide’s emphasis on 
ethnicity as a “decisive factor” to be taken into account in project planning. Dr. 
Alcaide’s framing of ethnic stratification in malnutrition, with Amerindians 
consistently having the lowest rates of malnutrition, is reflected directly in the loan 
proposal, as are several sentences taken directly from the consultant report, although it 
is not standard practice to cite such reports when using their language in loan 
documents. But Dr. Alcaide’s inattention to the ways that ethnic categories obfuscate 
patterns that are likely to affect nutrition (e.g. through religious practices), and his 
reference to Indo-Guyanese as Hindu, both reflect a limited familiarity with social 
relations in Guyana on the part of the IDB consultant. This lack of expertise is not 
consistent across IDB consultants: in the following section I demonstrate how other 
IDB consultants mobilized expertise in Guyanese social structures and state racial 
norms to reformulate the project away from its initial framings. 
 
Contextual Expertise and Justice 
As the Basic Nutrition Program loan agreement was nearing closing in 2002, 
IDB contracted another consultant to prepare the implementation of the project. Like 
Dr. Alcaide, this consultant was also a nutritionist by training, but she had deep and 
long-term connections and expertise in Guyana. Dr. Irfan ran a consulting firm based 
in the country, and she had lived in Guyana on and off since the 1970s, although she 
was born in the UK. During this period she had developed nuanced expertise in 
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Guyanese electoral politics, working closely with Rupert Roopnaraine throughout his 
political career, from Working People’s Alliance activist to long-term parliamentarian. 
While Dr. Alcaide, the Chilean consultant, had emphasized Indo-Guyanese 
nutrition as a problem area, Dr. Irfan saw Indo-Guyanese ethnicity as simply “too 
politically charged” to focus on in the Basic Nutrition Program (SI Interview, 2013). 
She remembers emphasizing this to the team at IDB headquarters after she reviewed 
Dr. Alcaide’s report and the loan proposal. By 2002 the People’s Progressive Party 
had held control of the government for ten years, and had regularly been accused of 
funneling development aid to its Indo-Guyanese base. The Guyanese government 
wouldn’t be open to orienting a health program around ethnicity so explicitly, Dr. 
Irfan argued, since it would play into existing challenges to the government’s 
legitimate representation of the entire Guyanese nation. Nor should IDB put itself in 
the position of promoting racial division, she suggested.  
Dr. Irfan didn’t see this concern for popular politics as something to tiptoe 
around: it was one of the first things she shared with me when we first spoke in the fall 
of 2013, as my research on the BNP was just beginning. At that time she was briefly 
away from Guyana consulting for a nutrition program in Zambia; she spoke to me 
from a sparse living room of a second residence she was maintaining for her ongoing 
work there. All three members of her British-Guyanese nuclear family work in 
international development, moving regularly across the former British empire, but also 
throughout Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. And while Guyana has 
been Dr. Irfan’s most central home for quite some time, she has often established such 
second residences for long-term consulting in other sites; her work regularly takes her 
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around the globe. The BNP kept Dr. Irfan in Guyana regularly after many years 
primarily abroad: a large project in her exact area of expertise, in the country where 
she had raised her son.  
As the BNP was beginning, and Dr. Irfan argued that racial politics in Guyana 
were far too sensitive to guide project planning, she argued instead that the Basic 
Nutrition Program should be targeted geographically by providing services to health 
centers in the districts deemed the poorest in a recent poverty survey (IDB, 2002b). 
During a mission of IDB team members to Guyana, Dr. Irfan noted that geographic 
targeting based on poverty maps would allow the BNP intervention to function as an 
income supplement for low-income families, and she stressed that this was a 
worthwhile goal to consider. She followed up on this point by email soon after, 
arguing that although this approach would lead to a greater number of program 
beneficiaries – and might thus be more difficult for the government to support long-
term, this focus “causes least dissatisfaction/disruption within communities, since 
whole communities covered by a health center are included” (IDB, 2002b). That is, 
rather than risk controversy within neighborhoods regarding who has access to the 
program, it would be best to include more people in the program’s coverage. 
Furthermore, geographic targeting would be administratively simple, avoiding the 
difficulties of screening for project beneficiaries: anyone receiving services at health 
centers in the poorest districts would be able to access the program. Although Dr. 
Irfan’s plan for geographic targeting presented a substantial reformulation of the 
project, the rest of the project team accepted her proposal without discussion (IDB, 
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2002b), deferring to her combined expertise in Guyanese politics and international 
nutrition. 
Dr. Irfan also expressed concern that the project planned to make use of 
imported pre-mixed foods to provide the key nutritional source for weaning infants. 
She proposed that the project instead make use of local goods and distribution 
systems, stressing that such an approach would allow the project’s resources to benefit 
local food producers rather than international companies. Throughout the project, Dr. 
Irfan’s progressive approaches have been consistently informed by leftist perspectives 
on both international and local power dynamics and justice. But in order to advocate 
for the use of local production to her colleagues at IDB, she did not use a language of 
justice. Instead, Dr. Irfan based her argumentation on administrative cost, logistical 
difficulties, and educational benefit. She argued that providing vouchers that could be 
exchanged in local shops for cereals and dried milk to make porridges would allow the 
project to avoid creating its own distribution systems, making it more administratively 
simple, and less expensive. Dr. Irfan stressed that using pre-mixed foods does not 
allow mothers to learn about providing appropriate nutrition for their children through 
food preparation, and she pointed to the success of voucher systems in the US, 
Jamaica and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, Dr. Irfan argued that the voucher system could 
be tied to required visits to health centers, which would promote broader use of health 
services. And while she argued for distributing food vouchers at post-natal counseling 
sessions, she did not root this approach in much-discussed data emerging at the time 
regarding conditional cash transfers like Mexico’s Progresa program. Rather than 
framing the provision of food vouchers through market languages of “incentivization,” 
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she stressed wealth redistribution. But again, IDB staff accepted her local expertise, 
combined with her direct references to recent international conferences and expert 
panels she had participated in; the IDB staff who initially conceived of the project 
were willing to significantly reformulate the program to base it on a food voucher 
system rather than the distribution of imported pre-mixed infant formula. 
Dr. Irfan’s resort to languages of administrative efficiency does not mean that 
other project planners and implementers were not interested in justice: local food 
production, “empowerment,” and a focus on vulnerable populations are all widely 
espoused values within IDB. However, Dr. Irfan’s success in reformulating the project 
from food distribution to a voucher system, and in stressing that the project must avoid 
future references to the Indo-Guyanese population, does provide insights into the 
dynamics of expertise and evidence at play in planning the Basic Nutrition Program. 
Dr. Irfan was able to situate herself as an international nutrition expert who also 
mobilized personal expertise in the specifics of racial and electoral politics in Guyana. 
But while Dr. Irfan dismissed a focus on Indo-Guyanese ethnicity in the project, she 
often spoke of Amerindian ethnicity as a structuring factor in project planning. For 
example, in her note about vouchers, she stressed that the system could be extended to 
“Amerindian communities” with little adjustment (IDB, 2002c). Rather than continue 
her focus on geographic targeting by using regional classifications, she used an ethnic 
classification. The conflation of geography and ethnicity is foundational to race 
relations in Guyana (Jackson, 2013), and represents a central tension in the Basic 
Nutrition Program, as I discuss below. But first, in the following section I elaborate on 
the Guyanese electoral politics shaping Dr. Irfan’s discussion of Amerindian 
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communities, examining the ways in which indigenous histories and communities 
have long been mobilized as a symbol of legitimacy in Guyanese governance. 
 
Amerindian Ethnicity and Racial Codes of the Guyanese State 
As Dr. Irfan suggested, Indo-Guyanese ethnicity holds a primary place in 
popular and scholarly representations of electoral politics in Guyana, which focus on 
ethnic divides between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese and very rarely make reference to 
indigenous Guyanese (Bartlett, 2005; Kean, 2006; Wilson, 2012; Bissessar and La 
Guerre, 2013). Shona Jackson has eloquently shown how in the post-independence 
period both Indo- and Afro-Guyanese have constructed “modern labor” of enslaved 
Africans and indentured East-Indians as the key to national belonging, from which 
indigenous Guyanese have been excluded (Jackson, 2013). But at the same time, 
Amerindian ethnicity has long been mobilized as a symbol of national unity in the face 
of racial divides, and to shore up the legitimacy of the Guyanese state against claims 
of racism, both by Indo- and Afro-Guyanese (Forte, 1996; Bulkan, 2013). Both of the 
major parties have mobilized language emphasizing that Amerindian heritage links 
modern Guyana to its pre-colonial roots, providing a way forward from plantation 
society and the ethnic divides that it generated. This framework of unity is a common 
tool in Guyanese electoral politics, promoting the idea of a legitimate government that 
represents the nation, rather than a single racial segment. 
In 1970, as the largely Afro-Guyanese People’s National Congress was being 
accused of discrimination against the Indo-Guyanese population, party officials 
announced that celebrations of Guyana’s independence would now be celebrated 
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under the name “Mashramani,” which is ostensibly an Amerindian term for festival, 
although it appears the term has had little meaning for any of Guyana’s indigenous 
groups (Danns, 2014). In recent years, several newspaper editorials have made 
reference to the idea that the word “Mashramani” was a fabrication with little 
connection to indigenous history, but these accusations have not caused much of a stir, 
as they have not challenged the central dynamic mobilized by the naming of the 
festival: “Mashramani” was marshaled more as a symbol of the idea of Guyana’s 
Amerindian roots uniting the new nation than to connect on a deep level with the 
experience of indigenous Guyanese (Taylor, 2015).  
Guyana’s independence celebrations under the name “Mashramani” were a key 
symbol of the new republic, as was the expansion of the British colonial Aerodrome 
into an airport that would represent the modern independent Guyanese nation.37 At the 
opening of the new airport expansion in 1969, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham noted 
that the name that had been chosen, Timehri International Airport, was based on the 
Amerindian rock paintings in Guyana’s interior, which he emphasized had been 
created long before British colonialism; this Amerindian heritage was essential to the 
idea that the country could be new and modern, but at the same time ancient and 
preceding European arrival in Guyana (Bulkan, 2013).38 In addition to the 
Mashramani festivities and Timehri Airport, the PNC government continued to 
promote unity through Amerindian symbolism throughout the 1970s, for example 
through the construction of the Umana Yana unity building in the capital in 1972. But 
                                                37	Large	infrastructure	projects	have	often	been	mobilized	by	post-colonial	governments	as	signs	of	the	modernity	of	the	new	state:	see,	for	example,	Prakash,	1999.	38	Navigating	this	tension	between	the	modern	and	the	traditional	has	been	a	central	dynamic	for	post-colonial	states	(Prakash,	1999;	Anderson,	2002).	
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in the 1990s, as the People’s Progressive Party government was being accused of 
discriminating against Afro-Guyanese, they too turned to indigenous histories to 
promote current unity and government legitimacy. In 1995, Cheddi Jagan officially 
established September as Amerindian Heritage Month. At the opening of the first 
Heritage Month celebration, Jagan emphasized that Amerindian history formed the 
basis of Guyana’s contemporary diversity, the wealth of the united Guyanese nation 
which he had been charged with leading (Moreno, 2009).  
These symbolic actions of naming festivals and celebrating indigenous history 
are key aspects of legitimacy in Guyanese electoral politics, a means by which each 
party emphasizes their ability to represent a unified nation beyond their racialized 
voting bloc. But even as they mobilize such indigenous symbols, Guyana’s main 
political parties have consistently worked to undermine the emergence of indigenous 
Guyanese as political actors. For example, Janette Bulkan has demonstrated that 
legislation denying government funding to third parties was specifically aimed at 
undermining indigenous political agency (Bulkan, 2014). Since 1992, the People’s 
Progressive Party government has created a series of spaces for indigenous 
engagement which have consistently channeled participation along the priorities and 
policy lines of the government, while at the same time denying these bodies any 
substantive power in Guyanese electoral politics (Bulkan, 2013). Both the PPP and the 
PNC have preferred to maintain indigenous Guyanese as symbols of unity, rather than 
political actors in their own right.  
Along with this symbolism, development projects focused on “Amerindian 
communities” have framed indigenous Guyanese as atavistic and impoverished (see 
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discussion of BNP below), emphasizing to coastlanders that they are much better off 
and more developed than their Amerindian brethren. These programs project the 
beneficence of the governing party, while also seeking votes from indigenous 
Guyanese in exchange for program resources. Over the last decade, as indigenous 
Guyanese have come to represent increasing percentages of the population (see 
chapter 1), the Guyanese government has also devoted more international 
development funding and financing for projects in this growing voting bloc (Bulkan, 
2013). But these electoral politics do not alone explain the focus on Amerindian 
nutrition within IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program. In the following section I demonstrate 
the key role of IDB indigenous specialists that have played on the racial politics I have 
been describing, and I show that popular challenges to the legitimacy of development 
banks have been essential in bringing such specialists in law and cultural anthropology 
to the institution. 
 
Justice Challenges, Indigenous Specialists, and Banks’ “Social Knowledge” 
Kathryn Bowdin was an IDB social development specialist who was assigned 
to the Basic Nutrition Program team in 2002, brought on to the project as a generalist 
in “social issues.” The BNP was coordinated through IDB’s Division of Social 
Protection and drew on their body of social development specialists, who worked on 
projects across the health and education sectors. Although Kathryn was working on 
the BNP as a generalist, she had been hired at IDB earlier that year specifically for her 
Canadian expertise on indigenous peoples. She was a lawyer from a First Nation in 
Canada, who had studied and published on aboriginal law, and had been running an 
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indigenous peoples’ organization for several years. Although IDB’s Basic Nutrition 
Program initially framed indigenous Guyanese as having the lowest rates of both 
chronic and overall malnutrition, Bowdin pushed for specific attention to Amerindians 
in the project. She was able to mobilize her own expertise and that of a cultural 
anthropologist she brought on as a consultant in arguing for specific studies and 
interventions focusing indigenous Guyanese. That focus fit smoothly into the racial 
codes of the Guyanese state, which have turned to Amerindians as objects of 
development, but not as political actors. 
But why was IDB seeking to hire a Canadian expert on indigenous peoples in 
2002? By the early 2000s, both IDB and World Bank had been subject to major 
international activism regarding the negative impacts their development projects were 
having on indigenous peoples through deforestation of indigenous lands and through 
forced relocation (Fox and Brown, 1998; Sarfaty, 2004; Rich, 2013; Goldman, 2005). 
Making use of social and environmental surveys conducted by development agencies, 
as well as independent anthropological studies, activists stressed that the banks’ 
infrastructure projects for dam and highway construction had led to the displacement 
of over a million people between the 1950s and early 1980s, and that these projects 
had led to large-scale destruction of wetland, riverine and forest habitats and 
associated flora and fauna (Scudder, 1989; World Commission on Dams, 2000).  
While critiques of development bank projects and their impacts began largely 
with international environmentalist NGOs and organizations of indigenous peoples in 
Latin America, by the early 1980s such critiques were being launched by mainstream 
political actors within the US government, especially within the US Congress. In a 
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much-publicized Congressional hearing in June of 1983, anthropologist David Price 
testified that the World Bank had “watered down” his negative assessment of the 
impacts that a proposed highway project in Brazil was likely to have on indigenous 
communities—with horrific consequences, Price argued. A Congressional inquiry was 
launched in response to Price’s testimony, which appeared to further jeopardize US 
appropriations for development banks, which that had been increasingly contested 
within Congress since the late 1970s (Charnley and Durham, 2010). The inquiry led 
the US Congress to adopt several sets of recommendations for multilateral 
development banks to improve their handling of environmental and indigenous rights 
issues, including a 1985 report making US contributions to the banks dependent on 
improved management in these areas (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
In response to such large-scale challenges, both the World Bank and IDB 
sought solutions to improve their image and legitimacy as essential arbiters of 
international development. One such response was enrolling cultural anthropologists 
and sociologists to help improve the design of development banks’ projects. In 1972 
the World Bank had commissioned two external consultants to study whether and how 
anthropology could contribute to the organization’s work (Cernea, 1996). Although 
the World Bank did not implement the consultants’ recommendation that the 
institution make extensive use of anthropological and sociological expertise in the 
design of its projects, the World Bank did create the position for a staff sociologist, 
and it hired its first employee under this title in 1974—the Romanian rural sociologist 
Michael Cernea. Over the next several decades Cernea played a major role in 
expanding credibility within development banks for what he referred to as “social 
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knowledge”—a phrase he has often used in World Bank publications to describe the 
expertise of both sociologists and anthropologists (Cernea, 1984; Cernea and 
Freidenberg, 2007). Drawing on emerging academic debates, Cernea argued in World 
Bank meetings and internal publications that development banks needed to pay more 
attention to “local social organization” when they designed projects; Cernea argued 
that this would require the expertise of sociologists and anthropologists to be valued as 
much as that of economists (Cernea, 1996). Although World Bank management 
dismissed such a vast role for qualitative knowledge as far from realistic, the 
institution’s growing focus on “poverty alleviation” yielded some space for applying 
“social knowledge,” as bank projects increasingly needed people who could identify 
and help target marginalized groups within borrowing countries (Cernea, 1982). 
Projects involving “involuntary displacement and resettlement” of indigenous 
peoples were one of the first areas where development banks sought anthropological 
expertise, both through the use of external consultants and by hiring anthropologists to 
work internally. In the late 1970s, the small group of anthropologists who had been 
hired full-time at the World Bank began to push the institution to adopt an official 
policy on resettlement; they put together extensive background papers and proposals, 
advocated with colleagues, and lobbied the Executive Board in a concerted effort for 
almost two years until an operational policy was adopted in 1980. That policy required 
any project displacing people from their homes and territories to make arrangements 
for “resettlement” (World Bank, 1982). The World Bank’s in-house anthropologists 
also pushed for a specific policy on indigenous peoples; in 1982 the World Bank 
adopted an operational policy requiring that any project on indigenous lands provide 
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safeguards to mitigate negative effects on “tribal peoples” (World Bank, 1982b), but 
this policy has been heavily criticized by activists and scholars as highly 
integrationist—pushing indigenous people to integrate more fully into mainstream 
capitalist social structures.  
In promoting policies on resettlement and indigenous peoples, anthropologists 
contributed to institutionalizing their expertise within development banks. With the 
creation of “social safeguards,” as these policies were called, the need for 
anthropological expertise in project appraisal was inscribed in World Bank policy. In 
order to guarantee that “tribal peoples” were not being harmed, projects now needed to 
conduct assessments of initial social conditions and the likely effects of proposed 
projects.  
In the 1980s, the World Bank also confronted a series of legal issues in 
implementing its new “tribal peoples policy,” especially issues relating to traditional 
land title and community property in projects involving the resettlement of indigenous 
peoples (Macedo, 1990; Shihata 1993). In addition to anthropological and sociological 
expertise, the codification of indigenous peoples policies also led the World Bank to 
enroll legal expertise on indigenous issues, both through training of existing legal staff 
and hiring of staff with legal expertise on indigenous issues (Escuerdo, 1988). In the 
early 1990s, the World Bank’s Legal Department became increasingly involved with 
indigenous issues and using legal solutions to address “problem projects,” as bank 
staff termed infrastructure projects that were generating widespread activism like the 
Polonoroeste Project in Brazil and the Sardar Sarovar Project in India (Davis, 1993).  
Subsequent operational directives made the need for legal expertise regarding 
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indigenous peoples into institutional policy. The World Bank’s 1991 operational 
directive on indigenous peoples, for example, required that projects affecting 
indigenous groups conduct an assessment of the legal status of indigenous groups in 
the borrowing country, as well as an analysis of land rights and legal recourse of 
indigenous peoples in defending their rights to natural resources (World Bank, 1991b). 
As opposed to policies for economic analysis (see Chapter 4), activists and scholars 
have closely observed the World Bank’s implementation of these policies requiring 
anthropological and legal analyses regarding indigenous peoples, and development 
banks have closely followed their own policies. 
But while the World Bank codified policies regarding indigenous peoples in 
the 1980s and 1990s, IDB didn’t adopt an official policy on indigenous peoples until 
2006. As it was developing that policy, IDB looked specifically to Canada’s 
experience with First Nations as an example, in spite of broad critiques regarding 
Canada’s own marginalization of indigenous peoples (Tang and Brown, 2008; Regan, 
2010; Neu and Therrien, 2003). But IDB’s recourse to Canadian expertise was 
supported in part through a trust fund established with the Canadian government. In 
2002 IDB put out a call for a Canadian expert on indigenous peoples, and eventually 
hired Kathryn Bowdin. Although Bowdin was involved in Guyana’s Basic Nutrition 
Program as a generalist, she played a key role in establishing the project’s focus on 
indigenous peoples. In project team meetings, she advocated for conducting research 
into how the project was affecting indigenous communities, which were eventually 
carried out by a Guyanese cultural anthropologist working in Dr. Ismail’s consulting 
firm, with funding from the BNP. As Bowdin met with staff in Guyana’s Ministry of 
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Health and at the IDB country office during site visits, she stressed the importance of 
having specific procedures in place for nutrition in indigenous communities; with the 
research that the BNP funded, these discussions eventually led to two subsequent 
World Bank loans for indigenous nutrition and an expanded focus on indigenous 
communities in the 2010 BNP expansion. Bowdin’s own background in indigenous 
studies fit well with racial codes in Guyana, and with two sets of legitimacy politics 
across the banks’ networks: the challenges regarding indigenous rights at bank 
headquarters, and those regarding representation by the Guyanese state. 
Challenges to the legitimacy of development banks have led them to hire 
specialists in indigenous studies such as Kathryn Bowdin, who have in turn pushed for 
a focus on indigenous issues in a wide range of projects, such as Guyana’s Basic 
Nutrition Program. A small percentage of IDB’s nutrition loans have developed such a 
focus, but many World Bank nutrition loans in Latin American and the Caribbean in 
recent years have focused specifically on indigenous peoples (Marini and Arias, 2016; 
World Bank, 2013). Attention to indigenous health and nutrition has arisen in Guyana 
in the interaction amongst these legitimacy politics, across the growing role of 
indigenous specialists at bank headquarters and the importance of expertise in 
Guyanese politics for project planning. But this construction of indigenous health as a 
problem has in the process constructed damaging representations of indigenous 
Guyanese as bound by traditional cultures and suffering from racially-based biological 
problems, as I discuss below. 
 
Biologizing Social Life 
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Lethem is a town of just over a thousand people, but it is the capital of the 
Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo region of Guyana, and a hub connecting Guyana’s 
southern regions with the capital city both by overland and air routes. These 
connections played a central role in making Lethem’s regional hospital one of the first 
“Amerindian Centres” to be included in the Basic Nutrition Program; while nurses 
would have to make the long trek to the capital by minibus for trainings and other 
meetings, researchers would be able to travel by air from the capital city to Lethem 
from time to time to study the project’s implementation. 
 Lethem’s hospital resembles the lower level health centers through which the 
BNP operated in the coastal regions: a small, yellow cement building where staff 
offers mostly preventative care. Although it has a theater for surgery, the hospital has 
few rotating physicians and surgeries most often have to be referred to the capital. As 
a part of its primary care efforts, prenatal counseling had been a focus of the hospital’s 
services for some time, but the BNP brought new emphasis to maternal and child 
nutrition here. A large, glossy banner hung outside of the hospital advertising free 
food coupons for young children if mothers registered for the BNP, and women often 
came into the hospital inquiring about how to be involved. In the hospital waiting 
room, four short films produced by the BNP showed on a new color TV procured 
through the program. The TV set had been delivered with much fanfare: a 
representative of the People’s Progressive Party government offered it to the hospital’s 
director in a ceremony covered at length by local news and on the BNP’s social media 
accounts. 
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By the fall of 2013, only one nurse from the Lethem hospital had attended the 
Basic Nutrition Program training in Georgetown; she held BNP pre-natal clinics on 
Tuesday mornings and infant nutrition clinics in the afternoons. She offered extensive 
prenatal care for women in the program, providing prenatal vitamin packs as well as 
in-depth counseling on personal nutrition, anemia, and preparation for breastfeeding. 
For caretakers of children between six and twenty-four months, Nurse Patterson 
provided training in weaning and complementary foods, again with a focus on anemia. 
In the early years of the program, she’d provided food coupons to these caretakers as 
well; now she had to repeatedly tell people that the food coupons aspect of the 
program had been discontinued, offering them instead micronutrient packets for young 
children. But she was sure to tell her patients that the project had been awarded a prize 
by the U.S. Treasury because of how much these micronutrients helped improve child 
health in Guyana.  
By 2013, the Basic Nutrition Program had transformed substantially from its 
beginnings six years prior, both in its methods and its focus. In the initial phases of 
Guyana’s Basic Nutrition Program, planners and implementers often spoke of 
geographical factors that affect nutrition. In presentations for planning meetings and in 
the projects’ original planning documents, project staff emphasized that poor road 
access makes it difficult to transport fruits and vegetables to the country’s Southern 
regions from the coastal areas where they are farmed, thus presenting nutritional 
challenges in Guyana’s interior regions from the lack of fresh foods. But throughout 
the project, implementers increasingly linked geography with Amerindian ethnicity, 
stressing the predominance of Amerindians in the “hinterland.” By the end of the 
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project, implementers had begun to speak of the nutritional effects of Amerindian 
ethnicity beyond geography. 
For example, a project report submitted by the project’s chief nutritional 
consultant to IDB in fall 2008 compares several health indicators amongst Amerindian 
and non-Amerindian children living in the same communities in the interior. By 
comparing across groups within the same location, the report attempts to isolate the 
effects of ethnicity. Based on this analysis, the nutritionist drew attention to 
substantially higher levels of stunting (low height for age) among Amerindian children 
as compared to non-Amerindian children in the same communities. She provided the 
following table to support her comparison of Amerindian children against “other 
children”, citing 30.9 percent of Amerindian children as severely stunted against 12.1 
percent of “other children” in the same communities. 
 
While highlighting high rates of stunting among indigenous Guyanese, the report 
stresses that the “consequences of stunting include poor mental development and poor 
school achievement” (Ismail, 2008: 11). This “poor mental development” became a 
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central theme in the project, a key message for nutrition counseling and a key indicator 
used to measure the success of the project’s communication efforts. Progress reports 
from the project consistently offer data on the percentage of mothers that understand 
poor mental development as a consequence of malnutrition, and how that has 
improved (or often not) through the program. 
The 2008 project report attributes stunting to “Amerindian cultural norms” 
which supposedly lead women to breastfeed for longer than the WHO-recommended 
six-month period, and introduce solid foods later than international standards. The 
report notes that there had not been an improvement in stunting in spite of the 
program’s nutrition counseling, food coupons and micronutrient supplement 
interventions. The report’s author attributes the lack of improvement in indigenous 
nutrition to both cultural and economic factors. She argues: 
Behaviour change and the translation of knowledge into good practice 
is challenging, especially when both culture and economic or physical 
access to the full range of nutritious foods are constraining factors, as 
they are in Amerindian communities (Ismail, 2008: 4). 
 
The report places Amerindian culture on the same plane as “economic and physical 
access” to nutritious foods in “constraining” Amerindian nutrition. In doing so, the 
report, and project interventions focusing on Amerindian culture, undermine the 
gravity of economic exploitation in shaping opportunity in Guyana. And beyond the 
homogenizing representation of a singular Amerindian culture, the focus on culture 
represents indigenous ways of life as malignant. Women are represented as the 
guardians of this culture, passing knowledge about breastfeeding between generations 
in female spaces of the home. Another BNP study by a Guyanese cultural 
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anthropologist argued, for example, with regards to breastfeeding guidelines, “key 
informants pointed particularly to the negative influence of other household members, 
especially senior women” (Ismail and Roopnaraine, 2008: 45). This contrasts with the 
focus on the role of fathers in 
breastfeeding promoted in the 
project’s publicity materials and 
campaigns in the capital region, 
like the poster included here. 
While most BNP trainings for 
nurses and counseling sessions 
for project participants 
emphasized the role of mothers as 
the essential guardians of child 
nutrition, this poster promoted the 
possible role of fathers even in 
providing breastmilk. But this message didn’t much transfer to project sites in the 
interior, where trainings were much more focused on communication among women.  
This focus on culture as an explanatory factor diverges markedly from the 
project’s efforts to avoid representations of race-based genetic difference. In the 
decades after World War II, biologists worldwide denounced such biological concepts 
of race, arguing that these interpretations not only opened space for biological 
discrimination, but imposed social categories onto biology (Stepan, 1985). In avoiding 
such constructions, several BNP reports emphasize that the problem with stunting is 
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not genetics. Dr. Irfan’s 2008 report argued, for example: “what is important with 
stunting is not the fact of being short, but rather the failure to achieve one’s full 
growth potential, and why this failure has occurred” (Ismail, 2008: 12). Dr. Irfan 
stressed that the problem is not genetics, but environmental factors that inhibit growth: 
“the fact of being short” is not a problem if that is your genetic “growth potential.” Dr. 
Irfan calculated stunting rates by comparing children’s heights against “international 
reference standards obtained from healthy well-nourished populations” (Ismail, 2008: 
11), in this case WHO’s 2006 reference standards. These standards were developed 
based on a sample of approximately 900 children living in circumstances with “no 
environmental restrictions on growth”, drawn from Brazil, Norway, the United States, 
Ghana, India and Oman (Ziegler and Nelson, 2012: 301). The IDB report stresses that 
such height comparisons can be made across countries because of the effects of 
nutrition beyond genetics. It notes that “ethnic groups, such as Indian, Chinese and 
Japanese, traditionally considered to be of short stature, are now achieving heights 
comparable to those found in European and North American populations,” especially 
when they “migrate to the States or Europe” (Ismail, 2008: 11). Here the report argues 
that environmental factors are more significant than genetic ones in shaping height and 
stunting. 
But while the report avoids a genetic view of racial difference, the project 
adopted a cultural view of racially-based bodily difference, offering “Amerindian 
culture” as the cause of racial differences in height for age. Those same cultural 
factors were then also held responsible for “poor mental development,” and 
“Amerindian culture” came to be a risk factor imperiling the possibilities for health. 
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But the report makes no reference to the BNP’s original framing of Amerindians as 
having the lowest levels of malnutrition in the country, or the five studies used to 
generate that analysis. Nor did it reference the findings of the consultancy report 
produced the year before by the Guyanese cultural anthropologist, which stressed that 
Amerindian culture had positive impacts on nutrition, as there weren’t taboos or 
fasting practices that would negatively impact child nutrition (Ismail and Roopnaraine, 
2007). 
Although some BNP reports recognize the many different cultures among 
indigenous Guyanese, both in the capital region and throughout the rest of the country, 
project planners and implementers most often referenced “Amerindian culture” as a 
monolithic impediment to health. This was the case at a BNP training for nurses held 
at the Regency Suites in the capital in the fall of 2013. Nurses had been bused in from 
across the country, including a fifteen-hour minibus ride for several nurses from the 
Southernmost regions. At the training, there was a special afternoon session devoted to 
“The BNP in Amerindian Centres.” An instructor from the nursing school argued that 
“Amerindians have a very strong culture” and that it was important for nurses working 
in “the hinterland” to understand why Amerindian breastfeeding practices were a 
problem. Whereas many Guyanese don’t breastfeed for long enough, she suggested, in 
Amerindian communities the problem was the opposite: breastfeeding alone beyond 
six months after a baby’s birth would not meet a child’s nutritional needs; it was 
essential to introduce complementary foods.  
While indigenous activists in Guyana have often pointed out the very different 
ways of life amongst indigenous Guyanese, for example among Warau living in 
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Guyana’s Northwest and Macushi living in the country’s South, the idea of a singular 
“Amerindian culture” has become so normalized in Guyanese development discourses 
that this framing didn’t seem surprising even to Lea, a Macushi nurse attending the 
2013 training. Lea and several other indigenous nurses were in the difficult position of 
representing the “modernity” of health programs planned in the country’s capital 
against Guyana’s “problematic Amerindian culture,” and finding a space for 
themselves between.39 In the year leading up to the 2015 general election, the BNP’s 
emphasis on its offerings of modernity felt especially acute, as project administrators 
drew attention to the technology the project was bringing to rural communities, 
posting photos on social media of government representatives offering laptops to 
indigenous leaders in front of BNP banners. However, indigenous nurses were among 
the strongest proponents of special attention to Amerindian communities, which 
brought resources to their clinics even as they furthered images of “backwards” 
indigenous practices. 
The framework of a malignant Amerindian culture has formed the basis of 
several subsequent IDB and World Bank loans, which advance representations of 
“Amerindian culture” as presenting a biological risk to intelligence and health. Even 
as a focus on indigenous Guyanese could be a progressive act of social justice through 
attention to the unique histories of Amerindian oppression, these projects instead 
construct indigenous Guyanese as unmodern, they build a biological basis for 
discrimination, and they rob indigenous Guyanese of personal agency. And while 
indigenous Guyanese have not publically countered the Basic Nutrition Program’s 
                                                39	Saida	Hodzic	has	analyzed	a	similar	dynamic	at	play	in	campaigns	against	female	genital	cutting	in	Ghana	(Hodzic,	2016).	
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representations, the maintenance of forms of life – to the frustration of BNP planners – 
is certainly a form of resistance.40 
 
Conclusions 
Amongst the often-cited “tapestry of races” in Guyana (Guyana Chronicle, 
2013; Stabroek News, 2016b), development banks and the Guyanese government have 
singled out indigenous Guyanese alone as appropriate subjects of health interventions 
based on race. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, project designers have argued 
that Afro- and Indo-Guyanese ethnicity are simply “too political” to form an explicit 
variable in project planning, but project staff have repeatedly turned to indigeneity as a 
key program framework. The banks’ projects selectively racialize indigenous 
Guyanese, representing Amerindians as subject to a single, fixed culture that manifests 
as racialized biological difference. Attention to the specific histories of oppression of 
indigenous Guyanese, not only by colonial powers but also by Guyanese elites 
(Jackson, 2013), is certainly essential to promoting more just distributions of wealth 
and opportunity today. But even as development bank projects aim to address such 
relationships of wealth and power, they have been rooted in, and have promoted, 
negative visions of indigenous Guyanese as diseased and culture-bound—
representations that are choices rather than simple reflections of reality. 
While other development agencies have also implemented projects targeting 
indigenous Guyanese, the legitimacy problems shaping development bank projects 
have been especially acute because of the large-scale popular mobilizations and 
                                                40	Such	resistance	is	a	“weapon	of	the	weak,”	in	James	Scott’s	terminology	(Scott,	1985).	
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activism that have targeted the banks’ treatment of indigenous peoples. In this chapter 
I have focused on IDB’s Basic Nutrition Program as a key site in the construction of 
Amerindian nutrition as a “problem area” in Guyana. The dynamics that I have 
described have solidified into a much broader focus on Amerindian nutrition in both 
World Bank and IDB programs in Guyana, which has major impacts on public 
representations of indigenous Guyanese. These programs continue to stress the 
obduracy of Amerindian culture, framing it as an impediment to good health and 
mental development. In these programs the banks’ indigenous specialists have 
continued to push for a focus on Amerindian nutrition, which has knit smoothly into 
national racial and electoral politics in Guyana. 
Two legitimacy problems converge to produce this selective racialization of 
Amerindians. In the first, development banks have mobilized indigenous specialists in 
response to activist challenges, marshaling anthropological and legal expertise as key 
forms of knowledge for creating just and effective programs. In the second, the 
Guyanese state has turned to Amerindians to demonstrate its ability to represent the 
full range of its citizens, and expertise in Guyanese electoral politics has become a key 
to designing development projects. But in their convergence on Amerindian nutrition, 
these politics have led to representations of Amerindian ethnicity as shaping biology, 
through culture, in ways that endanger health and mental development. These projects 
construct Amerindian ethnicity as uniquely relevant to health, portraying Amerindians 
as both biologically inferior, and exterior to the nation. I have shown here that this 
representation was far from foregone, constructed through a series of assumptions and 
choices that draw attention to Amerindians as opposed to other demographic 
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groupings, that construct stunting as a major problem as opposed to nutritional 
characteristics among other populations, and allow race to overshadow geography and 
economics. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH UNDER LATE NEOLIBERALISM: PUBLIC 
RELATIONS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
In this dissertation I have analyzed the relationships of power that underlie and 
result from public health efforts of the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, especially in Guyana. In this conclusion, I briefly discuss the 
main arguments of the dissertation, before reviewing the implications of these 
arguments. This dissertation has highlighted how, in attempting to reform their own 
practices of marginalization (displacement of indigenous peoples, further 
impoverishment of the poor, etc.), development banks have continued to inscribe state 
racial codes in the bodies of Guyanese citizens through the institutions’ health 
programs. I have highlighted the intellectual and economic continuities shaping these 
histories (Chapter 3), but I have also emphasized the institutions’ surprising departures 
from their past reputations and their own self-representations. While development 
banks have struggled to reform themselves, the practice of their health programs 
differs substantially from how the institutions have been imagined both by scholars 
and development practitioners. I have argued that even as economic knowledge has 
been minimalized in development banks’ operational practice (Chapter 4), 
anthropological and legal knowledges have played a central role in shaping health 
programs (Chapter 5). While development banks are known for their economic 
rationalities, it is through the work of anthropologists – brought to development banks 
for their “cultural sensitivity” – that many of the banks’ disenfranchising effects have 
operated in health projects in Guyana. My argument here is not that development 
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banks have simply enrolled anthropological and legal knowledges towards the banks’ 
own ends; I emphasize the active role that anthropologists and legal specialists have 
played in shaping development banks’ contemporary practices of marginalization, 
even as these specialists have become entangled with the banks’ institutional histories. 
And while I emphasize that development banks have mobilized health programs in an 
attempt to remake the institutions’ neoliberal reputations, I also highlight the 
marginalizing effects that bank projects have had even when the institutions have 
sought to substantively alter their practices rather than simply undertaking reputational 
repair work. In the process, development bank health projects in Guyana have 
constructed “indigenous culture” as homogenous and malignant, even when these 
representations counter the banks’ own nutritional statistics.  
I have emphasized that the banks’ ongoing projects in Guyana have not served 
primarily as a means of neoliberal privatization and individualization, in spite of the 
World Bank and IDB’s long-time promotion of market mechanisms as the solution to 
development problems. For example, even as the IDB Neglected Tropical Disease 
loan mobilizes drug donations from large pharmaceutical companies, it does not 
construct corporate power as the primary route to better health. The project focuses on 
a combination of environmental and medical preventative measures (Chapter 4). The 
project’s donations of albendazole are not set up to create infrastructures that then 
make it difficult for Guyana not to purchase the drug when donations come to an end: 
the albendazole donation covers drug administration until lymphatic filariasis is 
eradicated globally. Rather than a route to selling more of this specific drug, the 
donation is a part of efforts towards “corporate social responsibility” that are rooted in 
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improving the company’s image, and thus its sales, not so much in Guyana as 
globally. But even more than positive PR for pharmaceutical companies, the NTD 
project aims to create positive public relations for development banks themselves: it is 
part of efforts to remake the image of development banks away from the neoliberal 
exploitation for which they have been so widely criticized. 
In the early 2000s, development banks’ nutrition programs in Guyana began as 
a limited form of wealth distribution through food vouchers (Chapter 5), although that 
element was eliminated with the expansion of the Basic Nutrition Program in 2010. I 
have argued throughout this dissertation that health justice relies on greater wealth 
redistribution, both through health programs and through broader development policy 
– which should include trade and intellectual property regimes (see Chapter 4). 
However, IDB and the Government of Guyana agreed that in order for the government 
to “take ownership” of the BNP project and support nutritional efforts with minimal 
bank loans, the food vouchers would need to be eliminated – they were understood as 
pushing the project over its possible budget, in spite of their benefits. The resulting 
national project, supported by a new IDB loan, provided only micronutrient 
supplements, along with a substantial amount of surveillance and operational research. 
The data that results from such efforts play a significant role in the banks’ position in 
global health and international development. Development banks have branded 
themselves as “knowledge banks,” and their control of extensive data sets allows them 
to be a reference point in framing the vast majority of development analyses 
(Goldman, 2005). The banks conduct substantial research through their own operating 
budgets and through “technical collaborations,” which development banks provide in 
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the form of grants, usually creating data that forms the basis for further loans. But the 
data created through loan operations is also central to the banks’ positioning as centers 
of knowledge, and bank management has consistently pushed operational divisions to 
collect more data through their projects (World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2012; IDB, 
2015b). As low- and middle-income countries can increasingly borrow on commercial 
markets, both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank emphasize 
their knowledge resources as their “comparative advantage” (World Bank, 2012; IDB, 
2013). This knowledge-base is subsidized by borrowing countries, who repay the costs 
of research financed through loans, plus interest. 
Quantitative data on reductions in anemia produced through the Basic 
Nutrition Program’s research and surveillance efforts in Guyana allowed the program 
to receive international attention, especially through a prestigious “Development 
Impact” award from the US Treasury. Although data generation is highly significant 
within both the World Bank and IDB, not all loan projects place the same emphasis on 
data collection: project teams determine the allocation of resources, and some team 
leaders prefer to use project funds on other operational elements, such as medical 
supplies or training. However, research can be a key means of recognition and 
personal advancement within development banks. Staff and consultants at both the 
World Bank and IDB use an entrepreneurial model in explaining relationships within 
the institutions: they describe how people must promote and sell their various services 
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(research design and evaluation, anthropological knowledge, etc.) to other divisions 
within the banks in order to be deemed worthwhile.41 
This differential approach to quantitative data across bank projects points to a 
key insight of this study: the patchiness of late neoliberal management. While scholars 
such as Vincanne Adams (2013) and Manjari Mahajan (2015) have pointed to global 
health’s neoliberal practices of quantification, tied up in the search for scientific 
management tools drawn from business and the private sector, the use of these tools 
continue to be patchy even in the supposed heart of neoliberal practice – international 
financial institutions. While I set out to study neoliberal practices and knowledges in 
global health, it was not in rationalized, privatized, or self- management that I found 
these logics. Instead, late neoliberalism emerged as an explicit quest by financial 
institutions to remake their neoliberal reputations. The valorization of private 
management here exists alongside its public denouncement by development bank 
senior leadership, and health projects become a site to reform the bank’s image. 
These tensions are an essential aspect of development banks’ global health 
work. In this dissertation, I have drawn attention to the differing standards of values 
and knowledge at play in various spaces of the banks’ work: from operational health 
divisions to research collaborations or negotiations between country office staff and 
government representatives. In Chapter 4 I emphasized that while researchers at the 
banks’ headquarters place great value on cost-effectiveness analyses, these economic 
calculations haven’t held the same sway in the operational negotiation of projects. And 
while researchers have recognized the importance of local priorities expressed through 
                                                41	David	Mosse	has	picked	up	on	this	language,	describing	the	ways	that	anthropologists	have	made	their	expertise	“salable”	within	the	World	Bank	(Mosse,	2005).	
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democratically-elected governments, electoral politics have been much more 
consistently valued in operational practice. In Chapter 5 I showed how increased 
attention to anthropological expertise within bank headquarters has aligned with 
legitimacy politics of the Guyanese state to promote projects focused on indigenous 
Guyanese. But I highlighted how the resulting projects have constructed indigenous 
peoples as bound by a “culture” that translates into biological risk and difference. And 
in Chapter 3 I argued that the values of efficiency and individual responsibility have 
held great value across spaces within the banks and the Guyanese government through 
time, mobilized in different versions as part of very different discursive packages. 
 The differential entanglement of knowledge and popular politics across 
development banks’ networks helps explain tensions between the institutions’ 
operational practices and their self-representations; these representations are produced 
largely through research and policy at bank headquarters. But while development 
banks have long sought to reform the practices of borrowing governments, I have 
highlighted how these financial institutions’ efforts towards self-reform have 
continued to enact institutional histories of marginalization. I have emphasized how, in 
responding to critiques of their coercive practices, development banks have turned to 
discourses of “country ownership” and “participation;” however, the importance of 
such democratic priorities in bank operations has run up against the prescriptions of 
research divisions for using economic expertise to define project priorities. In the 
process, bank projects have come to promote a form of patronage politics under the 
guise of democratic priorities, and their neglected tropical disease programs in Guyana 
have sought to bridge Afro- and Indo-Guyanese in a form of national unity through 
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medicine. At the same time, development banks have enrolled legal and 
anthropological knowledge in responding to critiques of the banks’ treatment of 
indigenous peoples, continuing to marginalize indigenous peoples by singling them 
out as uniquely “racial citizens” whose ethnicity is uniquely dangerous to their health. 
Considering how knowledge and values are entangled differently across 
networks of the banks’ work helps understand the power dynamics that contribute to 
and result from the banks’ health projects. The banks’ health projects not only affect 
the health of millions of people around the world, they reflect and reproduce the very 
relationships that govern broad aspects of human life: between wealthy and poor 
countries, wealthy and poor people, national governments and private industry, elected 
officials and technocrats, as well as the daily relationships among healthcare workers, 
patients, volunteers, and government representatives in Guyana. In the dissertation’s 
Introduction, I described the larger system of extraction within which the projects that 
I study operate. I emphasized that global health programs allow for broader forms of 
exploitation, in which wealth continues to travel on balance from the global South to 
the global North. While I expected my research to reveal the daily exploitative 
practices that make up this larger system of oppression, instead my work pointed to 
gaps in the system – the ways in which financial institutions work to maintain their 
centrality by responding to academic and popular criticism. These are projects where 
activist efforts have had a real impact, pushing development banks to avoid privatizing 
and individualizing practices. Understanding these dynamics points to sites of 
disenfranchisement, such as the ongoing marginalization of indigenous peoples as they 
are singled out for development, but it should also give hope for the possibilities of 
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expanding social justice; activist efforts and critiques of development banks have 
fundamentally shaped the relationships of legitimacy at play in some of the world’s 
most powerful institutions, encouraging activists and scholars alike to imagine routes 
to other stories and other worlds. 
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